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1. statement of the Problem 
This dissertation is an investigation of the isolation, defi-
nition, and evaluation of nonrational components in reality and 
philosophical methodology as seen b.1 three cont~pcrar,r philosophers. 
In order to achieve this purpose, it will be necessar,r to define the 
fnnction and the product of reason, to distinguish the relations of 
reason to the nonrational in both, then to investigate the philoso-
phies of Arthur 0. Lovejoy, William P. Montague, and Radoslav A. 
Tsanoff, as representative contemporar.y American philosophers in 
terms of their relative use and recognition of rationalistic and 
nonrationalistic factors in reason. 
2. The Problem in the Contemporary Mood. 
Philosopey, through the centuries, has been characteristically 
·a quest to understand experience and its brute facts in reasonable 
terms. Also, characteristically, philosoplzy" has been optimistic of 
rendering successfully the generality of things in systematic form 
1vhich evaluates the significance of "facts" and thereb,y instructs the 
student in the way of wisdom. 
Some philosophers and schools of philosoplzy" have asserted that 
the _ systematic acconnt of the totality of things was impossible. 
1 
Sophist, skeptic, and irrationalist have furnished the exceptions to 
the rules. · 
a. The Challenge of Psychology 
Modern psychology has perhaps raised one of the most serious doubts 
regarding the reliability of the human intelligence's interpretation of 
the universe. In the place of the oldeh classes of conspicuous motives 
which ranged from truth and justice down to narrow prejudices, modern 
psychiatry would have one believe that most mental operations are dis-
sembling rationalizations of lustful drives for power, prestige, or 
sexual expression. E. G. Spaulding refers to this point when he re-
marks, 11The present tendency in psychology is to regard all reason as 
contaminated with preferences, biases, predispositions, and desires, 
either inherited or acquired. Reasoning is thus regarded as ration-
alization, and not as ratiocination. nl If reason is but the tool of 
drives such as these, "What possibility is there of a fair report of 
things as they are? Surprising~ enough, those who contend for these 
versions of the qynamics of personality do not seem to appreciate the 
double-edged sword which they are swinging; if they are correct, they 
reduce their mm theories to the same status! 
b. The Challenge of Critical Philosophy 
Modern philosoplzy", too, has contributed to the doubt that gnaws 
1. Spaulding, WAI, 96. (A key to abbreviations is found in the bib-
liography. ) 
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at an opt:imistic confidence in reason. Fre-Kantian metaphysics specu-
, 
lated on the nature of reality on the assmnption that rationality re-
fleeted the structure of being. Kant 1s critical methodology proposed that 
the mind prescribes its form to that reality and that the reality "in 
3 
itself" is beyond the reach of reason. From the revolution which this point of 
view precipitated in modern philosophy has burgeoned the pre-eminent pro-
blem of contemporary philosophy: the problem of the ego-centric pre-
dicament which is the result of beginning philosophy with epistemology. 
The problem begins in remarking that knowledge cannot be valid beyond the 
method used in obtaining it; to evaluate the method is to appeal to it; so, 
the problem lands in an endless circle. 
This confusion in modern philosophy has not been satisfactorily 
relieved. Its essential troublesomeness lies in the consequent inability 
to escape the fragmentation of experience between individuAls. 
This mention of the problem which is rooted in critical philosophy 
must suffice here; it is dealt with more fully in a discussion on Kant 
. c 2 in a later hapter. 
c • The Challenge of the Problem of Evil 
In the third place, the problem of evil has thrown real questions 
into focus regarding the value-reasonableness of the universe. From 
earliest .recorded time men have questioned their own ability and that 
of their kin:i to understand the value-cosmos in which they played their 
2. Chapter III, Section 4. · 
roles and have questioned whether the cosmos was indifferent to or even 
antagonistic to their deepest desires. Abraham says in early Scripture, 
11vJilt Thou also destroy the righteous with the vricked? ••• Shall not the 
Judge of all the earth do right? 11 3 
Philo, in one of Hume 1s dialogues, says: 
Besides, consider Demea; this very society, by vlhich we 
surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies; what 
new enemies does it not raise to us? What woe and misery 
does it not occasion? Han is the greatest enemy of man. 
Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, 
sedition, war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they 
mutually torment each other; and they would soon dissolve 
that society \<rhich they had formed, were it not for the 
dread of still greater ills, which must . attend their 
separation. 4 
John Stuart Mill stated the case ~gainst nature with unforgettable 
clarity in the Three Essays on Religion: 
In sober truth, nearly all things which men are hanged 
or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature 1s 
every day performances. Killing, the most criminal act 
recognized by human laws, Nature does once to every being 
that lives; and in a large proportion of cases, after 
protracted tortures such as only t4e greatest monsters 
whom ~ read of ever purposely inflicted on their living 
fellow-creatures. If by an arbitrary reservation, \<Ie 
refuse to account anything murder but what abridges a 
certain term supposed to be allotted to human life, 
nature does this to all but a small proportion of lives, 
and does it in all the modes, violent or insidious, in 
which the worst human beings take the lives of one an-
other. Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the 
wheel, casts them to be devoured by 1-vild beasts, burns 
them to death, crushes them with stones like the first 
Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes 
them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom 
of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous 
deaths in reserve , such as the ingenious cruelty of a 
Nabis or a Domitian rover surpassed. 5 
3. Genesis, 18:23-25. 
4. Hume, THN, Ft . X. 
5. Mill, TER, 28-30. 
4 
Among more recent philosophers~ too, the problem of evil bulks 
large in the problems for thought. Barth contends that goodness is 
supreme even if it is incomprehensible to man! 6 Even those who do 
not surrender in this way may say, as Brightman does, that 11 the evils 
of life, dysteleological facts , are the most serious obstacles to 
faith in God. is7 
The problem of the evil which men do to each other and to which 
they are subject in this world is particularly vi vid at the present 
time when the most frightful war in human history is still fresh in 
memory and a spirit of divisiveness threatens to plunge us once 
again into that holocaust . 
d . The Challenge of Science 
The experimentally- minded scientist has gained ~or his experi-
mentation freedom from creed and arbitrary judgments of authority and 
of tradition which would oppose or pre-empt that experimentation. 
The various systems of thought as they were brought to bear on obser-
vable phenomena were shown to be so riddled by error as to make it more 
useful to discard them all rather than to maintain a semblance of a 
system through the process of the experimenting. ~evertheless, any 
evidence, when viewed by reason, is an inducement to systematization; 
so, in the continuing efforts of the scientist, based on the premise 
of an absolute lack of determinacy of system in the stuff with which 
he was dealing- -in this milieu it \'las rather nat ural for the ·theory to 
6. Barth, mm. 
7. Brightman, ITF, 332. 
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develop that human interpretation of the phenomena of the natural world 
is totally unlike the real nature of the phenomena themselves . Man's 
description is irrelevant and incidental; the real thing is untouched 
and unlike our talk about it . 
Applied science particularly has brought so many wonders into 
common acquaintanc.e in contemporary society that it is small wonder 
that science is the great authority in the popular mind . In its flood 
of achievement , however, many intemperate, unjustified, and contradictory 
things have been said in the name of science . Careful reflection and 
coherent systematizing have not been the pattern. 
e. The Challenge of Existentialism 
From t\-ro quite different quarters comes a fifth challenge to 
traditional thought. The challenge of existentialism eomes in academic 
philosophy through Heidegger to Sartre; in theology through Barth and 
Brunner. The "spiritual ancestor" of both is Kierkegaard . 8 
Professor DeWolf's treatment of the Christian existentialists is 
discussed in detail later in this chapter. But, of the root of existen-
tialism, Barrett says: 
The Underground Man ••• proclaims his own existence a surd 
that cannot be resolved without remainder into any purely 
logical structure, and it is this that Kierkegaard brings 
to explicit philosophical expression. 9 
Barrett labels this existentialism 'The Search for the Concrete •.lO 
8. Barrett, WIE, 7. 
9 . Ibid., 2.3 . 
10. Ibid . , 12. Cf. Hegel and 
\'Jhitehead. 
6 
This concrete is understood in general from the fact of human being, 11 
particularly human existence in 11the fallen form of everyday existence 11 • 12 
Heidegger characterizes the 11 fallen11 state as one of anxiety. 
Existentialism may be the philosophical counterpart of that clini-
cal psychology which seeks to understand the normal from the study of 
the abnormal. But, existentialism makes the fallen state the normall 
Dwelling upon the data of the anxieties, the complexes and the fears 
of experience, existentialism readily becomes a rationalization for 
expression of the perverted forms of life.l3 
To sum up, existentialism challenges the abstractness of philosophy 
to a new concreteness. This concreteness characteristically (both 
theisti~ and atheistic) issues in irrational paradox and fragmentism 
while placing especial significance on the traumatic experiences of 
depravity and of death within the general framework of experience as 
such. An existentialist can alv1ays be detected by the impact on the 
theoretical distinctions he makes, especially such distinctions as: 
the priority of existence over essence, the priority of life over thought, 
the priority of feeling over conceptualizing.14 
Existentialism develops a challenge to substitute an irrational 
faith or an irrational activism for rationality in thought and conduct. 
It shares in a conunon concern in philosophy to avoid the abstract. 
Can the latter be preserved and the former. modified? This, in essence, 
is the task of philosophy in dealing with existentialism. 
11. Barrett, vliE , 25. 
12. Ibid., 29. 
lJ. Cf. Barrett., WIE, 62, and DeWolf, RRR, 71. 
14. Harper, EXI, 35. 
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f. Restatement 
In the face of these conflicts, whither philosophy? Has it a 
contribution to make to the understanding of these confusing data 
and concepts? Must it abdicate in favor of chaos or some kind of 
psychiatry which will offer 11 adjustment 11 ? 
There is a great deal of confusion in philosophy today:. In this 
confusion the methods of philosophical inquiry have not always been 
sharpened; indeed, they have often been dulled beyond recognition. 
The anomaly of philosophical name-calling has not contributed to 
mutually constructive understanding either. 
In view of these factors, the at tempt needs to be made and in 
widely separated fields of philosophy to sharpen the definition of 
the applicability of the fualamentals of the great methodologies a.rrl 
systems . Reason has been the instrument of philosophy. During most 
of the history of philosophy reas~n has been conceived in a restricted 
sense, a sense which we imply in .the term ratiorialistic . Under the 
five-fold pressure of psychology, · critical philosophy, the experience 
of evil, science, and existentialism, reason has come to be conceived 
more broadly in modern thought . This broadened conception has admit-
ted components to the methodology and to the systems of reasonableness 
which are nonrationalistic in character. This dissertation will attempt 
to sketch the territories of rationalistic and nonrationalistic compon-
ents in reasonable philosophy and to exemplify and document the defini-
. tions in the works of Lovejoy, Montague, and Tsanoff. 
8 
3. Significance of the Problem 
Rationalism has usually been popularly identified with the ability 
· of the human reason to order its own experiences and to solve its own 
problems. If rationalism is being widely supplemented or supplanted 
in philosophy, is that an acknowledgement that the human reason is to 
be judged incapable of directing its O\m destiny or that the new 
methods are 11 unreasonable 11 ? Regardless of that outcome, the nonrational 
components of the new philosophy should be drawn together and described, 
criticized, and tested to examine whether or not there is in them a new 
and more adequate systematizing agency. This is the problem in its 
simplest terms. 
4. Delimitation of the Problem 
It is impossible, however, that the present project should encom-
pass so much territory. The particular emphasis of this study, then, 
can be explained in this way: There are a number of vigorous, system-
atic schools of philosophical thought in our day in which this investi-
gation cocld be made and must be made in order to gain a coherent insight 
into the true features of the problem. The philosophers chosen for this 
study were selected as representatives of broad groups of contemporary 
American thinkers. Metaphysically they range from theistic-idealist 
(Tsanoff) to theistic-materialist (Montague) and to temporalistic-
materialist (Lovejoy). Epistemologically, Montague represents the move-
ment into and then away from Neo-Realism; Lovejoy is an exponent of 
critical realism. The three together appeared to offer promise of fruit-
ful investigation along the lines of the problem. 
9 
In order to introduce the distinctions which will be developed 
(1) between rationalistic and nonrational. characteristics of philosoph-
ica~ methods and theories and (2) to point the direction in which a 
ne1•1ly synoptic philosophy may be directed, one chapter, Chapter III, is 
devoted to a demonstrative essay on four classical philosophers who in 
their individual ways have pursued the problem of the relation of the 
rational and nonrational. Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz, and Kant have 
been chosen for this purpose • 
.!!:very problem of this kind has two faces: the methodological and 
the metaphysical. This dissertation will define rationalism and non-
rationalism as methods of knowledge and as theories of philosophy, 
Secondly, the philosophies of the three contemporary philosophers will 
be analyzed with respect to their lWe of these rational and other than 
rational methods and related theories. 
5. Work of Other Investigators 
a. Thill.y 
In an article "Romanticism and Rationalism"15 which is reprinted 
in his History of Phllosopl1y, 16 Professor Thilly . reviews the merits and 
deficiencies of the anti-intellectualism of the turn of the century. 
He regards as merits of anti-rationalism: 
1. Antagonism to ultra-deterministic system of any kind 
materialistic or idealistic... ' 
2. Interest is shifted from the universal to the particular ••• 
15. Thilly, Art. (1913). 
16. Thilly, HOP. 
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3. · They have again pushed to the front the question of the 
relation of natural science and philosophy, 
4. The whole knowledge problem and 
5. Have emphasized the significance of human values in the 
scheme of things. 
6. They have warned us against mistaking the universal frame-
work of reality for reality itself and have insisted on our 
keeping close to concrete experience. 
7. They protest against a one-sided metaphysic that fails to 
do justice to all the varied experiences ••• mere aspects ••• 
8, They refuse to accept as eomplete ••• the outward-looking 
intellect... 17 
9. They accentuate the dynamic character of reality. 
On behalf of reasonableness he maintains: 
1. Wbat satisfies the will to believe may not satisfy the 
will to understand ••• 
2. Reasons are always given ••• 
3. The cure for intelligence is ~ intelligence. •• 
4. Rationalism is not fatally bound to the mathematical-
physical method of procedure end static absolutes, nor 
prevented by any pre-suppositions from reaching the con-
ception of a dynamic and developing universe ••• 
5. Rationalism is committed to nothing but the business 
of understanding experience, of putting questions to it-
not · such as any fool may ask but only such as a wise man 
can answer ••• 
6. Though the mind longs for certainty and has for its ideal 
a system of interrelated judgments, present-day rationalism 
cannot and does not lay claim to the possession of complete 
truth. 
7. The way of escape from the block-universe is not through 
Romanticis~8but tpxough a broad~irided rationalistic philosophy • 
It will be noted that Thilly identifies rationalism with reason19 
and except for "broad~ndedness 11 or inclusiveness (a generalized empir-
icism) does not specify the particular ways in which the intellectualism 
which is objected to is to be corrected by a more adequate intelligence. 
17. Thilly, HOP, 582-583. 
18. Tbilly, HOP, 584-591. 
19. Cf. Spaulding and DeWolf. 
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b. Spaulding 
Spaulding's works, The New Rationalism20 and A World of Chance,
21 
are evideme that the meaning of the term "Rationalism" is confused. 
As Spauldj_ng uses his title term rationalism is equivalent to 
intellectualism or reasonableness or mentalism (his term) and is 
opposed to irrationality, sentimentality, etc. 
Recent attacks on intellectual analysis are really base-
less because arbitrarily and unjustifiably they limit 
intellect to the use of a logic and of methods that are 
Aristotelian, and so seem to be able to demonstrate its 
failure; whereas, if in place of this traditional logic 
and method, the principles of the new logic be granted r 
to intellect, it can be shown as inevitably to succeed.22 
The position may be called The New Rationalism to indicate 
that there are new methods of rational analysis which make 
it possible to solve problems where old methods .fail. One is 
not justified in betaking himself to an anti-intellectualism 
on the ground that intellect fails, unless he has first2,ranted to intellect the freedom to use all possible methods ••• 
The "new11 methods of rational analysis are taken from empirical 
inquiry. Either inductive or deductive thinking, according to the prin-
ciples of the 113W logic, 11 is thoroughly empirical, and the outcome in the 
two cases is the same. 1124 . Or, 11the modern view is that logic is an em-
12 
pirical science. One accepts various types of relations, of classes, of 
series, and of functions because one finds that there ~these entities.u25 
Or1 11Realism is a position that is established by empirical methods and 
20. Spaulding, TNR. 
21. Spaulding, ·woe. 
22. Spaulding, TNR, .xv~~l .• 
23. Ibid., 43, Cf. 36. "Nothing is exempt from rational examination 
and inquiry .u (Spaulding, WOC, 126.) 
24. Ibid., 28. Cf • \'iOC, xx:i-xxii. 
25. Ibid., 29. 
26 
not by a priori arguments and assumptions." 
As will be discussed later27 classical rationalism looks askance 
at abridgement of the ideal of certainty and the idea~ .. of probability. 
Of these, Spaulding says: 
No final and absolutely 2csertain test for absolutely certain knowledge can be found. · 
In the absence of any absolut~ test for absolute truth, it 
is a matter of probabilities. 9 
Metaphysical indeterminism or "radical chance" is the theme of one of 
Spaulding's works. He says: 
Defining Chance or Contingency as the absence of both 
Necessity and Impossibility I discover not only that there 
is Chance throughout Nature, here and there, but also 
throughout the whole structure of reality of which Nature 
~tself is3aut an instance, and, at that, only a chance lilStame. 
Although truth is, in the sense of realization, it is 
ru:t necessitated ~ any case, 3lo, that it is quite con-t~ngent wherever ~t is found. 
Spaulding readily admits that his metaphysical 11Chanceli is non-





Such a non-rational whole is the most rational of all 
wholes in the sense that it is the most logical or32 I am daring enough to say-all possible universes. 
A complet,ely rational universe is self-contradictory.33 
Spaulding, TNR, 372. cr. 381. 30. Spaulding, VfOC, vii. 
Chapter I. and .x:viii. 
Spaulding, WAI, 166. 31. Ibid.' 130. 
Ibid., 167. 32. Ibid., 283-28l~ .• 
33. Ibid.' 284n. 
Cf. 275 
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Here is one good example of the difference conceived between 
method and theory which makes it possible for a person to use a rational 
method and come up with a nonrational metaphysical concept. Spaulding 
himself, however, claims the process has a tendency otherwise: "Rational 
inquiry leads to results on rational grounds only.34 
Spaulding would discipline the classical rationalism by close 
observation of and respect for empirical data; he uses the term "ration-
alism11 as a synonym for philosophy . in the general understanding of the 
latter t erm. His argument is characteristically more empirical than 
rationalistic, meaning by the latter deductive analysis. 
In the following chapters Spaulding 1 s ideas of the combination 
of rationalism and empiricism, chance (or probability), necessity and 
certainty, and metapv~sical indeterminacy will be dealt with in some 
detail. 
c • Ramsdell 
Edward T. Ramsdell, in his doctoral dissertation entitled 
Pragmatic Elements in the Epistemolog_y of Borden P. Bowne,35 defined 
pragmatic characteristics and differentiated these from the tradition-
ally rationalistic characteristics and analyzed Bown's philosophy in 
terms of those pragmaticisms. 
Ramsdell lists five characteristic and definitive marks of prag-
matism, as follows: 
34. Spaulding, ~voc, vii. cr. 274 and xviii. 
35. Ramsdell, FEB. 
(1) Our practical vital interests control the developnent 
of our mental life, and are determinative in all cognitive 
activity. This use of 'interests' by the pragmatists is 
not equivalent to the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of 
the practical reason, for as we have seen in our consider-
ation of that doctrine, Kant was speaking solely of a 
priori principles of the pure practical reason; his empha-
:..sis was upon control ~ reason, not upon determination of 
reason by subjective interests. 
(2) Knowledge is essentially hypothetical, not final; it 
is always relative to a problem situation which it is pur-
posing to solve. Mind-activity therefore, is fundamentally 
instrumental. 
(3) The criterion of the validity .of ·an idea or belief is 
its utility or workability, that is, the suitability of the 
practical consequences that follow from it, the results 
which it brings about that mean the control of the problem-
situation, the success of the adaptation to the environment-
problem. These various expressions carry different empha-
ses, but their common significance is that of workability 
or instrumentality. 
(4) With the validity of the ideas so tested, truth it-
self tends to be defined as that which is verifiable, as 
that which works, as that which can be made·to solve a 
problem-situation. Truth becomes, therer;re, essentially 
instrumental. 
(5) The 'will to believe' doctrine is not characteristic 
of pragmatists in general, but belongs chiefly to such 
rel·igiously-interested lead~rs in the movement as William 
James and F.c.s. Schiller.3b 
These elements of pragmatism Ramsdell finds exemplified in all 
stages of Bowne's productive writing. 
The Pragmatic emphases were not casual and incidental, 
but g~meral and characteristic throughout the realm of 
moral and religious belief, beginning chiefly in the 
Studies in Theism in 1879 and continuing to the end of 
his work in 19lo.37 
36. Ramsdell,. P.ffiB, 34-35. 
37. Ibid.' 151. 
. I 
15 
Bowne remained a thoroughgoing rationalist in the 
fields of logic, mathematics, science and metaphysics. 
Only in the fields of moral and religious belief did he 
depend upon pragmatic methodology.3S 
As specific nonrational "elements", Ramsdell 1 s poi nts will be con-
sidered in some detail in Chapter II in the general attempt to define 
the nonrational in philosophy. 
d. Whittaker 
Thomas Whittaker in his essay on Reason39 traces the bifurcation 
of reason (self-evident processes of reason vs. observation of pheno-
mena) from the Pre-socratics through Post-Kantian philosophy. In his 
opinion the opposition of continental rationalism to English empiricism 
has come to a draw, a point at which modern philosophy must admit that 
both are necessary. After skillful analysis of the history of the prob-
lem and its difficulties, Whittaker proposes this solution: 
The problem is to find the right terms. Thus only can 
we hope to set ourselves free at once from arrogance and 
from confusion. Now the right terms are ready to our hand 
in Milton, (Paradise Lost, v, 4B6-h90.) who puts into the 
mouth of Raphael the declaration that the soul's being is 
reason, 11discursive 11 , or "intuitive", "differing but in 
degree, oi' kind the samen.40 
After one has been led to expect some genuine insight of either 
analysis or synthesis it is disconcerting to be left at this point. But, 
here Whittaker leaves the matter. It is difficult to see how the mere 
38. Ramsdell, f'EB, 153. 
39. Whittaker, RP.E. 
40. Ibid.' 29. 
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distinction of terminology between discursive and intuitive reason ends 
the discussion. 
No difficult introspection is needed to see that there 
is a total grasp, a "synoptic" view of things, and that 
there is also procedure from point to point. But it must 
always be borne in mind that, if' the former is higher, it 
is unavailable till it has been mediated by the latter. 
The ideal of philosophic presentation is achieved by t~se, 
who like Plato and Berkeley, have both in due balance. 
This is reducible to the statement that historic demonstrative, 
deductive rationalism plus intuition constitute synoptic reason. In 
essence this is the Aristotelian view42 without even Aristotle~s 
reference to empiricism. How Whittaker expects intuition to protect 
the empirical side of the philosophical method he espouses, he does 
not say. 
The essays on Gomte and Mill, Schopenhauer, Vico, and Spinoza 
which are appended to thj.s essay are not a demonstration of the 11balanceu 
or lack of it although the expanded title of the volume calls these 
''historical illustrations 11 • 
e .. de Santillana and Zilsel 
The Development of Rationalism and Empiricism is a small volume 
comprising two essays which are contributions to the University of 
Chicago project to publish an International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science.43 The essay on rationalism is by de Santillana and that on 
empiricism is by Zilsel. 
17 
41. Whittaker, RPE, 30. Cf. reference to the dialectic of whole-concepts in 
Chapter II, Section 7. 
42. Cf. Chapter III, Section 1. 
43. Neurath, (ed.), IEs. 
The full title of' the essay on rationalism is "Aspects of Scien-
tific Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century." The author finds diffi-
culty in defining rationalism and then t~es the term in different senses: 
(1) broadly, as "Rationalism ••• is the scientist himself, creative science 
at work .... the seeker after truth ••• the scientific minct. 11 44 and (2) more 
narrowly : "Strict and universal deduction, of course, is still held to 
be the ideal.. n45 
De Santillana's thesis is that scientific rationalism was a quest 
for precision, quantitative : characteristics, definition and prediction 
of behavior, all stemming from a faith in the competence of reason to 
organize reality guided by the ideal of mathematical interpretation of 
t . t . al ' LJ.b a om1c rna er1 J_sm. 
In its i deals lay its dissolution: 
'l'here is, no doubt, an inherent contradiction in ration-
alism, but it is a dynamic contradiction endo\'led with all 
the character of a dialectic. Some kind of substance, of' 
real being, is the object of' the quest. Yet, as soon as 
that substance appears to be reached, it shows itself to 
be a vain image and a sttwbling-block to faith.47 
The correctives to strict rationalism in de Santillana•s opinion 
are: (1) recognition of the giveness of material reality ~'after 
Newton, rationalism, whether scientific or not, has to admit of some-
thing which is 1given 1 beyond any argument. This, for the scientist, 
is matter" ).L:B (2) The frankly analogical character of' the fundamental 
44. de Santillana and Zilsel, DRE, 3. 
45. Ibid., 7. 
46. Ibid. J 40. 
47. de Santillana and Zilsel, DF.E, 41. 
48. Ibid., 39. In spite of the categorical assertion, it is difficult 
to see the basis for a statement that 1matter 1 is given as such in 
experience. The primitive given in experience, empirically is 
sensation from which the reference to matter is commonly made. 
lS 
insights of explanatory theories. 
The ideal of a universal matheme.tical deduction from principles to 
reality in its various forms was doomed when it was realized that the 
liEuclidean f:georretryJ was a choice and not a necessity. 1149 
The philosophical argument traced by de Santillana in science is 
not decisively settled. He says that the argument was not wholeheartedly 
faced and disposed of by the scientific men of that age. The pragmatic 
results of their work were so exciting that the theoretical foundations 
of their methodology were paid scant attention, except as the dialectic 
referred to above insistently repeated its denial of final decisions. 
To summarize, de Santillana would add to rationalism a recognition 
of the giveness of matter and a recognition that explanatory theories 
are analogical in character. Since both are pure postulates and cannot 
be interpreted as empirical, de Santillana has not relieved the situation 
at all. Moreover, a general science of analogy would be sUbject to all 
the criticism to which Kant 1s phenomenalism was subjected. 
Zilsel' s essay on the "Problems of Empiricism" chiefly describes 
the history of the introduction of experimental n:ethods into the research 
of the various sciences. Empiricism is equated with scientific methods. 
These methods are: collection of the material, observation, 
and comparison; experiment wherever objects can be influenced 
by technological means; co~Ulting and measuring if possible; 
causal investigation and investigation of laws.50 
49. de Santjllana and Zilsel, DRE, 15. 
50. Ibid., 88. 
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Zilsel tra~es the rise of philosophical empiricism in England and 
decries its wandering in modern times in the 11 pseudo-problerns 11 of sub-
ject-object relations. In his opinion this wandering could have been 
avoided by observing the scientific distinction: 
Natural scientists are faced wi th the task of separating 
constant relations; on which all observers can agree, f~om 
the variable and unstable aspects which are offered under 
different conditions or to different observers in a differ-
ent way. This is the sound basis for.;. the distinction be-
tween objects and subjects.51 
The "breakdown of ~chanistic physics" along with the collapse of 
subject-object metaphysics leaves traditional thought bankrupt, accord-
ing to the author, and leaves the future to more empirical ways of thought: 
In the early twentieth century those mathematical and logical 
influences increased, united with the empiricist tradition, 
and resulted f'inally in logical empiricism-a subject which 
must be reserved for later treatment.52 
So far as the purpose of this dissertation is concerned, he makes 
no ori gi nal contribution to the study. 
f. De~'iolf 
I n The Religious Revolt Against Reason53 Professor Harold De~ olf 
discusses the attack on the validity of reason in religious life and 
thought--an attack which sterns from Kierkegaard and finds modern expression 
in crisis and nee-orthodox theology. 
51. de Santillana and Zilsel, DRE, 69. Cf. 91. 
52. Ibid.' 94. 
53. DeWolf, RRR. 
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DeWolf lists five kinds of reason: (1) Cartesian consistency or 
'geometrical method', (2) analytic or quantitative method, (3) oppo-
sition to revelation, (4) internal coherence of a limited or closed 
system, and (5) synoptic Imthod which appeals to unlimited comprehensive 
coherence. 54 
All but the last of these kinds of reason are judged to be in-
adequate to the task of relating faith and reason and of providing a 
point of view in which Christian insight and experiential wisdom are 
har.IIO nized. 
Professor DeWolf emphasizes that the "revolt" from which the book 
takes its title is a revolt against all reason in the field of religious 
(i.e., Christian) knowledge. He quotes Swenson to document this position 
with respect to Kierkegaard and also quotes Barth and to a lesser degree 
Brunner. 55 
11Reason11 ••• is •• ,. the re.flecti vely organized common sense of 
mankind$6including as its essential core a sense of life 
1s 
values. . 
Against reason, so conceived, the irrationalists bring these 
charges, according to DeWolf: 
1. "<.:barges against the objectivity ot' reason ••• 
-· a. Objectivity is unchristian ••• 
b. Objectivity is impossible ••• 
c. Subjectivity is superior to objectivity ••• 57 
54. DeWolf, RRB., 189-197. 
55. lbid., 57-58. 
56. Kierkeeaard, PF, 99-100, in DeWolf, ~BR , 57. 
57. Dev-iolf, F.RR, 60-66. 
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2. IICharge of presumption /18e. ,Jthat supreme faith in Reason is idolatry ••• 5 
3. "Char ge of ineffectiveness ••• 
. a. Reason never attains certainty ••• 
b. Rational certainty would be fatal to faith ••• 
c. Doubt is caused by sin and cannot be cured by 
reason • •• 
d. Reason cannot comprehend existence ••• 
e. Human reason cannot find God, the wholly other •• • 
f. The evil in e~rience is incapable of rational 
explanation ••• 
4. "Charge of evil results ••• 
.. a. Trust in reason substitutes theory for decision ••• 
b . Dependence on reason leads to pantheism •• • 
c. Tr~t ~ reason imp;~es denial of t he paradoxical 
Chrl2 t lan gospel ••• 
The comprehensiveness of synoptic reason is shown in the 11defense 11 
which Professor DeWolf t~es against these charges. Synoptic reason 
includes these possibilities: 
1. Passionate interests as well as scientific detachment. 
2. Imaginative role-playing. 
3. Conviction of non-illusoriness and non-falsit;)r of faith. 
4a Humility of reason as a gift of God-
5. Absolute certainty on any grounds is illusory. 
6. Personal and social progress (i.e., to do the will of God) 
is endless challenge. 
7. Rational doubt is only one form of doubt. 
s. Knowledge about is only part of rational knowledge; 
knm'lledge £!.. is direct experiential acquaintance. 
9. The 'wholly other' is a meaningless notion. 
10. Quali tative relation does not mean substantial identity. 
11. Patristic irrationalism is principally provocative, not 
ultimate. 
12. Ethical commitment. 61 
By the preceding dozen points, Professor DeWolf has contained 
58. DeWolf, RHR, 70-?l. 
59. DeWolf, RR~, 74-92. 
60. Ibid.' 96-102. 
61. Ibid., 108-134. 
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the attack somewhat, but not decisively. There are some salients whi ch 
he contends mt~t be destroyed; so: 
1. · Irrationalism as a method is logically self-destructive. 
2. Paradox or contradiction destroys communication. 
3. Irrational system is a contradiction. 
4. False and true revelations have to be distinguished.62 
5. Irrationalism invites back tribal, degenerate religion. 63 
6. Faith is served by reason, either in word or deed. 
7. Christianity needs reason to: 
a. Restate its message in the current idiom. 
b. Incorporate historical knowledge recently discovered. 
c. Spell out its ethical implications. b4 
Professor DeWolf 1 s argument is a telling one in the terms in 
which the problem is stated. The total irrationalism of the revolt is 
not equal to the synoptic reason to which it is opposed. Some discontent 
remains, however, in the feeling that the irrationalists in the loose-
ness of their language did not distinguish the kinds of reason which 
Professor DeWolf distinguishes and so their 'revolt' was not against 
synoptic reason, but against deductive, analytic, self-contained and/or 
anti-revelational reason. Since it was not required for him to do so, 
Professor Devlolf did not undertake to specify to what extent synoptic 
reason has gathered up (aufgehoben) ' · Hegelian synthesis-wise, the methods 
and products of the other kinds of rational thought nor did he define 
the extent to which the more limited kinds of reason are either invali-
dated or supplemented by synoptic ree"son. Therein lies the principal 
distinction between his inquiry and the one proposed in this study. This 
62. Contrast Jonathan Edwards. 
63. Cf. Barrett, WIE, 62. 
64. De\'lolf, RRR, 138-163. 
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. study projects the analysis of the less glamorous and less surprising non-
rational rather than the obviously irrational; even so it should be noted 
that Professor DeWolf has explored some of the territory when he dis-
cussed those ways by which narrow concepts of reason should be expanded 
to a more comprehensive concept. Further comment and reference will 
be made in the body of the dissertation. 
Chapter I 
A DEFINITION OF MIND, REASON, AND RATIONALISM IN FHIWSOPHY 
1. Definition of Mind 
11 Reasonil obviously pertains to minds. It is instructive to 
observe the wide variety of meanings ascribed to mind and this whole 
class of concepts in current philosophical definitions. 
a. Mind as Self 
Baldwin's, Eisler 1s, Lalande's, and Runes' dictionaries all 
mention a concept of mind as self. Baldwin (collaborating with John 
Dewey) remarks that this is an older use of the term. 1 Ledger Wood, 
in Runes , lists as characteristics of the self: perceiving, remember-
ing, imagining, feeling, conceiving, reasoning, and willing. 2 Eisler 's 
characteristics are all of a different order: self-consciousness, 
activel y effective, and purposeful.3 Lalande notes the sense in which 
1 . Baldwin (ed.), II, 81-82. 
2. Runes (ed.), DOP. 
3 . Eisler (ed.), WPB , I, 484. (Translations from French and German 
dictionaries are by this writer.) 
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mind is conceived as subject as opposed to object . 4 
b . Mind as Non-Matter 
The second general sense of the term which is common to all the 
definitions referred to above is that of the nom-material . Two sub-
divisions may be noted: (1) non- matter as substance , and (2) non-matter 
as force . 
While all mention the idea of non- matter as substance, Lalande 
specifies it in most detail as not nature, not flesh (Eisler says not 
body5), and not sense . 6 Baldwin mentions not mechanical . 7 
As force , Eisler is most specific: "The self-conscious and telic 
spiritual life which compares values and ideas and is formative and 
creative . 118 Lalande says , "principle of life . 11 9 Both Eisler and Baldwin 
refer to purpose in this connection. 
c. Mind as Rigorous Reason 
Eisler notes two senses of the term 11 mind11 relating to thinking : 
"rigorous reason11 and 11 correct thinking11 • 10 Lalande notes one use as 
;,a synonym for intelligence 11 . ll 
d . Mind as Breath or Gas 
4. Lalande (ed. ), VP, 289. 
5. Eisler (ed . ), WPB, 484. 
6. Lalande (ed. ), VP, 289. 
10. Eisler (ed . ), WPB , 484 
11. Lalande (ed. ) , VP, 289. 
7. Baldwin (ed.), DPP, II, 81-82. 
8 . Eisler (ed.), WfB, 484. 
9. Lalande (ed. ), VP, 289. 
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Lalande points out that the etymological root of the term "esprit'' 
is that of 11 sou.ffle, gaz, produit du d ht i lJ at.i on . 1112 The others do not 
mention this usage although Lalande notes that both Bacon and Descartes 
made use of it . 
e. Ivlind as Rational Inquiry 
Spaulding's uniquely social definition of mind is an interesting 
contrast to the above: 11Mind then may be defined ... as the fact , or 
1 occurrence 1 , of rational inquiry in the world ••• Mind is then a social 
. 13 quality or property. " 
It may be seen from these illustrations that there is not a 
commonly accepted, technical philosophic ~eaning assigned to the term 
11 mind11 in its irrlividual reference. It is sometimes identified with the 
self; sometimes it is a verbalizing and conceptualizing part of the 
self which is non-sensing and non-willing; even at times it is a part 
of that part: the logical and validating conceptualizing process . 
For the purposes of a definition which will be suitable to this 
dissertation it is proposed that mind, in its individual reference , be 
defined as the sum total of the characteristics of consciousness , with 
emphasis on the unity of self. 
2. Definition of Reason 
lvfuch the same kind of diversity is expressed in the available 
12. Lalande (ed. ) , VF, 289. 
13. Spaulding, woe , 273- 274. 
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definitions of reason. The following analysis provides examples: 
a . Reason as Mind 
First of all Eisler suggests that in its widest sense reason is 
equal to mind, intelligence, or principle of thought . l4 While there is 
support for this view, especially to equate reason with intelligence 
or principle of thought, it appears to this investigator that it is 
inopportune to equate reason with mind because in the total content of 
mind there are too many vagrant and irrational thoughts not to mention 
illogical patterns of thoughts , etc., to justify identification of 
this content with that of reason. 
LaLande distinguishes broadly between reason as a faculty and 
reason as an object of knowledge.15 Kraushaar , in Runes , notes only 
its use as a 11 faculty11 • 16 The following outline follows Lalande . 
a. Reason as Discursive Faculty 
Reason may be the discursive combination of concepts and propo-
sitions according to Lalande.17 Baldwin says it is the drawing of 
inferences;l8 Eisler, following Kant , cites it as the source of theore-
tical and practical ideas . l9 
b. Reason as Good Judgment 
Lalande points out Descartes' idea of reason as the source of 
14. Eisler (ed.), WPB , III, 395. 
15. Lalande (ed.), VP, 857-862. 
16. Runes (ed.), DOP, 264. 
17. Lalande (ed. ), VP, 857-862. 
18. Baldwin (ed.), DPP, II, 424-425 . 
19. Eisler (ed.), WPB , III, 395. 
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self-evident ideas. 20 Eisler approaches it quite differently as the 
"unity and power of all intelligent, purposive thought and will which 
aims at a connecting and final u.r1ity of knowledge and action. 1121 
c. Reason as Natural Knowledge 
Lalande reports a distinction between reason as the faculty of 
natural knowledge and as the faculty of revealed knowledge.22 With a 
slightly different approach Kraushaar in Runes remarks that the spon-
taneity of thought arises in reason. 23 
d. Reason as a priori Principles 
All definitions cited bring testimony to the use of the term 
11 reason11 to refer to the a priori principles of the mind which condi-
tion experience. Referring to the Kantian use, Kraushaar repeats that 
these principles thus transcend all possible experience.24 (It should 
be noted that Kant assigns categories to the understanding.) Baldwin, 
Eisler, and Kraushaar note the way in which a priori principles are 
opposed to sensation25 and Eisler goes on to point to reason as the 
source of the categories.26 
e. Reason as KnoltTledge of the Real and/or Absolute 
Although Lalande does not mention either Plato or Descartes, 
20. Lalande (ed.), VP, 857-862. 
21. Eisler (ed.), WEB , III, 395. 
22. Lalande (ed.), VP, 857-862. 
23. Runes (ed.), DOF, 264. 
24. Runes (ed.), DOF, 264. 
25. Baldwin (ed.), DPP, II, 424-425; 
Eisler (ed.), vHB, III, 395; 
Runes (ed.) DOF, 264. 
26. Eisler (ed.), WfB , III, 395. 
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their concepts of pure reason as giving a true account and a special 
account of the real are cited as one use of the term. 27 
f . Reason as Relation 
As the first of three ways in which Lalande conceives reason as 
an object of knowledge , he lists it as a relation. 28 As relation, 
reason is the insight of connectedness , as in a series . 
g . Reason as a Principle of Explanation 
Baldwin notes particularly the sense of reason as a principle of 
explanation as a criterion for the practical reason. 29 Lalande remarks 
on the sense of the ontological 11 reason for being11 or 11 that which accounts 
for an effect , 11 30 and Baldwin refers to reason as that which causes some 
acts.31 
h . Reason in a furmative Sense 
Lalande points to the normative sense of reason (not only as a 
cause) as a motive and also as justification. 32 
i. Reason as the Principle of Totality in ~rience 
It is readily seen in the above that the various individual and 
27. Lalande (ed. ), VP, 857- 862. 
28. Ibid . 
29. Baldwin (ed,.)_, DPP, II, 424- 425. 
30. Lalande (ed. ), VP, 857- 862. 
31. Baldwin (ed.), DPP, II , 424- 425. 
32. Lalande (ed . ), VP, 857- 862. 
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specific usages of the term 11 reason11 are not indicative of an inclu-
sive functional concept , but rather of fairly restri cted denotation. 
By contrast Hegel uses the term as a principle of wholeness or 
totality in experience and in reality. This is the kind of meaning to 
which Brightman and DeWolf lead in their arguments against anti- reason-
able doctrines in theology. 33 Kant likewi se conceived reason as a 
totality comprised of understanding, practical reason, and judgment . 
From this welter of material it appears there is much the same 
kir~ of confusion and disagreement regarding the conception of reason 
that was found in the definition of mind. For the purposes of this 
study it is necessary, then, to set out a definition which in general 
conforms to usage , to the idea as compared with the definition of mind 
already made (cf. above) , and to the purpose of the dissertation. 
Reasonableness, in general, ·· then, is an order among things or a 
principle of order as conceived by minds or a mind. In an individual 
mind , reason is the relating, patterning, and selecting function whi ch 
renders experience comprehensible and meaningful and directs the activity 
o f the organism as well . 34 
3. Definition o f Rationalism 
Having worked through definitions of "mind" and 11 reason11 one is 
33 . Cf. 11 Introduction11 • 
34. Cf. Eisler (ed. ), 'vi.FB , III, 395 : 11 The reasonabie is that which 
conforms to reason combining sensations and purpose in thought, act , 
and being, logically or purposefully • 11 
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better prepared to approach the central theme of this chapter, "ration-
alism". vfuile the jmplication of this procedure is that a class 
" (rationalism) is being ident~ied within genus (reason) and species, 
(miDi), there are t~ be founi those35 who would avoid all such dis-
tinctions and would equate the class with the genus or species. This 
has added to the. extreme confusion in dealing with the subject. 
From the foregoing it should be obvious, but here and now must be 
made explicit; the rational, as herein discussed, is not synonymous 
with (nor co-extensive with) the reasonable. It will be recalled that 
a mind was defined as the sum total of the characteristics of a con-
sciousness (cf. Section 1, above) and reason ~as defined as the relating, 
patterning, and selecting function (of a mind) which renders experience 
comprehensible and meaningful and directs the activity of the organism 
to which it is related (cf. Section 2, above). A considerable part of 
the confusion which exists in the area of this study springs from making 
"rational" synonymous with "reasonable"• This Spaulding and Creighton 
do.36 Thilly uses rationalistic in this way: "It Lj)hilosophyJ 
accepts the competence of reason in the search after truth. n37 The 
more general usage has been to restrict rationalism to formal deductive 
analysis based largely on Aristotelian formal logic (and modern symbolic 
logic) and patterned afte.r the ideal of mathematical certainty (Spinoza 
and Descartes). By way of contrast the reasonable is the coherent and 
32 
systematic conceptualization of the true. While the significance will be 
developed in the succeeding chapter it may be pointed out here that the true 
35. Spaulding, Creighton, Thilly. On Thilly, see "Introduction". 
36. Spaulding, TNR, and Creighton, Art. (1949). 
37. Thilly, HOP, 13, 252, and 587. 
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is not conceived as abst r act accuracy, but rather is . (a) representation 
in conformity to the r eal, whether conceptual or nonconceptual, (b) 
participation in the process of forming the real, conceptual or otherwise; 
from "Which it develops that Truth is the integration of that re presentation 
and that participation. In more modern philosophy the dialectical 
deductive analysis of the Hegelian type has been an alternate type of 
rationalism. Hegelian logic is of course a supplement to Aristotelian 
logic. As a formal process of dialectic it is rationalistic; just as any 
conceptual formula is rationalistic. Hegel's method includes the empir-
ical, hence is not rationalistic as a whole. His system is charged by some 
critics as "rationalistic" because they object to the restriction of the 
formula of the dialectic and because they feel there .is an arbitrary encom-
passing concept in the absolute (James refers to it as a block-universe). 
There is serious question about the proper interpretation of Hegel on these 
points, but this investigator sides with those who feel that the evolu-
tionary, empirical, inclusive factors are strong in Hegel but who find the 
dialectic an artificial over-simplification. 
In this dissertation it is proposed to maintain the distinction 
between the reasonable and the rational on the hypothesis that data for 
philosophic arguments arising from empirical sources are susceptible to 
systematizing, relating, and patterning (i.e., reasoning) by other than 
rationalistic (purely syllogistic or dialectical) methods. This judgment 
presupposes at least tentatively that the sum of some rationalistic and 
some nonrationalistic methods (with some scheme of weights to be decided), 
so conceived, should produce a reasonable philosophy unless it is found that 
some among the constituent factors are irreconcilable with each other 
and thus must be independently tested. 
To state the matter in a slightly different way, philosophy has, 
to a large extent, been guided by the rationalistic ideal, believing 
it to be the sole valid method of defining and systematizing truth. 
This investigation has already shown that some philosophers not only 
admit that rationalism is not the sole method; some say it is no longer 
valid at all. This dissertation, then, attempts to define the territory 
of the reasonable by discovering certain rationalistic and nonrational-
istic constituents in current thought. In this dissertation "rational-
istic" will customarily be used to assist in differentiating rational from 
reasonab;Le, but wherever "rational" is used, it is to be construed as 
identical with 11rationalistic 11 • 
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To get on with the task at hand, a discussion and definition of ration-
alism comprises the remainder of this chapter. The succeeding chapter is de-
voted to a classification and evaluation of the nonrational. Only by the 
en.:l of the next chapter can a careful delineation of the scope of the ration-
al and nonrational components be made. "Nonrational" is used in preference 
to "empirical" because of a deliberate attempt to be as inclusive as pos-
s ible in the methods surveyed and in the data to be considered. Empirical 
is sometimes limited by positivists to sensory content. By contrast with 
the carefully restricted definition of rationalism, the nonrational is 
to include all other content of experience. It wiD. be noted here (and in 
Chapter II) that the nonrational includes most induction. 
· Because of its organization, Vernon Bourke's brief definition of 
rationalism is used as a point of departure for this analysis: 
Rationalism: A method, or very broadly, a theory of 
philosophy, in which the criterion of truth is mt sen-
.sory but intellectual and deductive. Usually associated 
with an attempt to introduce mathematical methods into 
philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza.38 
38. Runes (ed.), DOP, 263. 
This definition points out quite clearly the distinction that 
rationalism may be and is both method and theory and that it is char-
acterized chiefly by intellectual, deductive, and mathematical traits. 
It does not include reference to the long and vigorous argument regarding 
rationalism in theology,39 but this is not particularly essential to 
the purpose at hand. 
One further distinction must be made. In dealing with a method 
of philosophy there is possible both an internal and an external criti-
cism. The internal criticism can examine the degree to which it accom-
plishes what it professes to accomplish. The external criticism can 
examine the criterion itself by which the methodology is projected. In 
a similar way educators ask both validity and reliability of measure-
ment devices; the first point is to find out if it measures what it is 
supposed to measure, then how well it measures. Therefore, there follows 
a discussion of rationalism, first as a methodological criterion, and 
second as a methodology. After these there will be some examination of 
rationalism as a system of philosophy. 
a. Rationalism as a Methodological Criterion 
(1) First of all, rationalism is intellectual, i.e., non-sensory.40 
Both Baldwin and Eisler elaborate that statement to say that the source 
of knowledge is independent of sensory factors; 4l Lalande just says non-
empirical. 42 
Creighton develops a different point of view in saying that by 
35 
39. For which cf. Baldwin (ed.), DPP, II, 415, and Lalande (ed.), VP, 869. 
40. Runes (ed.), DOP, 263. 
41. Baldwin (ed.), DPP, ll, 415; Eisler (ed.), lifB, 579. 
42. Lalande (ed.), VP, 869. 
rationalism is meant that a subject matter is subject to criticism and 
subject to reason. 43 Eisler concurs in the latter. 44 Creighton goes on 
to say in his article on "Rationalism" that the reasonable is that which 
is explained in scientifi~ terms . 45 
While the term "intellectual" is descriptive it is hardly speci- · 
fie. There are several questions which the meaning of the term does 
not answer, including, (1) What kind or kinds of knowledge does this 
independent source provide? (2) \'/hat is the validity of the source 
with respect to the kind or kinds? arA (3) How distinguish the rational 
from the nonrational in the meaning of the term 11 intellectual11 ? (E. g. , 
caprice , phantasy, a fiat of judgment either according to principle or 
without principle might qualify as projects or products of intellect, 
but scarcely as rat~onalistic.) 
(2) When, however , the term 11 deductive 11 is considered, the mean-
ing is made much more specific . It is so limited that some , such as 
Spaulding, 46 would object to rationalism being restricted to deductive 
intellectualism. Nevertheless, not only the definition in Runes,47 but 
also that in Baldwin, 48 list deduction as a primary characteristic . 
Thilly says one use of the term is that 11 genuine kno\'Jledge consists of 
universal and necessary judgments . u49 
Deduction is the analysis of postulates by precisely defined pro-
cedures which reveal the necessary constituent relations among those 
43 . Creighton, Art . (1919), 225. 
44. Eisler (ed. ) , WPB , 579. 
45 . Creighton, Art . (1918) , 225. 
46. Spaulding, TNR. 
47. Runes (ed. ), DOP, 263. 
48. Baldwin (ed.), DPP, II, 415 . 
49. Thilly, HOP, 253. 
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postulates.5° Necessity is essential to certainty and the two are 
linked together from Aristotle to the present in rationalism and deduc-
tive demonstration.51 
37 
Only after sense data have been transformed by the understanding--
organized and systematized into comprehensibility--are symbolic repre-
sentations of the data subject to deduction. Thus it is that the given 
content of a proposition or group of propositions may represent either 
imaginary objects or concrete reality, but in either case, the mental 
work of sorting out valid relations must appeal to the principles which 
are inherent in that mental work to verify its results. Deduction does 
not appeal to data outside the given propositions. Its work is that of 
discovering valid relations among the given; it seeks the implications 
of the given. 
Hence, it is exaggeration to say that deductive reasoning does not 
deal with empirical facts. Deduction can deal with empirical facts (as 
terms) as well as any others if they are given. It does not add to the 
empirical facts. But deduction deals rationalistically with given facts 
in that it appeals to the principles of its own procedure for verification; 
it functions both as method and as criterion; it does not deal empirically 
(nor coherently) witn those facts, which would be to appeal to additional 
not yet given experience for verification and to more systematic and 
inclusive hypotheses. 
50. Cf. Runes (ed.), DOP, 74, and Lalande (ed.), VP, 195-197. 
51. Thilly, HOP, 180. 
The primary forms of classical deductive thought are: (1) immediate 
inference , (2) syllogistic reasoning, (3) classification, and (4) defini-
tion. Standard manuals of logic describe and define these processes 
in detail. 52 The criterion of truth i n rationalism is the process of 
intellectual (logical) analysis itself--precisely defined procedures 
which are believed to reveal necessary constituent relations among a -
group of postulates . 
(3) The second part of Mr . Bourke ' s definition of rationalism 
dealt with the customary association of mathematical methods with the de-
ductive method in Philosophy?3 Thilly points out that in Aristotle ' s 
day mathematics was the ideal science , hence the connection of necessity, 
certainty, and mathematics . He also remarks that the mathematical ideal 
is typical of modern rationalism. 54 Creighton likewise mentions this 
connection. 55 
The superiority of Euclidean geometrical method as regards demon-
strative certainty has long been acknowledged by deductive logicians as 
the ideal for all processes of reflection. 56 Only recently has tradi-
tional theoretical mathematics been compelled by the surge of speculation 
52. Cf. Burtt , PPRT, and Creighton and Smart , IL. 
53. Runes (ed . ) , DOP, 263 . 
54. Thilly, HOP, 00 and 253 . It might be remarked that Plato's interest 
in mathematics was more pronounced i n metaphysics than was Aristotle's. 
Aristotle's logic was guided by the mathematical ideal ; his meta-
physics more by vitalistic , biological categories . 
55. Creighton, Art . (1919) , 225. 
56. Pythagoras preceded the mathematical logicians in conceiving number 
as 11 the essence of things 11 • (Thilly, HOP, 20. ) The rationalist 
in Hobbes was guided principally by his mathematical ideal . (Ibid. , 
264-265 . ) Descartes ' mathematical ideal was a means to hi s method 
(from axioms deductively to new truth) and to his criterion of 
absolute certainty. (Ibid., 275 . ) 
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in physics to revise its claims to a unique and superior authority for 
explanation of observable phenomena. The developnent of the physical 
sciences suggests that the accepted system of mathematical relations 
is a self-consistent system, but there are other systems which have 
more merit in dealing with certain kinds of problems . These latter have 
no more elaborate presuppositions than the familiar one has .. 
The traditional relation of deductive and mathematical ideals 
helps to indicate the scope of deduction as a method. The familiar math-
ematics expresses appropriate and valid relations which apply when (1) 
analysis can reveal parts whose sum equals the whole and (2) a conven-
ient standard of measure , i.e. , length, weight , velocity, etc . , can be 
discovered. Thus , quantitative analysis (the pattern for deduction) 
can deal with some aspects of objects , but its systematization is in-
adequate when the arrangement of the parts constitutes a unique pattern 
as a whole and/or when mental content is viewed dynamically, estheti-
cally, worshipfully, or morally. 
Inasmuch as both familiar mathematics and other forms of deduction 
depend upon quantitative and distinct units , the formal structure of 
language and its ordinary usage are based on r ationalistic tendencies 
within thought . 57 If the units of measure do not maintain their fixed 
relations , the construction which involves those units will also be fluid . 
Lik:evlise , . historically, the developnent of mathematics flourished 
along with a body of knowledge that conformed primarily to the deductive 
type- the fundamental insights upon which the body of knowledge was 
developed were the authorities, human or divine , 58 to which appeal was 
57. Cf . c . (1) , below. 
58. In the early medieval \'IOrld, they usually appealed to Augustine , 
the patriarchs or prophets , and the Gospels . In the later medieval 
world they rediscovered the philosophy of Aristotle . 
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made in justification of particular propositions. The familiar 
mathematics is deductive in form just as other knowledge--philosoph-
ical, theological, and physical-prior to the scientific reformation, 
was primarily deductive in form. 
Although Bourke's definition linked mathematics and deductive 
thought, the preceding discussion is intended to show that the tradi-
tional connection is altered in the present age. In so far as ordinary 
mathematics was at one time believed to have a unique relation to 
speculative certainty, and as deductive reasoning conformed to the 
general pattern of ordinary mathematics, then deductive reasoning was 
supposed to enjoy that same special relation to speculative certainty. 
The major premise of this piece of reasoning has been invalidated in 
this age.59 The result, for present consideration, is that rational-
istic deduction and mathematical reasoning are appropriate where quanti-
tative relations inhere which are to be extracted analytically and are 
to be formulated explicitly. Other than rational means are required 
for other than quantitative, fixed relations. 
b. Rationalism as a 11ethod of Philosophy 
JVlethod is a system of procedure. Method concerns the tools with 
which one acts and the way in which one progresses; it deals with tech-
nique as distinguished from product. How does rationalism serve as a 
method in philosophical speculation? 
In the systematic solution of problems of thought, there are 
fairly distinct stages in which the operation of any method of 
59. Cf. Chapter II, Section 3.a.(2). 
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philosophizing could be observed . Professor Dewey's fa~iliar analysis 
of the unit of reflection involves five stages: (1) experiencing a 
difficulty, (2) clarification of the diff iculty, (3) suggestions of 
solutions, (4) reasoning out the consequences of those suggestions, 
and (5) empirical verification. 60 Dewey ' s analysis is a purposely gen-
eral statement which does not emphasize the particularly critical points 
in a process of philosophical reflection. For this latter purpose , three 
significant stages of development are proposed: (l) the stage of in-
sight (Dewey 1s first three stages) , the development of a knowledge-claim 
or an idea which professes to express a valid relation between a sub-
ject or group of subjects and an object or group of objects; (2) the 
stage of verification (Dewey ' s fourth and fifth stages) , the self-
criticism by which the knowledge-claim is accepted, modified, or re-
jected; and (3) the stage of relation, the systematization within veri-
fied knowledge in which the newly accepted knowledge fact is placed . 
The operation of rationalistic method will be analyzed at each of these 
stages. However, before analyzing these stages it would be well to 
point out that rationalism is not an independent , self- enclosed system. 
In addition to the limitations which will be demonst rated in the process 
of the following analysis , Burtt points out that a presupposition of 
all right thinking (conceived in this dissertation as including r ational 
as well as other methods) is right observation. The conditions of right 
observation, as listed by Burtt, are : good health, command of available 
tools, readiness to correct past, accommodation of reflection to avail-
able time , and the mental habit of tentativeness when time is not 
60. Dewey, illiT, 72-77. 
pressing.61 It is important to note that a handicapPed observation 
does not always cause error, but often has that tendency. Burtt fur-
ther admits emotion and desire as vrell as the habit of' the individual 
in formation of ends and selection of means as factors in right think-
ing.62 
(1) Rationalism as a Method at the Stage of Insight 
11 Insight 11 is the mental thrust at a possible solution of a prob-
lem situation. It is an informed guess, with a broad base in fact. 
From the introspective accounts of the moment of invention or enlighten-
ment it appears that insight may be accident, intuition, revelation, 
11 hunch11 , inference, or elimination of alternative hypotheses. Insight, 
then, is broadly conceived as the mental awareness of the possibility of 
solution of a problem regardless of the type of activity by which the 
solution is sought, viz., trial and error, imitation or reflection.63 
Thilly points out that the most useful differentiation of ration-
alists from empiricists is their position on the source of knovrledge. 
Self-evident truths and/or a priori truths are the source of knowledge 
for rationalists accor ding to· him.64 A sl~ghtly different emphasis seems 
just as important: rational insight is the source of the self-evident 
and the a priori. 
Deduction functions to make explicit the relations which are im-
plicitly expressed in the given propositions under study. In either 
immediate inference or syllogistic inference this fact is verified. The 
61. Burtt, P.PRT, 100-lll. 63. Ibid., 38-42. 
62. Ibid., 51-53. 64. Thilly, HOP, 254. 
process of this kind of insight is systematized in the body of formal 
logic . Deduction does not function as a method of revealing insights 
which are not constitutionally inherent in the propositions scrutin-
ized arrl it furnishes only a meager source of assistance in dealing 
with distinctly novel situations. Creighton and Smart define think-
ing in terms of (l) the transformation of conceptions and (2) con-
servation of concepts through developnent and definition. 65 In so 
doing they are ruling out nearly the whole of the . process of insight 




Formal logic assumes concept s; induction makes them. Rationalistic 
theories of induction must appeal to a kind of ideas with special status 
to justify and to assure their validity. Compare Plato 1s 11 ideas 11 and 
the "doctrine of reminiscence" , or Kant 1s 11 categories11 or Descartes 1 
"self- evident ideas 11 • A priorism and intuitionism are listed as 
rationalistic in one of Thilly 1s definitions of that term. 66 
Hegelian, dialectical logic attempts to outline a process by which 
concepts and nevi knmvledge are produced . In its formal aspect it is 
as arid as classical logic; in content i t is valid only insofar as 
empirical observation and intellectually criticized experience is 
treated by the process. 
The utility of rationalism (as deductive thinking) in discovering 
new insights by which knmvledge may be advanced is definitely limited. 
P.r:i..marily, it is limited to the implications of propositions already 
65. Creighton and Smart, IL, 57. 
66. Thilly, HOP, 253. 
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preoiaely £ormulated, 67 although DUbs would · irolude t.he possibllit.;r 
or the deduction or the prosupposition~le lkt says , fi 'J.'he process ot 
throwing & demonstration into completely syllogiatk form is at. the 
samB time a discovery o! all ita presuppOsitions.u68 Neverthl!lesa, 
the ut.ility .of' r ationalism in res~C1o to insight is so l:iaited tba\ 
t here is reason f or S t\!(ing that necessa17 inrere.u::e is mt insight, 
vu. , a knotdedge-elaim. at aU• but. only a clari!ying formulation of 
a. p.rlor krl;):wledg-e-cl.aim. llllbs s~ ot th!$ sit uat;ion: 
1:ha f~tion of the syllogism is merely to t eet an 
. inf.:nsen:e that is &l.ready drawn. to detemine its. 
va.lidity~. or to in1icate what. propositiol.ll are 
·DHded to establish a corv:~usion w'hoM grouni is 
ab'eady partially 51ven. 69 
(2) Rationalisa as a Met.bod: at the Stage. of VeritJcation 
Deductive thinld.ng haec been most l·Jbolehaa.rtedly accepted in the 
.field of demOnstration wbicb. is ore lnOde oi" verification. Agnin., in 
; : I 
uathema.tical fashion, r atioMl1sm bec-omes t~ ! imar;y method oi' aahiev-
ing justification tbl'Ough individual m.tm- ·ol'k un&ided by an appeal to 
criteria, data, or proce~sets f'o.reJ,gn to that min:l 's mm logical pro-
cesaes• v, bether that log:le be defined in classical or He~~limltems .. 
Dubs conteoos that even 1n the midst of the syllogistic procedure 
~ationalistic taetora are not operating e.sclu.sively in the dell¥)nstration 
of' vaJ.id reasord.ng. He says that in evt?Jry syllogistic Pl"f)Cess th&re is 
a ''validating propo~itionn • a proposition tlhi<:h asserts that an o'bsel'-
67. 'o:r a criticism of 11mere eorJSistercyt' see SpaUlding, ' ;cc. 119 a.OO 
l22. 
68. n m,s,. Rl, 184. 
69. Ibid. ~ 188. 
vational, inductive judgment is required testifying to the fact that 
the syllogism conforms to the structure of its canon. 70 He then says: 
~ validating proposition can be proved by purely deduct-
ive means, and ••• therefore the necessity of pure de-
duction would disappear.71 
Deduction is defined by Runes as 11 necessary analytic inference". 72 
Lalande supports this concept when he describes it as 11la conseguence 
necessaire, en vertu des r~gles logigues 11 • 73 
The essential part of these definitions might be rephrased into 
this kind of statement: Deduction is the analysis of given postulates 
by precisely defined procedures which reveal the necessary constituent 
relations. 
If one is dealing with groups of related propositions, the rules 
of inference are an irdispensable guide to the verification of the 
constituent relations and to the discr:imination of necessary from 
merely problematic relations. The rules by which such deduction is. 
systematically accomplished are outlined thoroughly in many logic 
texts and need mt be repeated here. 74 Rai;.ional deduction cannot 
verify, however, all knowledge-claims. It does not substitute for 
empirical verification.75 It is effective in the area where the pur-
pose is to show conformity or non-conformity with a given group of 
propositions. 
70. Dubs, 152-157, also 188. 
71. Ibid., 190. 
72. Runes (ed.), DOP, 74. 
73. Lalande (ed.), VP, 195. 
74. See: Creighton and Smart, IL, and Burtt, PPRT. 
75. Cf. Spaulding, woe, 115. 
45 
Syllogistic inferenc e proceeds on the fact that many 
individuals in nature are of the same kind and that 
what is true of the kind is true of each -individual . 
It caqgot shm'l how the universal differentiates it-
self.? 
Furthermore , all rationalism proceeds to an 11 all or none 11 judg-
ment with respect to conformity or non-conformity. It can display no 
degrees of probability. The nearly correct is as bad as the most er-
r a.tic error because concepts are dealt with in the form of fixed units 
in accordance with the law of identity. 
A knov-rledge-claim subjected to verification (the rigorous pro-
cedure according to the rules established by deductive logic) issues 
in the admission of a knowledge-belief into the company of previously 
accepted knowledge-beliefs. The claim for absolute certainty whi ch 
was and is a familiar demand of rationalists is delusive. The ration-
alist never gets outside the circle of the given propositions. In 
order to validate the rationalistic process, not only the given pro-
positions but the tools as well must be validated . 
Primary among the tools of the philosopher is language. Now, 
words as symbols are abstract representatives of experience. 77 The 
experience represented loses much of its character in the process of 
abstraction and the details of the process of abstraction are quite 
difficult to represent. Since the whole concept of definition, which 
is a basic factor in the rational process, is involved in this speci-
fication of the detail in abstraction, one must say that words are 
only feeble representations of only a part of the comprehended reality. 
76. Creighton and Smart, IL, 191. 
77. The point is presented counter to the claims of symbolic 
logicians . 
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The meaning cannot, if there is genuine communication 
of one mind with another, be identical with (a), the 
words ••• (b), the consciousness of the words ••• (c~, 
the consciousness of the meaning ••• (d) , facts ••• 7 
And, there is the more radical claim of existentialism: "Existential. 
reality (as particular and contingent) is incommunicable, and 1every 
system fantastically dissipates the concept of existence' ~Kierke­
gaard J.u79 
Language ani the careful specification of meaning are essential 
tools . Scientific communication would be impossible without t hem. 
However , the philosophizing rationalist often forget s his deliberate 
restriction and abstraction and treats language as if it were identical 
with the whole of experience. Such treatment is unjustified. With real 
justice, this kind of absolutistic reasoning was described by William 
James when he said: 
The treating of a name as excluding from the fact named 
•~hat the name ' s definition fails positivelD to i nclude 
is what I call ' vicious' intellectualism. 8 
If James ' meaning is understood, definition is constitutionally inade-
quate to represent 11what the name 1 s definition fails positivel y to 
incl ude 11 • 
Furthermore, the comprehended reality which the individual repre-
sents in word-s;ymbols is only a part of the total personal grasp on 
experienced reality. Psychiatric investigation indicates that persons 
always have sub- or super-lingual experience (ani learning) which is 
rarely exposed to conscious comprehension enough to talk about it. 
78. Spaulding, woe, 5. 80. James, PU, 60. 
79. Harper, EXI, 47. 
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Those areas have been explored to the point that it is recognized that 
if a person can verbalize his experiences , he can integrate them into 
his conscious patterr1...s . Importantly, even when these sub- or super-
lingual experiences are 11 uncon.scious 11 , they effect and modify conscious 
behavior and thought . Suvh data i ndicate tr:at experience, either of 
self or of externalit;>r, is vastly extensible- -probably inexhaustibly 
extensible . If so, the work of comprehending that experience and of 
relating it to the body of kno1vledge is also infinite . (cf . Kant 1s 
concept of unendliche Aufgabe). Every s ymbolic representation of a given 
stage of that extension becomes progressively outmoded . 
In the third place , language is structured and ordered by custom. 
Language must be more or less accepted in order to serve as communi-
cation. There is a not unreasonable theory that acceptance of the 
structure of a given language channels the current of thought for the 
' nd ' . ' al 81 1 _ 1V10U a It is possible that the limitations of the lap.guage 
form a repress i ve influence on some thought which seeks vainly to be 
expressed in that meditm . 
In view of these considerations with respect to lar~uage as one 
of the basic tools of philosophy, claims of unshakable certainty are 
umtarranted . 82 Language, at best , even for the single individual whose 
experience it represents (and much more so for s ocial, interpersonal 
commurucation) , is a sketchy representation of experience; the best of 
propositions83 is constitutionally imperfect- imperfect enough to 
require humilit y on the part of a philosopher. 
81 . Tillich is reported by Dr . Brightman to have said that English 
forces him to be more exact than German did. 
82. Cf. Dewey, c.g;·c . 
83. Cf. Russell ' s use of "proposition" in Hl\SL . 
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Additionally, there is the issue of whether or not the word-
representation is a reliable characterization of objects apart from 
the individual's experience of them. There are some who claim that 
objects are actually distorted in much of the process of being repre-
. sented in conceptual thought. Ayer, for example, argues that only 
propositions verifiable by sense experience have any significant mean-
ing.84 Ayer's criterion for significant meaning, i.e., reliable 
representation, seems to be universality and endurance. Even on the 
basis of this criterion, surely, sense experience is not the most 
basic and trusted experience. The experiences of self-identification 
in memory (i.e., the mind as herein defined: the sum total of the 
characteristics of a conSciousness) and the pragmatic validity of reason 
are both claimants for equality with sense-perception if not priority 
over it. In the experience of retrospection and its special form in 
introspection, the validity of ev~ry propositional judgment is tested; 
those which pass are not infallible, but useful and significant. And 
in the case of self-experience, language affords a fairly effective 
instrument of description. The only judgments about the valid repre-
sentation of other objects are from this analogy. 
In a filth respect, since experiences are not co-extensive with 
different persons, neither the same forms nor the. same terms of lan-
guage can be expected rigidly to represent identical experiences of 
different thinking persons, and communication requires a tremendous 
effort to be even fairly accurate. 
84. Ayer, LTL. 
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Vvhat I call ilhere11 is of necessity different from what 
anybody else calls 11 here 11 and what I call 11 now11 is of 
necessity different from what I call 11 no>'l11 on another 
occasion, a.r:rl from what another man calls 11 now11 at 
other times . This is the sharp point, in language, of 
the essential privacy of each individual's experience . 
Like Leibniz 1s monads, we each mirror the world from 
our (sic) personal point of view •• • Not only is a man 
private from other people, but he is also private from 
his past and future selves . 85 
All five counts, above , indicate that language , even though the 
best available form of interpersonal communication and of representation 
of objects independently perduring through his acquaintame with them, 
is not infallible nor inclusive nor penetrating enough to warrant any 
claim of absolute certainty being attached to its use . 
Rationalism is not the only philosophical method which pursues 
the will.-o- the- wisp of absolute certainty.86 Historically the idea of 
events which are necessary and without exception arose in conjunction 
with naive mathematics, inadequate natural science, and arbitrary 
philosophy. It now appears that no proposition warrants this certainty. 87 
Reasonable and justifiable belief and various degrees of these attri-
butes are muc)1 more accurate than the continued use of the misleading 
word 11certainty11 even when watered do\'Tn by qualifying adjectives . 88 
(3) Rationalism as a Method at the Stage of Relation 
Relation is here understood as a judgment with respect to the 
position in the system of knowledge · beliefs to which a newly verified 
85 . Russell, HKSL1 105. Cf. Werloneister 1s 11 first person experience" 
in BSK. 
86. cr. DevTey, QFC . 
87. Cf. Carneades, Butler, Dewey, Bowne, Larrabee . Spaulding and De-
'Vlolf were also cited in the 11 Introduction11 • Cf. also Russell, HKSL, 
516-517. 
88. Cf. Chapter II1 Section 3.b. 
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knowledge-belief belongs . 
Deductive , rational reasoning proceeds at this stage to test 
conformity with or disparity from those knowledge- beliefs which the 
individual calls to his own attention · for purposes of comparison and 
· of organization. This process of drawing knowledge-beliefs into the 
focus of attention is largely a creative act of the mind. As has been 
previously mentioned, the implications of a deductive process are 
· severely limit ed in scope.. Once a concept is present in consciousness , 
however, and -available to comparison, the deductive process switches 
into . effective action in demonstrating conformity or non-conformity. 
While Dubs says , 11 The function of the syllogism is criticism only" , S9 
t he general -acknowledgement of logic i ans is that deductive reasoning 
furnishes an important (at least ex post facto) systematiz:·ing resource. 
Complete conformity with existent knowledge- beliefs is the evi-
dence of the rationalistic relation; the new knowledge-belief does not 
modify the existent system, but at most furnishes an additional demon-
stration of it . If , however , the group of knowledge beliefs is inad-
equately systematized, the new knowledge- belief may contribute to the 
system by interpolating new linkages within that system. This efficacy 
and significance in- systematization of.'_ knowledge depends primarily upon _ 
the creative act of mind in drawing pert inent topics into attention. 
Whenever a new knowledge- belief does not conform with previousl y 
existent knowledge- beliefs, the resultant disparity may be one of any 
degree from minor to major proportion:- The proportion of disarrangement 
of the system, however, depends so strongly -upon the unexplained factor 
89. Dubs , RI , 197• 
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of attention that rationalism cannot claim to have furnished the con-
stituents of a method by which any such reorganizing judgment is made . 90 
The phrase 11degree of disarrangement 11 is not interrled to confute the 
former proposition that deductive verification yields an all or none 
judgment. The rationaJ:jStic judgment will always be 11 yes 11 or 11 no 11 to 
the relations of propositions , never the establishment of degrees of 
probable t r uth or error. (Probability is the product of a quite dif-
ferent method of procedure: schematizing an observed group of data, etc.)9l 
However , in the process of systematization, if a knowledge-belief differs 
from another knowledge-belief or beliefs , the resultant disarrangement of 
system may be minor or major according to the importance of the effected 
belief or beliefs and also in accordance with the munber of "no 1s 11 liihich 
the new 11yes 11 entails . 
A disarrangement wi thin a system of rationalistic thought can be 
relieved only by checking definition, classification, or syllogistic 
reasoning. If such a check does not alleviate the difficulty the only 
choice is to amend the system sufficiently to accommodate the exception 
or to revise the postulates . The progress of science has marked the 
overthrow of rationalistic systems by the weight of exceptions which 
would have been required to teep them going . Cf. Ptolemy and Copernicus . 
The rationalistic met od of relation and of systematization is again 
the application and operation of the criterion of consistency. This 
rationalistic method of relation is not to be confused with the method 
of evaluation in the ethical sense . (But , the value problem is similar 
90 . Cf. Chapter II, Section J . c . 
91. See 11Probability11 in Chapter II. 
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to the knowledge problem and the analysis of the value problem would 
tern to reproduce all the stages urrler which the knm-rledge problem has 
been discussed: insight , verification, and relation. ) 
The rationalistic organization of relations with respect to the 
knovlledge-claim-turned-into-belief is a system based wholly on the 
proportionate relations of parts and simple wholes . It cannot express 
the relation of the parts of organic wholes whose parts cannot be 
mechanically assembled to produce the living organism. Nor can it 
express the developmental, evolutionary system which expands from more 
to more while requiring judgments at intervals which express both the 
truth of the present situation and the directions tm'lard which or from 
which the development is moving. 
( 4) Summary 
The theses of this section of the chapter are emnnerated belm-r: 
(a) Characteristics of the Rationalistic Method: 
1 . Rationalism is the deductive reasoning, judging, or compre-
hending activity of the mind which aims at valid propositions or method-
ology. (Section 3.a., above . ) Deduction is the mental analysis of given 
postulates by precisely defined procedures which reveal the necessarily 
constituent relations among those postulates . (Section 3. a. (2), above.) 
The two great systems of deduction are those stemming from Aristotle 
(syllogistic i..r1ference) and from Hegel (dialectical inference). 
2. The criterion of rationalism is the system of principles in-
herent in the mental -v10rk of verifying its o•-rn efforts : consistency. 
(Section 3. a. (1) and Section 3. b . (3), above . ) Hegel enlarged the 
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concept of consistency to an organic, evolving concept · of coherence. 
3. The affinity of rationalistic and mathematical reasoning is 
indicative of the scope of their apPlication, viz., where regular 
quantitative relations inhere which are to be extracted analytically 
and formulated explicitly. (Section 3. a. (3), above.) 
(b) Points of Effectiveness in the Rationalistic Method: 
1. Rationalism demonstrates consistency among related propo-
sitions. (Section 3. b. (3), above.) 
2. Rationalism expresses analytic factoring which represents 
a generally quantitative relation. (Section 3. a. (3), above.) 
3. Rationalism reasons from acknowledged authority. Deduction 
forms hypotheses often found fruitful by experimental and other empirical 
testing. (Section 3. a. (3), above.) 
4. Rationalism systematizes that which is present and known. 
(Section 3. b. (1), above.) 
5. Rationalism encourages the development of precise units of 
logical and grammatical construction. (Section 3. b. (2), above.) 
6. Rationalism describes a status quo situation. (Section 3. 
b. (3), above.) 
(c) Points of Inadequacy in the Rationalistic Method:92 
1. Rationalistic method constantly aims at and characteristi-
cally claims absolute certainty about material truth. For formal truth, 
when one postulates the rules of a system and postulates perfect defi-
nition, a restricted kind of speculative certainty is attained. L~ order 
92. The ways in which these inadequacies are dealt with in nonrational 
philosophy is the subject for Chapter II. 
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to do so, of course, abstract symbols are a necessity. Such is the case 
in formal logic and in mathematics. (Cf. Section 3. b. (2), above: con-
trast Chapter II, Section 3. a. (2).) 
2. Rationalistic method cannot produce insight in problem 
situations without appealing beyoni itself to empirical data. (Cf. 
Section 3. b. (1), above; contrast Chapter II, Section 3. a. (2).) 
3. Rationalistic method cannot demonstrate degrees of prob-
ability among propositions except in the case of those propositions whose 
relations are expressible in terms of precise mathematical frequency. 
(Cf. Section 3. b. (3), above; contrast Chapter II, Section 3. a. (2).) 
l~. Rationalistic nethod canmt formally escape the circle of 
the given and that which is actually present in thought. (Inherent in 
Hegelian deduction is the reference beyond itself to the data of ex-
perience.) (Cf. Section 3. b. (1), above; contrast Chapter II, Section 
3. a. (1).) 
5. Classical logic does not draw knowledge-beliefs into atten-
tion in order to create an integrated system of beliefs. Hegelian 
logic formally points a direction but not a content. Rationalism does 
not specify the postulates of the concept nor does it involve any but 
the formal :iJD.plicates. (Cf. Section 3. b. (1), above; contrast Chapter 
II, Section 3. a. (1).) 
6. Rationalistic method cannot discover and demonstrate the 
unique properties of wholes nor the truth of developing experience 
in process. Hegel's logic proposed a formula of rationalistic type, 
but its constant requirement of empirical 11phenomenology11 invalidates 
it as a purely rationalistic methodology. (Cf. Section 3. b. (3), 
above; contrast Chapter II, Section 3. a. (2).) 
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c. Rationalism as a System of Philosophy 
Rationalism has functioned primarily as a method of philosophy. 
Methods, of course, are not equally theories nor always theories. How-
ever, critical philosophy has pointed out that methods often have char-
acteristic influences and often have subtle propositional tenets which 
are assumed by their use. Hegelian logic is a rather brash attempt at 
the integration of fonn and content. Unfortunately, when the content has 
been criticized the formal structure was imperilled also. 
To the examination of the Jilicages of rationalism as a:· method 
and rationalism as a content the developnent of the definition of 
rationalism :oow 1e ads. 
Although subtle terrlencies and general dispositions do :oot lead 
to arbitrary statements, the factors now to be enumerated under the 
headings of the main divisions of philosopny are inferences from the 
methodology as defined. 
(1) The Theory with Respect to Logic 
(a) The emphasis upon necessity in the deduction of rela-
tions and in the verification of judgments is a methodological value 
which issues forth in a tendency to require a similar connection in the 
subject matter with which the rationalist deals. The emphasis upon cer-
tainty and mathematics contribute to this valuation of necessity. The 
outcome of this tenden:y is to introduce the pattern of necessity into 
the interpretation of events which inclines to a preference for mechan-
ical, materialistic linkages (e.g., Hobbes and the world of nature as 
conceived by Descartes) in contrast to data which would indicat,e the 
presence or chance or choice among the contributory factors. Even the 
all-inclusive absolute in Hegelian philosophy inclines more to the former. 
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(b) The relative cohesiveness of rationalistic principles 
when they are the criterion of selection among knowledge-beliefs pre-
sents a stubborn barrier to the admission of novel and apparently in-
consistent data of experience. One notes the charge of determinism 
levelled at Spinoza and the label of 11block universe" attached to 
modern idealistic rationalism. In this respect the logical methods 
of deductive thinking exercise a conservative influence upon reflective 
selection, verification, and systematization; witness also the frequent 
references to the 11 guile of reason" and to the "pride of reason". 
Eisler mentions a tendency in rationalism to give exclusive attention 
to the rationalistic data and he also notes the tendency to value the 
rationalistic data higher than others.93 
(c) The previous discussion of language indicates that purism 
of grammatical structure and terminology as well as the tendency to 
hypostatize terminology (cf. the attempt to treat terms and concepts 
with mathematical precision) is a characteristic of rationalistic method 
which places its stamp immediately on the product of reasoning. 
(d) Deductive logic, classical or dialectical, is the common 
norm of rationalism.94 
(2) The Theory with Respect to Metaphysics 
(a) The general metaphysical system to which rationalism, 
93. Eisler (ed.), I PB, 579. 
94. Runes (ed.), DOP, 263. 
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as defined, tends is one in . which relations are static and mechanical. 
The Eleatic doctrine of the impossibility of change has had a lasting 
influence on philosophic thought.95 Philosophy, until modern times, 
was guided by its aim for the universal, unchangeable, and eternal.96 
Descartes' God was unchanging and thus there were no modes in His 
existence.97 Classical rationalism is inept in dealing with the rela-
tions of evolutionary and genetic developnent. Dialectical rationalism 
is constantly charged with creating a block universe. A great part of 
experience is involved in the experiences of growth and novelty with 
which an adequate philosophy must deal. 
(b) Rationalism as a theory of philosophy must somehow 
prove there is a positive relation between the realm of objects and 
the r e alm of thought. This relation i s postulated by Parmenides 98 and 
recurs regularly in the history of philosophy.99 Rationalism in deduction 
and analysis seems to encourage the bifurcation of existence even while 
postulating some absolute unity. Note that logical empiricism is basically 
rationalism plus scientific pragmatism. Note also Descartes' mind and 
body. The postulate of unity by contrast to the differentiation seems 
forced; if the unity be stressed the differentia wither and wane. 
Kant showed in his Critigue of Pure Reason that if the r ealm of 
objects is unlike the r ealm of thought, human minds will never be able 
rationally to define that realm of objects. If rationalism is 
95. Thilly, HOP, 32-40. 
96. Ibid., 63, referring to Plato. 
97. Ibid.' 280. 
98 . Ibid., 28 . 
99. Cf. Aristotle (Chapter I II, Section 1), Descartes and occasionalism. 
(Thilly , HOP, 280). Note also Leibniz 1 pre-established harmony 
(Thilly, HOP, 372). 
metaphysically true in some ultimate and absolute s ense , the real 
interrelationship of the objective world and the structure of ration-
alistic thought must be shown. 
In consequence of the wide areas in which rationalism does not 
seem adequate to describe objects or to systematize propositions 
representing the facts of experience, rationalism has largely been 
invalidated as a process for relating the logical and objective sys-
tenlli. If rationalistic systematization were valid as a representation 
of objectivity, most laboratory and experimental observation and the 
other techniques of validation would be unnecessary. 
(c) Furthermore, as Kant also showed, and as the current 
argument implies, a rationalistic system is dependent upon the a priori 
validity of certain propositions which are just given and not deduced.100 
Plato 1s doctrine of ideas serves this same function.lOl The principles 
which serve as method, goal, and gtdde cannot be deduced or justified; 
they have to be found and accepted . Cf. Descartes' basic proposition: 
Cogito , ergo sum. Not even is their 11 frui-e' necessarily a justification 
or verification; the view assumes that that which the mind posits not 
only is but must be. 
(d) There is a continuing interchange of pattern and applica-
bility between a rationalistic philosophy and mathematics and geomet-
ry.l02 
100. Cf. Eisler (ed.), WPB , 579, and Lalande (ed.), VP, 869. 
101. Thilly, HOP, 62. 
102. Lalande (ed.), VP, 869. 
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(e) Lalande points out that one of the products of ration-
alistic philosophy is that rationalism itself provides a general reason 
f . 103 or be1.ng. 
(f) Rationalism tends to present too neat and orderly a 
view of reality which experience refutes: e.g., Plato , Aristotle, 
Spinoza, especially Leibniz, and Kant in regard to the principle of 
continuity in nature. 
(3) The Theory with Respect to Psychology 
(a) Rationalism is not a psychological theory or method of 
insight. It does not pretend to be psychological; but it develops a 
psychology from its theory of development of knowledge within a mind. 
Rationalism can only add a theory of mind- work to the presupposition 
of a priori ideas in explanation of the phenomenon of insight; in-
sight is one of the ultimate and inexplicable characteristics of 
the mind. The rationalist tends to emphasize demonstrative verifi-
cation at the expense of attention to the problems of insight and 
of empirical verification. 
(b) Rationalism tends to produce two characteristic 
factors : (1) separation of mind and body 104 and (2) a faculty 
105 psychology. Separation of mind and body occurs in recognition 




Lalande (ed.), VP, 869. 
Cf . Descartes and Spinoza. Contrast Leibniz (Cf. Chapter III, 
Section 3). 
Cf. Scholasticism (Thilly, HOP, 193). 
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selves but on data furnished from 11without 11 • 106 (Compare the theories 
of Plato and Descartes.) Reason is a detached philosopher-king 
ruling over the other parts of the person. (Note Aristotle 1s plant, 
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animal, and reasonable soul, also Augustine 's acting, sensing, 
and intellectual soul.108) The detachment of reason, always the 
factor to be watched, suggests detachment of those other functions 
whose operation affords the cues for reason to perform through pro-
viding data for the field of attention. The faculties , then, become 
distinct to the point of de-emphasizing the unique vnity of the per-
sonality--by parceling out all its functions among the 11 parts 11 • 
However, it must be noted in fairness that Descartes and Spinoza so 
emphasized the Vlholeness of spirit that they did not develop a 
compartmentalized, faculty psychology. 
(4) The 'rheory with Respect to Ethics 
One of the most confusing aspects of the topic of rationalism 
is the character of the application to ethics. Philosophers, for 
all t heir high- borne theorizing have generally maintained an in-
tense concern for the ethical implications or corollaries of their 
speculation. 
As one surveys the history of philosophy the contributions to 
ethics of Plato , Aristotle , Spinoza, and Kant stand out particularly. 
106. 111, ithout 11 does not necessarily require an external , material-
istic body; it may imply merely sensations of the same mind. 
107. Cf. Chapter III, Section l. 
108. Thilly, HOP, 151. 
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It seems to be more true of "rationalists'' than 11 nonrationalists" 
that their systems give careful attention to ethics . As Thilly says: 
. 
vlith the Greek thinkers of the classical period and 
many of the great philosophers who came after him 
Descartes emphasizes the practical ethical signifi-
cance of philosophy: 11 The study of philosophy is 
more imperatively requisite for the regulation of 
our manners and for conducting us through life than 
is the use of our eyes for directing our steps.ul09 
Nevertheless a persistent charge against rationalism is that it 
devaluates the moral life. Kierkegaard, vfilliam James , John Dewey 
all join in proclaiming a new significance for human conduct in 
breaking the shackles of intell ectualism. 
The attack of the nonrationalists yields at least the suggestion 
that rationalistic thinking in ethics is subject to the twin dangers 
of dogmatism and legalism. 
The enthronement of demonstrative deduction as the strict prin-
ciple of mental operation produces in the field of ethics an equally 
narrow , legalistic systematization of values . The evolution of the 
value- claim into a value-belief is much like the development of a 
knowledge-belief from a knowledge-claim. Naturally, when the cri-
terion itself (which, of course, is a key value- belief) is a rigid 
formula, the resultant standard of value is some kind of impersonal 
necessity. Jesus 1 revolution within Judaistic legalism driven by 
a kind of righteousness that springs creatively from the spirit is 
one of the profound and eternal contributions to the understanding 
of the human situation. 
109 • Thilly, HOP, 27 4 n. 
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But even that insight is drained of significance in the authori-
tarian, dogmatic, and legalistic machinery of a medieval society. Re-
garding the spirit of the Middle Ages, Thilly says: 
Within the body politic the individual finds himself 
under restraint and discipline, socially, politically, 
economically: for the great mass obedience is the 
law of life , subjection of self to the authority of 
some group: obedience to the rules, obedience to the 
Lord, obedience to the guild , obedience to the master, 
obedience to the head of the family. Authority and tra-
dition are superior to public opinion and the individual 
conscience; faith , superior to reason; the corporation, 
superior to the person; and the caste, superior to the man.llO 
A further tendency of classical thought which anti-intellectual-
ists bring against its ethical theories is its emphasis upon unity and 
all-embracing inclusiveness and consequent inadequate attention to the 
individual. Rat ionalism is a passion for an all-inclusive formula, an 
Absolute, even of tautologous definition. As Dubs says, 11Deduction 
thus shows a power of grouping together diverse conclusions as results 
f t f · t · ,,lll T l f . . d. t . al o one se o propos~ ~ons. he aw o pars~ony ~s a tra ~ ~on 
rationalistic standard which is fundamentally a statement of the ration-
alistic preference for systematization: the more compact the better. 
The law of parsimony (Occam's razor) is generally accepted as one of 
the basic tenets of both philosophic and scientific speculationll2 al-
though Kant points out that it is a regulative, i.e., non-c onstitutive 
principle. Part of the motivation for existentialism is the demand for 
keeping the distinguishing marks of individuality in philosophy 
1.10. Thilly, HOP, 159. 
111. Dubs , RI , 202. 
112. Cf. Burtt, PPRT , 365-366. 
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of experience. 
We sense that everything we come across is individual; 
but what we see l'lith our minds , and what we say we see , 
is not the signature of individuation in things but 
the form or face , the generality signifyinf something 
that one thing has in common with another. 13 
(5) Summary 
The general philosophical theory of rationalism tends to cluster 
around this group of propositions: 
1 . The rationalist introduces a pattern of necessity into the 
i nterpretation of events . (C:f . Section 3. c . (1), above . ) 
2. Rationalistic principles tend to mental conservatism 1-vith 
respect to reflective selection, verification, and systematization. 
(Cf. Section3. c . (1) , above . ) 
3 . Rationalism tends to describe a mechanical , static meta-
physical system. Cf. the Eleatics, Plato, etc . (Cf. Section 3 . c . 
(2) , ab ove . ) 
4. The similarity of the realm of objects and the realm of 
ideas is a presupposition of rationalism. Cf. Parmenides , Aristotle , 
Kant, etc . (Cf . Section 3 . c . (2) , above . ) 
5. Rationalism depends upon a system of a priori propositions . 
(Cf. Section 3. c . (2), above . ) 
6. Rationalism applied to psychology tends to introduce separa-
tion of mind and body and a rigid faculty psychology. (Cf. Section 3 . 
c . (3) , above . ) 
113. Har per, EXI, 118. 
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7. Rationalistic ethics is characteristically a strict system 
subject to the twin dangers of dogmatism · and legalism. (Cf . Section 3. 
c. (3), above . ) 
8 . Rationalism tends toward an all- inclusive formula at the 
expense of the differentia of experience . (Cf. Section 3. c . (4), 
above . ) 
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CHAPrER II 
A DEFINITION OF IDNR.ATIONALITY IN PHll.OSOPHY 
1. Distinction of Nonrationality from Irrationality 
The previous chapter revealed that the nonrational. in philosophy 
may be reasonable; indeed, nonrational traits may well be demanded by 
reason to correct the imbalance of a structure of thought built on 
inadequate grasp of the relevant data, too narrow perspective regarding 
implications, or too restricted insight into the dynamics involved. One 
of the essential dema:rxls of reason is inclusiveness. 
Not so with the irrational. With irrationality, philosophy is 
gone; the quest for understanding and order in experience is abandoned. 
Not only that, but meaning is gone; what the right hand sets up, the left 
knocks down. He who in confusion or despair abandons himself to irra-
tionality has judged experience to be incompatible with the nature of 
the human understanding and the latter to be a distorting, perverting, 
mocking instrument without utility. 
Nevertheless, this grim view of the incongruity of the person and 
his environment has found expression in a number of forms and these 
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will be mentioned briefly as an indication of extreme .types of irration-
ality. This study will deal very little with them since it is concerned 
with the systems of Lovejoy, Montague, and Tsanoff. 
a. Skeptical Nihilism 
Skepticism asserts that genuine knowledge is impossible,l hence 
radical skepticism is nihilistic regarding both knowledge and experience. 
It ·is self-refuting in affirming what it is denying and thus removes 
itself from serious consideration as a philosophical procedure. A great 
deal of irrationality is attributable to those who have argued to a 
conclusion based on premises of ignorance. Along with radical skeptics 
may be listed those simple persons whose intellectual exercises so 
delight them that they never advance from the practice-hall of the para-
doxical 1 antino~c 1 and incompatible to the concert stage of artistic, 
systematic, and purposeful perfor.mance. 
b. Faradoxism 
Not only do some delight in the imagery and novelty of the para-
doxical., but some (particularly unorthodox religious figures such as 
Tertullian1 Kierkegaard, and Barth) propose that the paradoxes and the 
contradictions regarding the most crucial issues of life are ultimately 
true. In their concept, God 1s truth is contrary--wholly other-to man's 
wisdom. Bacon is quoted as saying, "The more absurd and incredible any 
divine mystery is, the greater honor we do God in believing it.112 
1. Cf. Runes, DOF, 277-278 for other usages. 
2. Thilly, HOP, 262. 
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Such a lack of relation makes systematization of thought impossible; human 
beings may stand in l«>n1er or amazement before such revelation, but they 
ma.y not understard it,3 or even define it consistently. 
c. Solipsism 
Solipsism is a logical extreme of a tendency of thought which 
denies reality to arry except the sole mind in its own activity. 4 It 
is contrary to systematic judgment regarding the vast majority of exper-
ience. Reason as inclusive aDi coherent judgment refutes it, not 
empirical evidence in itself. In lonely isolation, the solipsistic mo-
nad, if there were one, would proceed oblivious to siren, divine, or 
mundane cajolery. 
d. Animal Bon:iage 
Psychological behaviorism, its close relative, instinct psychol-
ogy, and some other concepts of human motivation make of man an animal 
bouni by mechanical response, habit, or instinct-driven without the 
capability of indepen::lent ~ction ·or thought. 5 Even the structural or 
functional maturation theory of personality is only a moderately dis-
guised mechanistic theory. 6 Reason or moral choice is negated by con-
cepts like these. cr. also: 
3. Of. DeWolf, RRR, summarized in 11 Introduction11 • 
4. Of. Runes, DOP, 295. 
5. A matter of no small worder is how William James managed to find 
arry consistency between his concepts of instinct and the remain-
der of his philosophy--even the rest of his psychology. On his 
concept of instinct see James, FOP, 383. 
6. Thorpe, PFP, 190. 
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I believe we can write a psychology and never use the 
words, consciousness, conten~, introspectively verifi-
able, imagery, an:i the like. 
e. Divine or Demoniacal Bondage 
The extreme forms of the theory of predestination which describe 
the phenomenal world as dictated in detail by either the supreme or 
some degraded power in the universe are merely a different form of the 
denial of reasonable or moral choice. 
Sometimes this destiny is thought of in terms of an en-
compassing Fate or Luck (Roman and Greek), sometimes as 
the cyclic routine of the wheel of Fortune (Indian), 
sometimes as due to special gods or goddesses (Clothe, 
Lachesis and Atropos in Hesiod), sometimes as the Kis-
met or mysterious Fate (Mohammedanism), as due to rat-
ional Necessity (Stoicism) and more often in terms of 
the sheer will of a sovereign Deity (Hebrew, Jewish 
and Christian). In historic Christianity utterances of 
Paul ~ are given as . the authority for the doctrine (Eph. 
l:ll; Rom. 8:30; Rom. 9:18}. St. Augustine believed 
that man1s own sinfulness made his salvation utterly 
dependent upon the sheer grace and election of God. 
~reme expressions of Calvinism and Lutheranism held 
that man does absolutely nothing toward his salvation 
apart from the grace an:i good will of the Divine. 
Classical examples of theological determinism are the 
views of Bucer (1491-1551), Calvin (see Calvinism), 
and the American theologi.!;g, Jonathan Edwards (1703-
1758). £"vergilius Form_}'"' . _ 
Needless to say there is likewise a teleology innocent of the 
charge of irrationality; e.g., a supreme power may direct in view of 
human choices. 
7• Watson, Art. (1913). 
8. Runes, (ed.), .DOP, .248. 
even extreme Calvinism. 
no efforts would avail. 
It should be noted there is some truth in 
If the envirollDlent were wholly hostile, 
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f. Irrationalistic Rationalism 
The ill-advised use of some revelatio~la±ms as bases for in-
discriminate deductive and analytic systems of thought has driven some 
rationalists to forego all the other tenets of their creed in order to 
make this a priori concept hold together. 
g. 
Many medieval theologians had held and asserted when 
you are dealing with a sufficiently abstract ar:rl ele-
vated stibje9t, the ordinary laws of thought cease to 
be bin:iing. 
han Vital 
Throughout the history of philosophy there have been not always 
a very small number of persons who would sUbstitute the will for the in-
tellect as the basic factor in reality. Duns Scotus 1 emphasis on the 
freedom of God becomes voluntaristic; Jacob Boehme's mysticism is a 
full-fledged voluntarism.10 Schelling, Schopenha~r, Hartmann, and 
Nietzsche are all voluntaristic: will is more fundamental than reason. 
Bergson's duration (as a blind thrust of primary force) would 
lie close to the border-line between the irrationality of the preced-
ing varieties and the nonrational as developed in this dissertation: 
Duration is the continuous progress of the past which 
gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.ll 
Organic evolution resembles the evolution of a con-
sciousness .12 
9. Lovejoy, Art. (1904)1, 164. 
10. Thilly, HOP, 249. 
11. Bergson, CE, ?. 
12. Ibid.' 32. 
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Duration ••• ~ • •• the very substance of the world in 
which we live. 3 
Intelligence, according to Bergson, is a function of knowing the 
discrete and the static ani these by analysis.14 11The intellect is 
characterized by a natural inability to compreherrl life.1115 11 That which 
is instinctive in instinct cannot be expressed in terms of intelligence, 
16 
nor, consequently, can it be analyzed." 
h. Nonraticnal or Surd Given 
Plato 1s 11matter11 or "receptacle" is 11 a dull, irrational, [!ion-
rational in our usagej rec~citrant f~rce1117 {rather, a somewhat) 
upon which the true reality of creative mini acts. 
Duns Scotus conceives the given as nonrational in the sense of 
being contingent upon God 1 s will and not necessarily as it is nor 
continuing as the product of God's will.18 
Brightman's concept of the Given includes {1) the "eternal ani 
uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness which exhibit all 
the ultimate qualities of sense objects {qualia), disorderly impulses 
and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of 
space ani time1119 ani (2) "Whatever in God is the source of surd evi1."20 
Brightman acknowledges empirically the irrationality of evil wills; 
they are not 11 givenl1 but are {indirect) products of creation. 
13. Bergson, CE, 45. 17. Thilly, HOP, 65. 
14. Ibid., 170-172. 18. Ibid., 213. 
15. Ibid.' 132. 
16. Ibid.' 185 
19. Brightman, roR, 337. 
20. Ibid. 
Although Brightman 1 s . cosmology included non- and irrational ele-
ments 1 it is important to point out that he, unlike Bergson, does not 
fi:OO reason incapable of dealing with the subject matter. His theory 
of empirical coherence will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The extreme forms of methodological irrationality which invalidate 
the attempt of reasonable thought or action destroy not only philosophy 
but morality, science, and knowledge as well. 
Never surely, did a sillier or more self-stultifying 
idea enter the human milli, than the idea that thinking 
as such · •. • is a vast irrelevancy • • • a mysterious 
redulliancy in a cosmos which would follow precisely 
the same course without it.21 
i. The Transcendent or Wholly Other 
Long before Barth or Kierkegaard, the irrational concept of the 
wholly other had been formulate~ by Philo in his theory of God. 
God is . an absolutely transcen:l,ent being, so far above us 
that we cannot ·comprehem him or define him, the ineffable 
one, who is higher than knowledge, virtue, and2~he high-
. est good. We know that he is, not ~ he is. 
To predi~te anything of him is to limit him. [Scot us 
Erigena.J ... 3 . · 
Bayle held that both philosophical and theological doctrines were 
11 not only beyond reason but contrary to reason11 • 24 
21. Lovejoy, Art. (1920)1 • 
22. Thilly, HOP, 123. Cf. Plotinus, Ibid., 127. 
23. Ibid., 165. Note by way of contrast that Plato always conceived the 
Good as the limited. 
24. Ibid., 392. 
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During the whole Christian era up to the sixteenth cent~J it was 
commonly agreed that matters of faith and dogma were not sUbject to 
either rational nor empirical criticism. Before this concept was re-
futed there were systematic attempts to harmonize or to divide the 
territories in which faith or reason was applicable, but not until 
Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648)25 proposed a universal philosophy of 
natural religion does the topic of this dissertation even get discussed. 
To return to modern times, Harper s~s of Heidegger, 11 My self-
concern, my awareness that I am, is .!!2!:, defined or transparent; it is 
not comprehensible. n26 
Between the theses of the extreme rationalists ani the antitheses 
of irrationalism there are already some hints of neutral ground, recon-
ciliation, or possibly even Hegelian synthesis.27 These grounds are to 
be referred to herein as nonratit::ml. Their classification follows. 
2. Distinction of Nonrationality from Empiricism 
Not nearly so extreme opposition to rationalism as a method or 
criterion is represented by the great school of philosophers who have 
appealed primarily to concrete experience-particularly sense-experience 
-as the source of knowledge, the criterion for verification, and the 
data for establishing relations. These philosophers have usually been 
25. Thilly, HOP, 245. 
26. Harper, EXI, 00. 
27. Hegel's syntheses are always supposed to add some empirical factor. 
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called empiricists. 
The followers of Plato became dissatisfied in the attempt to re-
strict philosophy to the intelligible, eternal forms. They wanted 
philosophy to sa;r something about the world of appearance also. Aris-
totle 1 s philosophy is much more empirical than was Plato 1 s, although 
in his refinement of concepts, Aristotle 1s 11 pure form11 is less empirical 
than Plato's Forms or Ideas. (Cf. Chapter III, Section 1.) The demand 
for c~ncreteness in apPlicability to experience has waxed stronger in 
modern times. Berkeley's polemic against abstract ideas (Cf. Chapter 
III, Section 2.) is one of the sources from which pragmatism and instru-
mentalism have arisen. 
After the reign of scholasticism (also with its preoccupation for 
the other-worldly), modern empiricism draws attention back to the world 
of common experience and of nature. 
Modern times have seen attempts to mediate the opposition of empir-
icism vs. rationalism by such systems as that of Hegel. Contemporary 
efforts such as Spaulding's, Brightman's, and Del:lolf 1s to bring forth a 
coherent theory of reason are evidence of this mediational activity. 
In order mt to restrict the inve.stigation in this dissertation 
to arry particular kind of empiricism., in order to attempt to avoid a 
pre-established schism between the r.:tloil.a:t and the empirical, and in 
order to be genuinely inclusive of data (some empiricists28 restrict 
their data so severely as to rule out much common experience) this 
dissertation will refer to non-deductive., non-demonstrative reasoning 
and its characteristic content as nonrational. 
28. Vide the sensationalism of Locke's successors Comte, K. Pearson, 
and twentieth century positivists, such as vlittgenstein, Carnap, 
~er, and others. 
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3. Definition of the Nonrational 
a. The Nonrational as Dete~ining Method 
(1) At the Stage of Insight 
Insight was defined in the previous chapter as the mental thrust 
at a possible solution of a problem situation.29 It was said there 
that deduction does not function as a method of revealing insights 
(forming concepts); deduction functions only as a clarifying formu-
lation of a prior knowledge-claim. 
For nonrational sources of insight there follows a discussion of 
all those sources which reach out beyond the criterion of the exclusive 
validity of the processes of the individual mind. The nonrational sources 
incluie: empirical induction, prestige authoritaria.Tlism, specific re-
velation, sign reading, trial and error, attention am interest and 
concern, nonrational faculties, sensitivity to empirical novelty, 
evolutionism, empirical coherence, and a normative concept of personality. 
(a) Empirical. Induction 
Empirical. induction is an attempt by the human reason to consult 
data sympathetically and interiorly. Rationalism tries to impress its · 
· pattern upon data; the scholastic view of faith did likewise. Induc-
tion, on the other hand, tries to see data as they are before laying 
out a program of doing something with them. Modern man is more self-
conscious of the tendencies to 11 projection11 , as psychiatry has demon-
strated the prevalence of that practice. 
29. Cf. Chapter I, Section 3. b. (1). 
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Just as it might have been possible to have adopted the familiar 
distinction of rational and empirical, it might also have been possible 
to have organized the present investigation around the distinction 
of deductive and inductive. The latter is not being done for the same 
reasons that the former is not: (1) to avoid particular limited de-
finitions of induction, (2) to avoid preconceived schisms between in-
duction and deduction, and (3) to be genuinely inclusive of all perti-
nent data. 
Since John Stuart Mill the methodology of induction, in the broad-
est and most inclusive sense of the term, has developed considerably. 
The dissertation will propose a method of induction which is referred 
to as coherent and synoptic. This method will be described and defined 
in the course of this chapter. 
(b) Frestige Authoritarianism 
One substitute proposed for self-evident truth as a fixed datum 
is historical arii/or Biblical revelation. Social psychology refers to 
the operation of this dependence upon external authority in terms . of 
"prestige factors". In actuality this belief serves in the same way as 
rationalistic self-evident principles; it is just the same theory with a 
different source of first principles. Its limitations and defects are 
the same. 
(c) Specific Revelation 
Faith which relies upon mystical revelation is cited as one of 
(and usually appraised by its claimants as the highest of) the sources 
of insight. Cf. Augustine: "Understand in order that you may believe; 
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believe in order that you may · un:lerstan:\. 113° The revelation of feeling 
is the base of the system worked out by Jacobi.3l 
"This communication has taken, in the history of religions, 
almost every conceivable form," says VergiJ.iu.s Form.32 It should be 
noted that only personal revelation becomes a nonrational source of 
insight; historical or Biblical revelation function as a source of 
insight not as revelation but as prestige factors. 
(d) Sign---Reading 
At the source of the search for means of control of the . environ-
ment which motivates so much of science is the grasping at signs-
primitively in superstitious and magical fashion. It is not far re-
moved from irrationality; that is certain. But at any rate there is 
the curious grasping at 11signs 11 (to iniicate favorable planting 
seasons or time to make war or peace, etc.) on the part of more or less 
superstitious people as a source of aid to the solution of the problems 
of life. 
(e) Trial and Error, Accident, Intuition or 11 Hunch11 , and 
Elimination of .\lternatives by Testing 
Random selection and chance have been shown by psychology to be 
one of the means of resolving bewilderment under the necessity of unin-
formed choice. Systematic elimination of alternative possibilities is 
a refinement of the technique of trial and error. Dewey gives trial 
and error a key role in his system: "There is thus no a priori test or 
30. In Thilly, HOP, 148. Likewise Meister Eckhardt, Thilly, HOP, 22l; 
and Nicholas of Cusa, Thilly, HOP, 231. 
31. Thilly, HOP, 430. 
32. In Runes (ed.), DOP, 271. 
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rule for the determination of the operations which define ideas. 1133 
The profit from the intelligent person's experience consists 
of his acquiring clues from his experience to apply to his future 
choices. The attainment of maturity and breadth of experience then 
usually decreases progressively the role of trial and error in the 
resolution of problem situations. 
(f) Attention, Interest, and Concern 
In any system of thought where the mind is not the bond-slave of 
some external or internal system--in other words, in any system where 
there is genuine choice, there is deference to the functions of atten-
tion, interest, and concern in the process of problem-solving. James 
calls attention to these extra-rationalistic factors in characteristic 
fashion: 
It would seem here to be the duty of his fthe pragmatist 1s_7 
critics to show with some explicitness why, being our 
sUbjective feelipgs, these satisfactions cannot yield 1ob-
jective1 truth.34 
To James, all factors, including reason, are objective (in the mind). 
Why accept some and reject others? Ledger Wood points out that attention 
may be involuntary or voluntary; if voluntary, then 11 guided by the sub-
ject 1s purpose or intention.u35 Attention :isa unique am irreducible state 
or characteristic of consciousness. This factor is so nearly akin to 
33. Dewey, QFC, 124. 
34. James, MT, 192-193. 
35. In Runes . (ed.), DOP, 27. 
78 
consciousness itself that the problem of insight is the problem of at-
tention, interest, and concern. Nevertheless, these factors call atten-
tion to the nonrational processes of the center of consciousness which is 
the more comprehenSive, vital whole~hi~ which the rationalistic pro-
cesses are members. 
Attention is notoriously wayward even in the experience of a con-
cerned and purposeful individual. The arid and deterministic character 
of much rationalistic thinking is not sue~ as to bolster one 1 s unflag-
ging interest in the task at hand. 
Attention mt. only wan:iers at random but it easily sinks into in-
sipid levels where mediocrity and boredom replace devotion and active 
concern. Ani, St. Paul was not the first nor the last to observe that 
even the most dedicated find themselves doing the contrary of their de-
sires and mt doing what they believe they should be doing. 
The disciplines which are undertaken to counteract the fact of 
waning and wandering attention are primarily nonrational. Some such are 
asceticism, ritualism, mediation aril/or prayer, and imitation or sug-
gestion. 
Some persons will look at these disciplines primarily in terms of 
the objective factors which they believe account for the efficacy of 
· the practice. "Objective" disciples will join societies which require 
asceticism; they will feel that the setting or ceremonies or ritual-
istic acts do things !.£ them; meditators and prayers in this group will 
look for external forces to impregnate the period of discipline with gifts 
not wholly present to the individual prior to the experience; suggest-
ible persons are directed by the mores of the groups to which they are 
related. 
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"Subjective" disciplinees will regard these same factors in terms 
of the placing of one~s self in the position and attitude for the 
desired effects to occur internally. Asceticism, ritualism, prayer, 
arrl suggestibility are not, to them, so much a product of the external 
11 furniture" of the situation as much as products of the self in follow-
ing self-adopted processes. 
Coherence, as a method of philosophy rests upon a statement of 
faith that can also be subjectively and objectively described. Sub-
jectively, it affirms that the personality seeking a reasonable inte-
gration of his experience needs and requires a wide perspective and 
that, objectively and complementarily, the experiences provided by the 
actual environnent are sufficiently varied am diverse to supply the 
need. This concept of personality describes its own dynamic, comple-
mented and correlated by environnental stimulation. 
(g) Nonrational Func£ions; 
Just as those who were disappointed with formal reason's failure 
to provide absolute certainty turned from reason to other somewhat 
compartmentalized 1 faculties 1 of personality, the same turn occurs in 
the search for sources of insight. If reason does not give the 
preferential clues, perhaps the will, the senses, the soul as the fac-
ulty of faith, the emotions, or the moral conscience may, these non-
rationalists may assert. 
Is it not singular that where deduction and analysis have occupied 
so dominant a place in philosophy, philosophers have been peculiarly 
susceptible to the method of search which prescribed in advance of the 
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finding that the 'pearl of great price 1 would be some isolated part 
of life, experience, or knowledge which exercised some magical power 
over the rest? One gets the impression they are always looking in 
the back of the book for the answer instead of working out the problem. 
Some false sense of security and accomplishment is produced in a 
mental shift of attention from one faculty to another. The results are 
not, however, due to the sole efficacy of the new source of data, and 
are not justification for the proclamation of a new exclusivism; the 
efficacy is tracable to the adgitbnal data which can be expected from 
!Bl fresh approach and should lead the investigator to embrace a com-
prehensive, all inclusive method. 
Positivism is one of the 'preferential clues 1 which are sought so 
avidly. The positivist calls special attention to the direct sensory 
experiences as the preferred regulators of insight and judgment. He 
claims that the inclination of a mentality to abstract, theorize, and 
generalize is a confusion and distraction which is to be studiously 
avoided. 
To say that people always know, or believe, propositions 
is no more informative than to say that they love their 
beloveds, or hunt quarry, or eat food. It tells us no 
more than that we believe what we believe, and know what 
we know.36 
The positivist also points out that sensory experience is the seat of 
most empirical verification. In so doing he adopts a restricted (and 
unwarranted) view of empiricism. Is not value experience, memory, or 
36. Ayer, FEK, 100. 
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purpose empirical? Indeed without memory, purpos~ and reason se.nse ex-
perience cannot function • 
. ;
The positivist's witness. for sensory experience directs attention 
to that objective environment which is the ground of sensation. This 
solution by simplification is adequate only so long as one is content 
not to question or to attempt to understand the realms of value, emo-
tion, and growth of personality--or even the more obvious and evident 
incoherencies of sensory representation. 
(h) Sensitivity to Empirical Novelty 
The attitude of open-mindedness in the observation and arrange-
mentment of data is one of the foUIXiations of scientific empiricism. 
Classical empiricists such as Locke admitted all the data of experience, 
both sensation and reflection.37 To him knowledge including intellec-
tual and moral values came from experience, not from innate ideas. 
It may be that the attitude of open-mindedness is but the symptom 
resulting from a psychologically more basic faculty of judgment. I f so, 
~ 
it is still valid to discriminate in such a faculty the rationalistic 
judgment from the empirical judgment. Empirical judgment, largely 
characterized by open-mindedness and tentativeness, has been one of the 
primary nonrational criteria of those minds which have opened up modern 
thought to the scientific, coherent method of solving problems. When 
unchecked by more mature consideration, the admirable exponent of open-
mindedness is susceptible ~o the afflictions of that cult which peculia~ 
ly contends that 11facts 11 in all their bright array solve a problem. 
37• Thilly, HOP, 310. 
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(i) Evolutionism 
With Fichte, Hegel, ani Darwin came an emphasis in thought upon 
origin, development, and ·direction which overthrew the ancient concepts 
of fixed classes. Fichte 1s concept of active substance particularly 
influenced subsequent thought regarding attributes of God arii/or an 
Absolute. The demand to consider sources and growth brought with it an 
empirical demand of no small power. 
The historical point of view has brought with it a broader 
conception of reason and what is r.at.lomh; it has taught 
us that it is only in the light of its origin and function 
that a thing can properly be judged, and that, accordingly, 
there may be a truer rationality in historical creed~, 
beliefs and institutions than in the self-confidence of 
the irxiividual of clear and distinct ideas who ventures to 
criticize what he does not understand.38 
(j) Empirical Coherence 
The ?oherent method urges upon the philosopher an attitude 
of patient and careful observation. It requires the mental habit 
of tentativeness referred to previously. Prescription does not 
precede but rather follo~s observation and diagnosis. Honest and 
co-operative, objective observations have revealed to modern man the 
especial significance of the process of growth, evolution, or 
dialectical unfolding which characterize a large part of his obser-
vations and thus his experiences. In the process of transforming 
growth, by whatever name, the coherent philosopher firiis himself 
building arii occupying more stately mansions, pushing back the 
38. Creighton, Art. (1918), 226. · 
frontiers of ignorance and meaness as he proceeds. The method does 
not prescribe the result (as rationalism tends to metaphysical monism). 
'i'iilliam James came to a metaphysical pluralism but there is no indication 
that this pattern is inherent in the method. This, too, James claimed. 
That method of collecting data and ever bringing new observations 
to enrich the stream of thought-the method in philosophy which deliber-
ately aims at a philosophy of judgment and wisdom arrl perspective-is 
empirical coherence. The latent superstitious magic of preferential 
faculties and lode-stones is banished; the narrow, restricted throne-
room is abarrloned in order to permit philosophy to reign in the broad 
courts which embrace all experience. "In a world where both the terms 
and their distinctions are affairs of experience, conjunctions that are 
experienced must be at least as real as anything else.u39 
The tremendous variety of the perplexities of self, society, nation, 
ani the cosmos along with their interrelationships is not screened out 
nor watered down by the arbitrary demand that it conform to any re-
stricted pattern; rather this panoply of perplexities is admitted with-
out disguise ar:rl is confronted with the total resources of the person-
ality sensing, feeling, moralizing, theorizing, even diligently working 
with them to maintain something of an integrated control of the situa-
tion. 
The efficacy of the method of coherence for assembling data is 
largely comparable to that of the modern public opinion poll; there 
39. James, ERE, 59~ 
84 
is as much difference between faculty-sampling and coherent sampling 
of philosophic data 8$ there is a difference between restricted group-
sampling a.n:i scientific sampling in public affairs data. 
(k) A Normative Concept of Personality 
This recital of some of the different means by which insight is 
obtained in problem-solving points to a special case of the pragmatic 
claim which is that problem-solving is a basic requirement of the human 
personality. The concept of the person as a whole-center of activity 
is introduced into modern philosophy by Lotze and Renouvier and Bowne, 
among others. Not by rationalistic methods only but by all the resources 
of his personality the human individual lives with the need of solving 
the problems and resolving the tensions that arise in his experience. 
It would probably be fair to say that it is these related 
concepts of fundamental wants and organism tensions that 
have led us to a conception of human dynamics that bids 
fair, in the light of present knowledge, to supersede all 
others in logical validity. If man is characterized by a 
variety of basic 11 needs 11 which demand satisfaction, their 
frustration will obviously set up desires or tensions of 
various kinds which call for release, or, we might say, 
restoration to equilibrium.40 
This idea of the wholeness of personality as an active unit is the 
core of the existentialist position. Harper writes, "The whole mind is 
aware, and its tending aspect is what is meant by will, am its behold-
ing aspect what is meant by knowing.u41 
40. Thorpe, PFP, 204. 
41. Harper, EXI, 139. 
It is of the nature of personality to require integration; mental, 
physical, and emotional tension, frustration, or maladjustment results 
from failur~ in this respect,. 42 Such is one of the roots am strengths 
of coherence: a point of view or a solution of a problem is not 
reached by any isolated authority whether that be external or internal 
to the in:iividual. Facts do mt give solutions, but facts confronted 
by personality are amenable to arrangement and classification, and are 
the test of proposed solutions. 
Summary 
The principal nonrational sources of insight are: (1) empirical 
induction, (2) prestige authoritarianism, (3) specific revelation, 
(4) sign-reading, (5) trial and error, accident, intuition or "hunch", 
and elimination of alternatives by testing, (6) attention, interest, 
and concern, (7) nonrational faculties, (8) sensitivity to empirical 
novelty, (9) evolutionism, (10) empirical coherence, and (11) a 
normative concept of personality. 
These factors are not wholly distinct and separate from each other. 
Data for personality as a whole to confront with its problem-solving 
activity are produced by (1) oracular sources (1, 2, 3, and 4, above), 
(2) nonrational faculties (7, above), and (3) dynamic and wholistic 
42. This investigator is constantly baffled at the classification of 
wants and tensions which psychologists draw up (e •. g., Thorpe, PFP, 
207 ani 209) completely ignoring the mental functions of order, 
consistency, and obligation and their derivatives: truth, beauty, 
and goodness. In the experience of a great many persons it appears 
established that frustration of mental function is just as destruc-
tive if not more so than frustration in other areas, e.g., sex. 
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concepts and functions of reason (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11, above). 
Unlike rationalism, nonrationalism does not appear to provide a 
content with characteristic systematization. In contrast to t{le ra-
tionalists' one source of data, nonrationalists list eleven and there is 
no claim that this list is exhaustive. 
The analysis which has been carried out does not indicate that 
there is anything in the nonrational side of the discussion to sup-
plant or to invalidate the rational except the radical claims for ex-
clusivism, necessity, or certainty on one side or the other. There-
fore, it appears that the division between rational and nonrational must 
be bridged; both sides supply data and insights which are required for 
a coherent and synoptic account of experience and reality. 
(2) At the Stage of Verification 
It was pointed out in the preceding chapter that deductive de-
monstration is a valuable and important method for checking the formal 
correctness of reasoning.43 More than for.mal correctness, however, 
verification customarily denotes checking hypotheses, i.e., inductive 
inferences, with the facts. involved. This is empirical verification and 
the whole vast accomplishment of scientific advance in modern times 
is witness to the crucial importance of empirical verification in sub-
stitution for merely formal verification as the primary criterion. 
(a) Empirical Verification 
Scientific hypotheses, i.e., inductive inferences, aim principally 
43. Cf. Chapter I, Section 3. b. 
at classification, control, or prediction of the behavior of data under 
observation. To a considerable degree the hypotheses directed at these 
aims are directly verifiable by testing the hypotheses against the con-
crete events to see whether or not the theory and the event conform. 
The primacy of empirical verification directs that if an event is sur-
prising and counter to the logical expectation from formal reasoning, 
nevertheless the empirical observation is accepted as normative. 
Not all hypotheses may be checked_ by direct observation of or 
r eference to events. Note particularly hypothes~ of synoptic insight 
am hypotheses of explanation in terms of 11 cause 11 or 11why11 • Similarly, 
judgments of value are frequently not amenable to such inspection. In 
these cases empirical observations may be cited as partial justification; 
processes of reasoning may also be cited and judgment must be made upon 
an attempted synthetic grasp of the total evidence. This total synthe-
sis must attempt a balance between the formal certainty of rationalism 
am the probability of nonrationalism. These topics of certainty and 
probability are discussed below from the ·standpoint of nonrational 
methodology. 
(b) Nonrational Attempts to Produce Certainty 
The second point on which rationalism was found unsatisfactory 
was its claim of mcessary and absolute certainty with regard to its 
principles. Instead, comprehensive modern thought rejects the claims 
of both mcessity arrl of absolute certainty. In spite of the tradi-
tional claim of rationalists, DeWolf mentions that the Kierkegaardians 
charge against reason its impossibility of attaining certainty. 44 These 
44. DeWolf, RRR, 74-80 (summarized in "Introduction"). 
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objectors to reason seek an intellectual peace in "certainty", and 
(according to Kierkegaardians) the possibility of a good life waits 
upon that certainty in .faith. 
vihen the vain goal of a Cartesian system of self-evident, a 
priori truths45 is abandoned and when irrational sUbstitutes are re-
jected as a means of attaining a secure certainty, other contenders 
have arisen from which the following are examples: 
(i) Formal and Traditional Authoritarianism: If, by the opera-
tion of prestige factors, authorities are accepted as the source of 
truth (cf. above), then it is a short step only to attach a high degree 
of certitude to the content of their revelation. Even so, the validity of 
(or at least the dependence upon) authoritarian reports in the cases of 
historical and/or private experience is not to be disparaged. 
(ii) Still a.mther form of rationalism is an experience of 
religious faith in whose exercise a personal revelation is given to the 
devout individual.46 In its individual practice this content is even 
more compelling than historical and Biblical revelation, but it does not 
alter its essential ns.ture as a sUbstitute for rationalistic certainty. 
Note the existentialist 1 s personal verification in such statements as 
this: 11 The self as both knower and known, feeler and felt, guarantees 




Such experiences do shift the emphasis from reason to a unique 
Cf. "Certainty: the alleged irrlubitability of certain truths, es-
pecially of logic and mathematics." .IJ,edger WoodJ Runes (ed.), 
DOP, 4$. 
E.G., Fythagoras 1 ipse dixit; likewise Christian mystics: Bernard of 
Clairvaus, Hugo and Richard of St. Victor. (Thilly, HOP, 176-177.) 
Harper, EXI, 61. 
perception of the devo-ut spirit. This unique experience is unknown to 
so ID.al\Y ·' and . t he validity of the experience is denied by so many persons 
that it fails to be anywhere near a universal criterion. Note that refer-
ence is made to the method of arriving at a truth-claim, not to the truth 
of the claim itself. That the truths of reason harmonize with the 
truths of faith (cf. Augustine, Scot us Erigena, and the Scholastics) 
is not at issue. 
(iii) Existential Intuition: Although existentialists refer to 
the priority of feeling over reason ( cf. below), Harper refers to their 
criterion of certainty in sophisticated conceptual terms as (1) the in-
tuition of the eternal validity of experience and [the contraryJ (2) 
intuition of the fragile finitude of that personal experience.48 
11 The two kinis of intuition just described are the sources 
.. of existential certainty, of the existential creed. The 
existentialist believes in life, his own, and consequently 
in other persons• also. He cannot forget that life is 
short, slippery, and totally responsible.u49 
(iv) Emotional Feeling of Certitude: There are those who would 
define the given in the personality of man in such a way as to claim 
that he is endowed with an especial kinship to certain ideas (the truth) 
so that when he is exposed to these ideas (or objects as Jacobi says) 
he reacts with an emotional feeling of acceptance which verifies them. 
Butler 1s 11 conscience 11 was such an endowment. The fairly universal aspir-
ations and value-judgments of mankini are pointed to as evidence for 
this receptivity on the part of individuals. The third Earl of Shaftes-
48. Harper, EXI, 38-U. 
49. Ibid.' u. 
bury claimed that moral judgment was a direct perception analogous to 
sight and sound. Whewell 1s 11 common sense 11 ethics was based on the theory 
of intuitional ju:lgment.5° 
That there is some such common given in the nature of men could 
scarcely be denied and escape a · new confusion of Babel, but that its 
manifestation is uniquely in the emotive, feeling nature of man is 
highly unlikely. Psychological research tends to demonstrate that 
the passions of men house ani store up the animal, blind, destructive 
forces within personality and persons are weaned away from these 
lower means of behavior only by assiduous training and discipline. 
Existentialists are emphasizing the feeling element and it is 
instructive to note that they have been especially concerned with the 
violent forces and the traumatic situations in experience. 51 
( v) Satisfaction of Human Need: Another variety of the faith-
in-nature s chools is that thought which proclaims the certainty of those 
ideas satisfying the needs of men. Such is the strange kinship of 
Rousseau, James, Schiller, and Freud in the proposition that the basic 
ani nat ural needs of men will not and may not be thwarted in the uni-
versa! scheme. 
As regards the psychical fact of the truth-valuation, 
Truth may be called an ultimate function of our intell-
ectual activity. As regards the objects valued as · 
1true 1 , Truth is that manipulation of them which turns 
out upon trial to be useful, primarily for any human 
end, but ultimately for that perfect harmony of our 
whole life which forms our final aspiration.52 
50. Tsanoff, ~ac, 252-254, 438. 
51. Harper, EXI, 35. 
52. Schiller, HUM, 61. 
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(vi) Will to Believe: The will to believe doctrine depends not 
just on the emotionS nor just on spiritual revelation in either of its 
forms but on the impact of the personality conceived as will. In 
its formulation, ~villiam James converted the demand for rational cer-
tainty to a state of mind he called the 11sentiment of rationality" which 
is much closer to what has been cited in this study as the whole 
reason. James says: 
The transition from a state of puzzle and perplexity 
to rational comprehension is full of lively relief and 
pleasure ••• This feeling of the sufficiency of the 
present moment, of its absoluteness,-this absence of 
all need to explain it, account for it, or justify it, 
--is what I call the Sentiment of Rationality.53 
Whatever lets loose any action which we are fond of 
exerting seems rationa1.54 
The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedi-
ent in the way of our thinking, just as the right is 
only the expedient in the way of our behaving. 55 
The individual will creates the true and verifies it in its results. 
Again, James says, tiEssential those relations are, but only for our 
pur;pose, the other relations being just as . real and present as they 
and our own purpose is to conceive simply and to foresee.56 
The primary failure in this point of view is its slighting of 
the given, common factors in experience which make possible an inter-
personal and transteiJlporal truth. Consider the following passage by 
G. H. Mead: 
53• James, \iB, 63. 
54. James, PU, 320. 
55. James, MT, vii. 
56. James, WB, 119. 
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The individual in his experience is continually creating 
a world which becomes real through his discovery. In so 
far as new conduct arises under the conditions made . 
possible by his experience and g~ hypotheses ·the world ••• 
has been modified and enlarged. 
(vii) The Appeal to Practical Consequences: A central criterion 
of pragmatism is the claim that the true works and that what works is 
true. 
The pragmatic rule is that the meaning of a concept 
may always be found, if not in some sensible particular 
which it directly designates, then in some particular 
difference in the course of human experience which the 
being true will make. Test every concept by the question, 
11What sensible difference to anybody will its truth make? 11 
and you are in the best possible position for understand-
ing what it means and for discussing its importance ••• 
In obeying this rule we neglect the substantive con-
cept of the concept, and follow its function only ••• 
Particular consequences are the only criterion o~ a 
concept's meaning, and the only test of its truth.5 
The only worth of either treatise or saying is that 
the consequences are there.59 
Taking its source in the inductive process of scientific experimenta-
tion, the hypothesis is verified in the occurrence, not in the reasoning 
by which the occurrence might be predicted. This eventuates onlJr in 
the tentative, mt the certain; empirical verification confirms on the 
basis of the theory of the uniformity (i.e., continuity) of nature 
(formulated by John Stuart Mill). 
From such a beginning the pragmatic instrtmentalism of Dewey's 
philosophy has developed. 
57. Mead, CI, 23. 
58. James, SPP, 6o-62. 
59. James, WB,l24. 
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Knowing is itself a mode of practical action and is the 
way of interaction by which gther natural interactions 
become sUbject to direction. 0 
A definition of the nature of ideas in terms of opera-
tions to be performed and the test of the validity of 
the ideas by the consequences of these operations, 
establishes co~~ectivity within concrete experience.61 
They are as conceptions instruments.62 
Idealism ~~ something experimental not abstractly 
rational. j 
(viii) Positivism: Added to that group of non-intellectual 
faculties which are given priority and are used as preferred guides to 
certainty (faith, will, and emotions have already been listed) is the 
faculty of sensation. 
It has been assumed that he agrees with us about the 
nature of sensible appearances; arrl no evidence of any 
other kind is or can be available. \ie are not disput-
ing about the validity of two conflicting sets of hypo-
theses, but about the choice of two different languages. 64 
Positivists claim that theorizing and philosophizing lose their authen-
ticity by becoming removed from, or by being invented wholly apart from 







Positivism ••• (4) The term is used more loosely to denote 
~ philosophy which agrees with that of Comte in limit-
ing philosophy to the data and methods of the natural 
sciences--opposition to the a priori, ~nd to speculation 
by any method peculiar to metaphysics. 5 
Dewey, QFC, 107. 
Ibid., ll4. cr. 129, 136, and 141. 
Dewey, QFC, 135. 
Ibid., 167. 
Ayer, FEK, 18. 
Baldwin (ed.), DPP, II, 312-313. 
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The conclusion that I have now reached is that in order 
to account for our perceptual experience, it is not ne-
ces~ary6to maintain that any of our perceptions are de-
lusJ.ve. 6 
The everlasting privacy of the sensations and the incomplete or utter 
lack of representation of much personal sensual experience are telling 
criticism of the inadequacy of the criterion as a guide to certainty. 67 
Ayer, for one, does not make too much of certainty: 
If what is here meant by 11being sure 11 is 11being able 
to give a conclusive demonstration", then it is true 
that I cannot at any time be sure that I am not dream-
ing ••• There is no theoretical limit to this process 
of testingS it is always logically possible that I am 
mistaken.,6 
The positivists are right that clear and evident sense perception 
is convincing unto certainty. However, (1) "clear and evident" is not 
naive but sophisticated perception, criticized and clarified by intel-
lectual criteria, and (2) elementary experiments in psychology indicate 
the gross inadequacy of most observations. With the existentialist the 
positivist can stand firmly on the statement that he has had such or 
such an experience, but as soon as he tries to identify what the exper-
ience meant he must exercise the transtemporal self and the interperson- · 
al social setting. According as this transtemporality and interperson-
ality are expanded the probabilities regarding the character of the 
' 
11whatness 11 are increased. Cf. the discussion of probability below in 
this section. 
66. Ayer, FEK, 19. 
67. Russell, HKSL. (Cf.) 
68., Ayer, FEK, . 4?-43• 
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(ix) Russell's 11 Nonrational A Priorism11 • Bertrand Russell claims 
that since scientific iniuction is not logically justifiable, a set of 
(nonrational) postulates are required according to which inductive in-
ferences become credible.69 Like the Kantian categories which were con-
ceived to be prerequisite to the conception of experience,. Russell's 
postulates are designed to establish the jurisdiction of scientific 
procedure. 
Russell's 11 nonrationalism11 gives up necessity and absolute cer-
tainty. It validates empirical observation, primarily in terms of 
sensory observation.7° His posttuates are attempts to reestablish a 
priorism in what otherwise he admits would be a purely empirical philo-
sophy. The reign of law for which his postulates prepare the way is a 
reign of continuation and preservation of the situation but little or 
no elaboration of how events can change or evolve or develop organic-
ally. 
(x) Empirical Coherence: When the inadequacy of narro\'T, re-
stricted rationalism has been demonstrated, there is still the possi-
bility of constructing a philosophical platform from which the individual 
may view the tumult of experience with security and confidence. This is 
precisely what coherence attempts. The philosopher depending upon co-
herence contends that the materials of experience are broad and sound 
enough to furnish the materials of a platform capable of sustaining him-
self and those who build with him. It is notable that such security never 
comes ready-made to any man, but must be achieved with the materials 
69. Russell, HKSL, Part VI. 
70. Ibid. 
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of his own experience, but all men using their own experiences are never-
theless using common materiall Deductive coherence which rejects the 
empirical is inadequate to this function; only that coherence inclusive 
of the totality of experience is sufficient. Even so, inclusive coherence 
does not claim absolute certainty. 
DeWolf points out with reference to the claim that a good life 
waits upon certainty in faith, that certainty 11 is beyonl the reach of 
men, whatever instrument he may choose for its attainmentu. 71 In fact, 
it requires man to be God in knowledge. And, he also remarks that 11the 
detachment which reason requires does not imply indifference". 72 Vle 
act on the best we know alw~s holding open the possibility of dis-
covering a higher best. Empirical coherence requires this rational 
tentativeness along with ethical positiveness. It is in this sense that 
William James used empiricism: 
It is contented to regard its most assured conclusions 
concerning matters of fact as hypotheses li,ble to modi-
fication in the course of future experience. 3 
Brightman defines the method of coherence as including the follow-
ing stages: 
(1) preliminary synopsis, (2) scientific analyses and 
syntheses, (3) synoptic hypotheses, (4) verification, 
and (5) reirrterpretation.74 
71. DeWolf, RRR, 119. 
72. Ibid., 108. 
73 • James, Vffi , Vll. 
74. Brightman, FOR, 117. 
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The verification, which is step four in the preceding process, is 
defined in the criterion of coherence, by Brightman, as follows: 
According to the criterion of coherence, a proposition 
is to be treated as true if (1) it is self-consistent, 
(2) it is consistent with all of the known facts of 
experience, (3) it is consistent with all other propo-
sitions held as true by the mind that is applying this 
criterion, (4) it establishes explanatory and inter-
pretative relations between various parts of experi-
ence, (5) these relations include all known aspects of 
experience and all known problems about experience in 
its details and as a whole.75 
Professor Brightman points out that the criterion of consistency is 
expanded by the empirical demarrl in items four and five. 
Coherence is a growing, evolutionary method of arriving at judg-
ments to which some trust can be given. It necessarily implies that 
truth is developed in the individual consciousness from less to more. 
It remains rooted in the empirical and individual while seeking to 
grasp the totality and universal. This calls one to make' at least a 
basic distinction between coherence and Hegeiian dialectic. 
Hegelian dialectic also is growing and evolutionary; it proceeds 
from the partial and inadequate to the total and Absolute. But Hegel's 
principle of negativity is too narrow. He conceived the negative or 
antithesis as an objective fact and facts are individual. In the place 
of ~ negative it seems literally true the negative must include all of 
the rest of reality if it is to be a metaphysical principle. The human, 
finite mirrl cannot comprehend that infinite detail so a methodology of 
the principle is too much for man. Instead of Hegel's restricted nega-
75. Brightman, FOR, 128. 
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tivity which is metaphysically incorrect or a metaphysical negativity 
which is methodologically useless it is proposed that a pedestrian dia-
lectic adjusted to the capabilities of ordinarily acute minds be defined 
and put to work. In this dissertation the definition and application 
of coherence is that attempt. 
Coherence, then, affirms the validity of all experience as evi-
dence for systematic understanding; it does not give preferential status 
to either special or general revelation nor to the responses of emotional 
feeling. Coherence attains universality by affirming the conunon content 
of experience and thus escapes the hopelessly ambiguous pluralism of 
a will to believe or merely instrtnnental pragmatism. The method of 
coherence does not attain certainty, but it is capable of producing 
a tolerable security against uncertainty; it is expandable and improv-
able; it is in a measure self-correcting for if the materials are not 
well put together, the vessel will break apart in the normal course of 
additional experiences. As will be remarked later, commitment need not 
wait upon intellectual certitude; indeed a person is under obligation 
always to act upon the best he knows if he is to be morally responsible. 
Summary 
The three criticisms of rationalistic verification were (1) that 
rationalism did not have an adequate substitute for empirical verifi-
cation, (2) that rationalism characteristically claimed absolute cer-
tainty which is unv•arranted, an:i (3) rationalism rejects judgments of 
probability and of "radical chance 11 • 
It has been shown in this section that nonrational philosophical 
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methods point out a number of kinds of empirical verification: (1) 
induction based upon the uniformity of nature, (2) prestige authoritar-
ianism, (3) specific revelation, (4) emotional certitude, (5) satisfac-
tion of human need, (6) will-to-believe, (?) appeal to practical conse-
quences, (8) positivism, and (9) empirical coherence. Although at one 
time or another expansive claims of certainty have been attached to 
each of these sources of verification, the evidence regarding them all 
seems to be apodictic certainty is unwarranted with regard to any 
or all of the available methods of verification. Reality is at once 
the individual arrl the totality. The only certainty is the that ness 
(the self-recognition and the witness) of experience and there is real 
question as to whether that ever comes pure. The whatness (i.e., the 
signific~Dce, or meaning) of experience is always a probable judgment. 
Probable judgment translated into occurrences issues in radical 
chance. The pragmatic value of the presupposition of the possibility 
of radical chance is undeniable as a technique of investigation. It 
is merely another way of stating the theme of open-mindedness. On the 
other hand the ideal investigative attitude toward the judgments ex-
pressing relations between data is the ideal of system and coherence. 
Thus it is that at the stage of verification just as it was at 
the stage of insight (cf. Section (1), Summary, above) found necessary 
to transcend the distinction of rational and nonrational as mutually 
exclusive and opposite systems. The method for philosophical verifi-
cation is both rational and nonrational not only in its sources of data 
but also in its means of verification. 
(c) Nonrational Attempts to Include Degrees of Probability . 
The third point of inadequacy in rationalism as regards verification 
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was its unsatisfactory account of the notion of probability. The ration-
alistic judgment is a structw-al judgment, not a judgment with regard to 
cont ent. Furthermore, it is an 11 all or none" judgment; it does not in-
dicate degrees of probability.76 
It is doubtless reasonable to be guided rather by my 
knowledge than by my ignorance; yet that does not tell 
me how much knowledge it is reasonable to form a judg-
ment on at all ••• For the only ·objective relations are 
merely of necessity to be, or necessity not to be. 
Probability after all derives from our ignorance ••• 
There is no probable knowledge and logical certainty is 
not any degree of probability.?? 
So it is that rationalism kept the ideal of necessity before it. Hume 
was one of the first to show that necessity is a vain aim,?$ but he went 
so far as to bring into question the possibility of knowledge. For 
human underst arrling, the content of judgments which express probability 
is extremely valuable; therefore, the methodology of reasonable thought 
must include ways and means by which such judgments are framed. 
The source of the judgment of probability is the observation of 
events which do not follow rigorously and consistently in the train of 
apparently similar con::litions. Thence derives the concept of chance. 
In the concept of chance and probability there is a distinction between 
the probability of an occw-rence am the probability of a belief. The 
"chances" of an occurrence, e.g., the turn of dice, are in mathematical 
proportion to the possibilities--in this case a definite number. On 
the other han::l the probability of a belief, e.g., a certain man committed 
?6. Cf. Chapter I, Section 3. b. (2). 
??. Joseph, Art. (1923), 121. 
78. Cf. Thilly, HOP, 352 • 
. 
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a crime, is a judgment about the 11 chances 11-a judgment based on evidence 
bUt not conclusive evidence. In such a case the occurrence is not 
probable, but the judgment is. 
The notion of chance is not necessarily an ultimate notion; it may 
be merely a pragmatic notion of convenience. Thus, . the metaphysical 
rationalist may, and often does, use the idea of chance under the reser-
vation that if all the circUmstances of the situation could be noted, 
the judgment of chance would be eliminated. \'iilliam James notes that 
11 the stronghold of the deterministic sentiment is the antipathy to the 
idea of chance". 79 On the other hand the nonrationalist may conclude 
that there is a metaphysical indeterminacy which would still leave 
I 
possible only a judgment of probability in some cases. 00 
At any rate, the basis of the probable judgment, whether ultimate 
or intermediate, is in the field of observable indeterminacy. 81 The 
data are, then, peculiarly exclusively empirical. These data customar-
ily consist of observations in fields of the greatest concern of persons: 
the relations and interrelations of persons and social institutions, the 
relations and interrelations of persons and institutions with the total 
envii-omnent in which they are located, the relations and interrelations 
of the constituent parts of that enviromnent, etc. 
The judgments of probability issue from the attempt to discover 
among their observations the traces or patterns in the phenomena being 
examined. :Mrs. Gilbert traces the alternative senses of the word 11 proba-





James' vffi' 153. 
If he does, the rationalist will charge 
positions that invalidate the decision, 
numbers". Cf. Churchman, Art. (1945). 
Cf. Spaulding, WAI, 167. 
Runes (ed.), DOP, 251-253. 
him with disguised presup-
e.g., the 11 theory of large 
Also irfilliams on induction. 
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classifiable under the headings of (a) mathematical probability and (b) 
normative probability. The mathematical class divides into at least 
three sub-divisions: (1) There is the apparently mathematically pat-
terned, including cyclical events. (2) There are events in which the 
pure laws of chance appear to be operating. (3) There is also the 
special class of elusive events in which a mathematical relation appears 
to obtain, but in which some of the factors have different values from 
others. The normative probability divides into judgments according to 
tentatively approved value judgments, such as (1) pragmatic efficacy, 
(2) ease of understanding, and (3) aesthetic criteria, etc. 
The status of probability in the structure of thought has caused 
much controversy.. Mrs. Gilbert lists· seven interpretations and iden-
tifies most of them with ... their principal advocates: 
.Probability as a Measure of Belief-LaPlace,. S3 
Probability as a Relative Frequency,.84 
Probability as a Truth-Frequency of Types of Argument 
--Fierce and Venn.85 · 
.Probability as a Primitive Notion--Keynes,.86 
.Probability as an Operational Concept-Kemble. 87 
.Probability as a Limit of Frequencies--Mises and Wald.88 
Probability as · a Physical Magnit~e Determined by 
Axioms--Kolmogoroff and Frechet. 
Without detailed consideration it can be pointed out that the 
11 frequency" notion is a rationalistic concept of theoretical limit 
within which a definite mathematical process of probability might be 
developed. Thus, items two and six are specifically rationalistic 
83. Runes (ed.), DOP, 253. 
84. Ibid.' 253. 
85. Ibid., 253. 
86. Ibid., 253-254. 
87. Ibid., 254. 
88. Ibid., 254. 
89. Ibid,. 1 254., 
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theories of probability; item three is abstractly rationalistic but 
actually pragmatic because, for basis in pure mathematics it substitutes 
the subjective meaningfulness of proposition; the remainder are clearly 
nonrational theories. Bertrand Russell divides the field of probability 
into two classes: (1) the mathematical frequency and (2) the degree of 
credibility. 90 This division is closely related to the distinctions 
drawn above • . The discussion by Russell of degrees of credibility pro-
duces (1) logical credibility, (2) epistemological credibility, and (3) 
psychological credibility.9l He decides that scientific induction with 
satisfactory credibility requires a set of 11 nonrational 11 postulates of 
scientific inference.92 
(3) Nonrationality at the Stage of Relation 
In the previous chapter, two inadequacies of rationalism were 
pointed out: (1) the failure to draw knowledge beliefs into attention 
in order to create an integrated system of beliefs, and (2) failure to 
respect the unique properties of wh6le> and inability to express adequately 
a developmental concept. (Cf. Chapter I, Section 3, b. Summary.) 
In addition to the extremely limited source of data for rational 
procedure, there have been suggested a number of varied sources for 
synoptic philosophy in Section 3. a. (1) of this chapter. It has also 
been said that data should be treated in the methodological attitude of 
rationalism, i.e., seeking for a rationalistic order, while preserving 
a respect for the empirical data. (Cf. Section 3. a. (2) Summary, of 
90. Russell, HKSL, Part V. 
91. Ibid., 396. 
92. Ibid., Part VI. 
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this chapter.) Finally it was stated that the evidence seems to indicate 
that attention itself is one of the ultimate and inexplicable factors 
of consciousness: 93 all the scientist, problem-solver, or philosopher 
can do is to confront data of all conceivable kinds with an inquiring 
mind and history testifies that insights sometimes occur. 
With regard to the second criticism of rationalism, there is a 
special emphasis in much of nonrational philosophy upon the nature of 
empirical !1wholes 11 and their evolutionary development. 
(a) Wholes and Rationalistic Logic 
Rationalistic demonstration must commence with an all-inclusive 
principle. Such a principle does violence to the possibility of contem-
poraneously-existing wholes. As William James says, 
·Rationalism tends to emphasize universals and to make wholes 
prior to parts in the order of logic as well as in that of 
being. Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the explanatory 
stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats 
the wholes as a collection and the universal as an abstraction. ·· 94 
Unless rationalism included some corrective base such as empirical ob-
servation and verification, it would become a closed system without 
means of correcting its inadequacies. As such it must become a creed, 
not a philosophy. Even when rationalistic philosophy is accurately 
stated, its dependence upon and constant reference to its first prin-
ciple will have a tendency to obscure and to minimize the differentia 
'revealed in subsequent demonstration. 95 
93. Cf. Section 3. a. 1. (b), (vi), above. 
94. James, ERE , 4].. 
95. Cf. Bradley and Royce. 
The reasonable caution about destroying unique properties of wholes, 
if they exist, lays a deterring hand on ruthless philosophical, ration-
alistic analysis and urges a respect for and a consideration to those 
differences which may be as significant as similarities.. This same 
caution urges attention to synthesis as well as to analysis and to 
dialectical reconciliation as well as to deductive demonstration. 
Concepts are thus as real as percepts, for we cannot 
live a moment without taking account of them. But the 
11eterna111 kind of being which they enjoy is inferior to 
the temporal kind because it is so static and schematic 
and lacks sg many characters which temporal reality 
possesses.9 . 
(b) The 1Whole 1 of Personality 
One of the primary, obvious wholes which early comes up for con-
sidera.tion is that of. personality. With Descartes and existentialists 
one must say that it is absurd to question~ one 1s experience is. 
Coherence speaks for that kind of philosophy which satisfies and realizes 
in perspective the whole, the 11that11 and the "what", of the personality. 
Berkeley's concept of spirit as substance prior in reality to 
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ideas is one of the earlier attempts to emphasize this wholeness in re-
lation to persons. 97 Devlolf is pointing out the abstractness of traditional 
rationalism and the demand for a synoptic view of reason when he notes, 
for example, that not all doubt is rationally based.98 Philosophers who 
use coherence claim that rationalism will be a satisfactory and conclu-
sive method only when knowledge is complete, only when the principles on 
96. James, SPP, 101. 
97. Cf. Chapter III, Section 2. 
98. DeWolf, RRR, 123. 
which the demonstration can be accomplished are certainly known. And, 
as DeWolf also points out, one of Kierkegaard 1s criticisms of rationalism 
is that it. leaves out of consideration large parts of experience: emo-
tional, aesthetic, volitional, etc. Heidegger says, according to Harper, 
11 Conscious and unconscious reflection is not a whole. It is a series of 
transcendings,u99 i.e., a developing process. 
In light of the demand that explanation be accurate concerning the 
role of personality as a metaphysical unit and of the criticism of 
rationalism, DeVfolf would expand the concept of reason to include the 
whole of experience, 100 an enterprise which Plato began in his de scrip-
tion of the philosopher as 11 the synoptic man11 and an enterprise to which 
this dissertation is likewise dedicated. 
Sustained and vigorous attacks on rationalistic methods have been 
made by both religionists and ethicists whose basic .contention is that 
life itself is whole; rationalistic reasoning is arid arid abstract, and 
can grasp only a part or phase of life.101 Then, they proceed to say that 
no matter how accurate a description may be, _nor how well it may be sys-
tematized and related--this abstract knowledge about is inferior to the 
concrete knowledge of, i.e., the actual living through the experience.102 
That experience in all its diversity or monotony, profundity or 




Harper, EXI, 80. 
DeWolf, RRR, 108-109, 130-131. 
Dewey's substition of 11 intelligence for reason!' is another evidence 
of an .attempt to get a .more inclusive, organic, and "wholistic 11 
concept. Cf. QRC, 212-213. 
Cf. DeWolf, RRR, 124-125. 
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ience is reality, does this imply an epistemological monism? It does 
not appear so; the thatness of experience implicitly calls for a meta-
·physical, qualitative monism, but knowledge is not identical with exper-
ience. Knowledge is one way of dealing with experience. Knowledge is 
reality plus a point of view. On: this basis, truth is that kind of 
experi ence which symbolizes reality most fully (i.e,, inclusively and 
orderly); truth may be knowledge-it may be another kind of personal 
act. In this way of looking at things the truth of knowledge may be 
second-class truth behind the truth of an overt act in which case the 
ethical pr oblem transcends the knowledge problem. (Cf. (e ) , below.) 
(c) Evolutionary Wholes 
Rationalism is not self-correcting, evolutionary, nor growing. 
Until the need for these attributes is passed, ·rationalism cannot be a 
satisfactory, exclusive philosophical method. T.he corrective, the 
evolutionary agents, in philosophy are those empirical or arbitrary 
alternatives to rationalism which have been mentioned repeatedly in 
this chapter. Attention to wholes is directed by will, faith, sensory 
experience, etc., just as insight and certainty are. Coherence claims 
all through this discussion that one fragmentary view should not be 
sUbstituted for one proved inadequate; rather one should adopt an in-
clusive total-view.103 
103. Cf. Harper, EXI, 125: 11~ie have compared intellect and will in their 
three common aspects of .. interaction, objects, types of action; and 
no impartial judge can give a clear cut priority to either one, They 
are functions of one lif e and consciousness, and together they form 
interlocking aspects of the life of reason~' Cf. also the defini-
tion of reason in Chapter I, Section 2. 
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Rationalistic philosophy has difficulty in dealing with growing 
evolutionary processes. Knowledge of human or nonhuman growth involves 
a philosophy of change. As James says: 
The everlasting coming of concrete novelty into being is 
so obvious that the rationalizing intellect, bent ever on 
explainingl'tlt=t is by what was and having no logical prin-
ciple but identity to explain £o~ treats the perceptual 
flux as a phenomenal illusion. 4 
(d) The Dialectic of Wholes in Coherence 
Importantly enough, .there is in this attempt to focus attention 
on wholes a kind of dialectical shifting in thought. By coherence, the 
claims of the 11faculties 11 are integrated in perspective and judgment 
into a whole-concept. This whole-concept works for a mind (except, 
perhaps, in an aesthetic or eulogistic fashion) only as it is analyzed 
and its implications worked out in typically rationalistic fashion.105 
So, while a consideration to the properties of wholes curbs over-
zealous analysis, consideration to the whole-concept of the philosophiz-
ing agent unleashes a new demand for rat~nation and demonstration 
within thought. The temptation to be satisfied with a meager whole-
concept is a danger to all philosophy. Dedication to coherence as a 




An ontological dialectic of a similar kind is proposed by Kierke-
He says, 11 That which is chosen does not exist and comes into 
James, SPP, 149. 
Cf. DeWolf 1 s comment on imaginative role-playing and his reference 
to Hocking l.s principle of alternation (in The J.vieaning of God in 
Human Experience) in regard to the dialectical thought process re-
ferred to herein. 
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existence with the choice: that which is chosen exists, otherwise 
. uld . II 106 there co be no choJ.ce • The effect on the chooser is not so 
much arrival at the true but at the good. For, 
Even if a man were to choose the wrong, he will nevertheless 
discover ••• that he had chosen the wrong. For the personal-
ity, his nature is purified and he himself brought into im-
mediate relation to the eternal power .107 
Compare: 
On the one hand, every man looks for 'absolutes'; on the other 
he develops himself. On the one hand, a man pursues stability 
and evades relativism ••• On the other ha£B~· the same man 
struggles to make something of himself. 
(e) Nonrational Attempts to Validate Faith, Aspiration and 
Ethical Values 
The immediately preceding remarks reflect back to the conception 
of reason: the relating, patterning, and selecting function which ren-
ders experience comprehensible and meaningful and directs the activity 
of the organism as well. 
There are too many philosophers to whom the discovery of truth 
means merely the abstract, intellectual formulation of true proposition. 
The concept of coherent, organic, and synoptic truth which is being de-
veloped in this study is one which frankly recognizes that intellectual 
formulation, while necessary, is sometimes inferior to the concrete 
exemplification of the proposition in the experience of the individual 
and eventually in the experience of the society. 11A man cannot become 
the person he wants to be merely by thinking about himself, but only by 
doing something with himself. nl09 
106. 
107. 
In Harper, EXI, 54. 
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This is the kind of criterion whose use would redeem philosophy 
from its fall into mere intellectualism. It is the kind of criterion 
whereby self-conscious, philosophically critical, religious life be-
comes the highest aspiration of man: "True conversion is of the full 
1mind and heart of love 1 , and only in love is God 1 s presence realized 
. 110 
in a:ny degree. " 
Only when the personality is seen whole, with reason its executive 
is the dichotomy of faith and reason resolved, or of ethical endeavor 
and reason. 
Legalism and authoritarianism are the dangers of rationalistic 
ethics.111 Legalistic or authoritarian ethics crystallize in habit and 
thwart modification, new insight, and increased sensitiveness. A non-
critical ethical base is a contradiction in terms: The narrowness am 
eventual downfall of a closed system like the Scholastic system is re-
vealed in this description: 
The highest good is the blessed life in God; that is 
settled; but there are :oo empirical means of finding 
that way to such a life: it is bestowed gpon those 
who do the will of God by divine grace.112 
Professor DeWolf has listed in his defense of reason the presup-
positions or characteristics of the synoptic reason which encompass faith, 
aspiration, and ethical effort. They are: 
a. Conviction of the nonillusoriness and nonfalsity of faith.ll3 
ll.E> . Harper, EXI, 143. 
111. Cf. Chapter II, Section 3. c. (4). 
112. Thilly, HOP, 161. 
113. DeWolf, RRR, 113. (Cf. Summary in 11 Introduction11 .) 
lll 
b. Humility of reason.114 
c. Infinity of God's challenge to man's and society's pro-
gress.ll5 
d. Passionate interest and ethical commitment.116 
It will be recalled that the major portion of Brightman's argu-
ment for a finite God is the ethical imperative. Against the concept 
of the infinite will (i.e., the power of the Divine will), Brightman 
charges (1) an 11 ascription of surd evils to divine will11 , (2) 11 its ten-
dency to make good and evil indistinguishable" and (3) 11 its cutting of 
the nerve of moral endeavor" .117 
The purpgse of the remarks in this section is to indicate some of 
the ways in which philosophy can be revitalized by considering ethics, 
faith, and aspiration integral to its task. Philosophy which neglects 
these aspects of experience invites irrational existentialism, immoral 
irresponsibility, and incredible combinations of concepts. Such philo-
sophizing is like racing a motor without engaging the clutch~ 
4. Summary and Thesis 
The protests against a restrictive rationalism have been aired and 
discussed in some detail in this and the preceding chapter. A goodly 
company of alternative techniques and theories have been tallied to show 
some of the suggestions whereby the deficiencies of rationalism might be 
114. DeWolf, RRR, 115-116. 
115. Ibid., 120-121. 
116. Ibid., 10$-109, 130-131. 
117. Brightman, FOR, 309. It appears to this writer that the ration-
alistic attack on Brightman's concept of the Finite God misjudges 
the importance and axiological theory of the ethical base from 
which the concept is developed. 
ll2 
corrected. 
In many cases it has been discovered that "alternatives" which have 
been suggested are not substitutes for nor are they logically contra-
dictory to rationalism, but instead either precede as presuppositions, or 
accompany as additional data, or follow as supplementary to rational-
istic methods and theories. Although many of the alternatives reviewed 
in this chapter may be viewed as supplementary it is obvious that some 
among those making claims of exclusive authority must be modified at 
least, and some invalidated. In conformity with the purpose of this 
study, it is time to draw together those characteristics of adequate 
reason which seem to belong together in the best uses of a person's 
total capacities. 
The concept of reason which is being develo:ped in this disserta-
tion is called 11synoptic11 am 11 coherent11 , in the broad Hegelian tra-
dition, and in agreement with Brightman and De~ olf. It is literally a 
theory that a philosophy should be an incarnation in a personality, 
not an intellectual abstraction. Or as Hegel would say, we must move 
from abstract universals to concrete universals, from abstract being 
to spirit, or from substance to subject. 
The primary objection to rationalistic procedure as it has been 
developed herein is its restrictive and rigid method and view. Some 
philosophers of the modern era have come to share the prejudice of the 
common man that rationalistic systematizing is arid rationalization. 
The epitome of synoptic philosophy must be the concrete experience of 
critically self-conscious, highly motivated living, both personal and 
social. This does not negate rationality; it fulfills it. The rational 
systematization of thought is not the ultimate goal of a synoptic philoso-
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phy; it is an important intermediate step toward the creative, intel-
ligent living of a life dedicated to universal truth and the noblest and 
finest of human and divine purposes. 
The philosophic process, with rare exception since Plato, has been 
truncated: It has aimed at a statement in words of a pattern of thought. 
Synoptic philosophy would add a higher step beyond: Transforming the 
verbiage of the statement into the example of a life, either of indivi-
duals or of social groups. Just so, democratic process has often been 
handicapped by believing the process was fulfilled when a group passed 
a resolution l•!hen, in actuality-' democratic process should always include 
not only study and decision but also group action. 
a. Steps toward Truth and Reality 
The formulation of a synoptic philosophy will be characterized by 
the following progressive and additive psychological factors: 
1. Recognition of the physical, habit, and instinctive base of 
behavior with which any animal, including the human, is equipped. 
2. Recognition of the distinctive attributes with which man is 
endo\-red, among \ihich is the potentiality of developing the practice of 
making deliberate, intellectual choices. From this practice he develops 
criteria of consistency, parsimony, and valuation in order to avoid un-
doing his own constructiBg. 
3. Implementation of .intellectual choice in practical affairs 
through the development of manipulative skills guided by scientific pro-
cedures to the development of prediction and control. 
4. Formulation of purposes of choice, whether choice be intel-
lectual or manipulative. 
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5. Integration by critical analysis and syntheses of the various 
purposes which evolve from the foregoing. 
6. Exemplification of integrated purpose in experience. The 
constructive act of a good man doing that act in full recognition of Why 
it should be done is much more to be desired than just the promulgation 
of the principle of his act.ii8 The formulation is necessarily prere-
quisite to the doing, but it is mt the highest accomplishment to be 
sought. Cf. the Existentialist claim for the "priority of life over 
thought 11 • 119 
b. Characteristic of Synoptic Philosophy 
Now it devolves upon the definer of the synoptic philosophy to 
characterize the method in terms of the rational and nonrational qualities 
referred to in this dissertation. 
1. The tools of reason must be treated as tools, not as ends. The 
tendency to haughty aloofness (from the concrete data of experience) of 
the ratiocinative mind must be combatted. Professor DeWolf's presup-
positions of synoptic reason are valid and appropriate: 
(a) Conviction of nonillusoriness and non-falsity of faith. 
(b) Humility of reason. 
(c) Belief in the infinity of God's challenge to man's and 
society's progress. 
118. Cf. Fichte, of whom Thilly says, "Philosophy therefore begins, not 
with a~' but an act11 • (Thilly, HOP, 436.) One would add that 
it does not necessarily-end with a statement, . but very probably 
in amther act. 
119. Harper, EXI, 35. 
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(d) Passionate interest and ethical commitment.120 
The first loyalty of philosophy to be true to the data of ex-
perience must be its cardinal principle. The tendency to include data 
readily systematizable and to close the system against new data must 
be constantly avoided. This involves at least: 
(a) Sensitivity to value experience. 
(b) Acknowledgement of necessity to include all experience: 
emotion, habitual, sensory, intellectual, ethical, 
worship, work, etc., etc. 
3. The systematizing process must be at least rational; it cannot 
take easy leaps to non-sequiturs, paradoxes, etc. This does not mean 
that the system which the process produces will be rationalistic neces-
sarily and through and through. Where there is disparity it will be 
frankly included in the results, e.g., Brightman's irrational surd. One 
cannot, however, \vith Kierkegaard, Bergson, or Barth abandon reason in 
the greatest issues of choice. 
4. Abstraction and over-simplification will be kept at a minimum 
in view of the tendency to allow the rationalistic process to become the 
goal instead of remaining a step toward the goal. The synoptic philoso-
phy must be really inclusive and must be coherent among all this inclu-
siveness. 
5. The analytic-synthetic alternation between parts and wholes 
must constantly be practiced not only in thought but in conduct. 'rhe unique 
120. DeWolf, R.B.R, 108-131. Cf. "Introduction". 
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goal of aspiration within such a theory and practice wotud seem to be: 
(a.) Wholeness of personality, well-balanced at the highest 
level of the individual's potentiality, 
(b) World citizenship among the htlll1an community, and 
(c) Htlll1ble and devoted relation to the universal ground of 
being. 
In terms of the above, each and every one of the factors which 
have been examined in the course of the chapter may be expected to pre-
sent data for consideration. Only pretensions to exclusive authority 
and preferential status and a naive expectancy that the end of the pro-
cess is foreseeable must be denied. 
Chapter III 
THE RELATIVE USE OF THE RATIONAL AID NONRATIONAL 
IN CLASSICAL PHTI.,()SOPHY 
1. Aristotelian Form and Matter. 
a. Historical Background. 
The pre-sophists were primarily concerned with examining the 
material sUbstance of the world in which they lived. In the course of 
this examination, objective materialism developed from materialistic 
monism through elementalism to atomism. The men who engaged in this 
examination were imputed to be wise men, by which one would infer that 
the knowledge which they gained contributed to an attitude and/or be-
havior in daily affairs which was deemed admirable and praiseworthy. In 
these terms, then, early Greek philosophy was an enterprise by which men 
studied external nature believing that such knowledge as they gained en-
hanced their ability to guide the affairs of men in conformity with that 
knm-1ledge, witness the general activity of those philosophers in the poli-
ll8 
tical councils of their own and other states. It must be granted that this 
practical application was not explicit in the philosophies of the early 
Greeks, with perhaps the exception of the conspiracy to power on the part 
of the Pythagorean cult, but it cannot be denied that it was there impli-
citely. 
Begun by the Sophists and Socrates and carried into systematic 
order by Plato was a revolution in philosophy which turned the spot-
light of investigation inward upon the natt~e of man: his reason, 
appetites, and passions. The Orphic proverb 11Kno\'T Thyself" which was 
adopted by Socrates expressed the gradually climaxing opinion of a 
group of philosophers that the realm of the human spirit represented 
a territory for exploration more fruitful than the realm of external 
nature. This new philosophy enjoyed the immediate advantages of its more 
intimate appeal to the experience of the individual. For Plato the mind 
was confused by the disorderly array of things as presented by the senses 
while order was achieved by turning resolutely away froin sense appear-
ances on the walls of the Cave and setting one 1s face toward the realm 
of Ideas. Analogous to the way in which objects had to be generalized 
into substance then analyzed into elements and atoms in the materialism 
of their predecessors, the dialectic of ideas had to establish first 
the activity of mind as a valid realm (Sophists), then to point out 
the common objects of that realm (Socrates), and finally by the •method 
of division• come to define the constitutive material: Ideas (Plato). 
Such is the status of philosophy when Aristotle conceives the 
opposing tendencies within the philosophy of being and the philosophy 
of knowledge and embarks upon the attempt to bridge the gap with a 
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1 philosophy of statement. 
Naturally, the philosophy of statement is logic whose structure 
in grammar was largely charted and constructed by Aristotle. In order 
to confine their totalitarian tendencies, both the philosophies of 
being and of knowledge were forced to yield a part of their autonomy. 
The philosophy of being, in order to accommodate teleology and system-
atization of mind, was stripped of its accidental and qualitative 
differentia. The philosophy of mind, in order to represent places 
of contact with external nature, was required to yield claim to sub-
stantial reality for ideal forms. 
b. Aristotle on the Stages of Knowledge. 
(1) Method of Obtaining Insight. 
Aristotle testifies that the attainment of the premises of 
scientific demonstration, i.e., of philosophy, is through inductive, 
not deductive, reasoning. He says, 
We must get to know the primary premisses by induction: 
for the method by which even sense-perception implants 
the universal is inductive ••• Intuition is more accuxate 
than scientific knowledge {jfeduced knowledgeJ ••• Primary 
premisses are more knowable than demonstrations ••• There 
will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premisses, 
••• intuition will be the originative source of scientific 
1. This figure was suggested by McKeon's 11 Introduction11 to BvfA, in 
which he says, 11Carefully rest ricted thus f rom inferences based on 
hovl we think about things and how we state that we know, the dis-
tinction of form and matter (which are common to knowledge, state-
ment, and being) is transmuted into the distinction of actuality 
and potentiality (which limit questions of being to considerations of 
being without slipping into analogies, and which are therefore the 
proper terms for the consideration of being gua being) 11 • ( p. xx). 
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knowledge. And the originative source of science gr asps 
the original basic premiss, while science as a whole is 
similarl2 related as originative source to the whole body 
of fact. 
The methodology by which these all-important primary premises 
or intuitions are t o be pursued is only vaguely treated. In a sense 
they have to be innate, but at the same time they have to be actualized 
thr ough experience. As he says: 
Scientific knowledge through demonstration is imposs ible 
unless a man knows the primary immediate premisses ••• 
Neither can we possess them from birth, nor can t hey come 
to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the 
extent of having no such deve loped stat e at all . There-
fore we must possess a capacity of some sort, but not s uch 
as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. 
\ie conclude that these states of knowledge are neither 
innate in a determinate form, nor developed fro~ other higher 
states of knowledge, but from sense perception.~ 
The suggestions which we might draw out of this remark are: (l) 
One must trust one was born rlith the capacity, and (2) one must seek 
experience and subject it to exhat'!Stive 'dialectical' and 'scientific' 
reorganization, then trust to faith that the premises reveal themselves. 
Another suggestion of the direction in which thought should move 
· is contained in Aristotle 1 s famous doctrine of the four causes. Basic-
ally, he contends that to know the cause of an object is part of the 
knov1ledge of the object itself and then he analyzes cause into its 
2. Aristotle, Post. Anal., II, xix, lOOb. (McKeon, BWA, 185-186.) 
All fo~lowing references are from Aristotle until a change is 
irrlicated. 
3. Post. Anal., II, xix, 99b, 20 to lOOa, 15. (McKeon, BWA, 184-185.) 
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constituent kin:is of material, formal, efficient, ani final. Although 
the doctrine of causes is referred to in most Aristotelian treatises, 
it is described in the Physics as follows: 
Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not 
think they know a thing till they have grasped the 1why 1 
of it (which is to grasp its primary cause) ••• 
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes 
to be ani which persists, is called a 'cause 1, e.g. the 
bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, ani the 
genera of which the bronze and silver are species. 
ffiaterialJ 
In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. 
the . statement of the essence, ani its genera, are called 
'causes 1 , (e.g. of the octave the relation of 2:1, and 
generall~ number), and the parts in the definition. 
lJormal_j 
Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming 
to rest; e.g. the man who gave advice is a cause, the 
father is cause of the child, and generally what makes 
of what is made and what causes change of what is 
changed. /JfficientJ 
Again (4) in the sense of en:l or 1 that for the sake of 
which' a thi~ is do(le, e.g. health is the cause of walk-
ing about. LFina1J4 
One other suggestion is found in Aristotle's Topics. There, he 
points out: 
The means whereby we are to become well supplied with 
reasonings are four: (1) the securing of proposi-
tions; (2) the power to distinguish in how many senses 
a particular expression is used; (3) the discovery 
of the d~ferences of things; (4) the investigation of 
likeness. 
The succeeding discussion reveals that he considers only the last 
of these four as applicable to the discovery of premises. Then he 
4. Phy., II, iii, 194b, 15-35. (McKeon, BWA, 240-1) 
5. Top., I, xi, 105a, 20-25. (McKeon, BWA, 198) 
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says: 
The examination of likeness is useful with a view both 
to inductive arguments and to hypothetical reasonings, and 
also ldth a view to the rendering of definitions. It 
is useful for inductive arguments because it is by means 
of an induction of universals in cases that are alike that 
we claim to bring the universals in evidence: for it is 
not easy' ~o do this if we do not know the points of 
likeness. 
Therefore, in attending to the similarities in things the individual 
mind conceives connections in the form of 1 inductive arguments and 
hypothetical reasonings.• Unfortunately the process is not specified 
further. 
(2) Ivle thod of Verification. 
(a) Verification of Premises. One cannot construct the interpo-
lation in the previous material that through the use of definitions 
rooted in experience and through using hypothetical reasonings, the specu-
lative premises are validated and tested, but Aristotle did not explicitly 
outline that process. At least the inclination to regard seriously the 
pragmatic function of the premises is indicated in the following remark 
from the Metaphysics: 
6. 
7. 
As for those to whom the difficulties mentioned fjhange .and 
identityJ are suggested by reasoning, it is not easy to 
solve the difficulties to their satisfaction, unless they 
will posit something and no longer demand a reason for it; 
for it is only thus that all reasoning and all proof is 
accomplished; if they posit nothing, · they destroy dis-
cussion and all reasoning.? 
Top., I, XV~~~, l08b, 5-15. 
Met., XI, vi, 1063b, 5-15. 
(l-1cKeon, m~·A, 205) 
(McKeon, BWA, 859-860) 
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He appears to be hinting at the proposition that to philosophize one 
has to make some assumption or assumptions and that these are to be 
tested by their adequacy to relate and systematize the facts of experi-
ence. Although he hints at this, he never directly says it. 
(b) Verification of Propositions Subordinate to Premises. 
Aristotle identifies the validation of subordinate propositions with the 
entire process of reasoning: 
Reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being 
laid down, something other than these necessarily comes 
about through them. 
a. demonstration ••• 
b. dialectical ••• 
c. c~ntentio~... 8 d. ~s-reaso~ngs ••• 
Aside from the systematizing references within this statement (w~~ch 
will be discussed subsequently), reasoning by demonstration was con-
ceived to be the "necessary" and 11essentia111 relation of an inference 
from its premises and this, in tur n, similarly. 
The syllogistic form was Aristotle's . constribution to the descrip-
tion of the thought process. In the discussion of the syllogism the 
principles of the practical philosophy of statement are formulated. In 
it are discovered principles, e.g., the law of contradict ion,9 which be~ 
came basic to thought about the philosophies of being and knowing. 11 A 
certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject. 1110 In 
this philosophy of statement Aristotle points out the illusions of gram-
mar as the pre-sophists had pointed out the :illusions of being and Plato 
8. Top., I, i, lOOa, 25 to lOla, 15. (IvlcKeon, BHA, 188-189) 
9. Met., XI, v, 106lb, 35. (IvicKeon, BVlA, 856) 
::0. Cat., ii, lb, 5-10. (McKeon, BViA, 8) 
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had displayed the illusions of sensation. 
The general scheme of verification in Aristotelian philosophy is 
in the domain of the demonstrative which is between the immediate and 
certain pr emises and definition of the nature of terms. Of the pre-
mises enought has been said previously. Definition was conceived to 
be the symbolizing act of the mind with reference to a specific experi-
ence. 
Definition is of the essential nature of being of some-
thing, and all demonstrations evidently posit and assume 
the essential nature.ll 
Experience, ro symbolized, is a term which, as such, has no truth nor 
validity •12 The judgments and inferences from these terms can be 
treated by the rules of the syllogism. 
(3) Method of Relation. 
The systematic nature of Aristotelian thought is revealed in the 
way in which every stage of insight and of verification interrelate v1ith 
the organizing process within his philosophy. By virtue of his histori-
cal position it fell to Aristotle to construct the outlines of formal 
logic which contributed immeasurably to the effectiveness of analysis 
of thought. In stressing that contribution, the accompanying harmony 
and balance of synopsis and systematization have often been overlooked. 
In the preceding section the nature of definition was indicated. 
The term defined was usable in construction of propositions and in 
11. Post. Anal., II, iii, 90b, 30-35. (McK~on, BWA, 161) 
12. Org., i, 16a, 1-5. (McKeon, Bvli"A, 40) 
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syllogistic inference,. Propositions (judgments) and inferences were 
always guided by the insight furnished by first premises. A sensation 
or a group of sensations which formed an experience carried with it 
similarity to prior sensations or difference. In case it is similar, 
it is experienced through perception; in case it is dissimilar, it 
is experienced intuitively. The intuition immediately sets up a 
concept symbolizing the sensation. 
The formula Lexpressing essence or substance~is of the 
universal ••• But when we come to the concrete thing, 
e.g., this circle, i.e., one of the individual cir~les ••• 
of these there is no definition, but they are known by 
the aid of intuitive thinking or perception ••• Iviatter is 
unknowable in itself.l3 
The term 11 unknowable 11 is of critical significance in this con-
nection. It is evident that Aristotle is not subject to the criticism 
sometimes levelled at Hegel that all reality is not comprehended in the 
philosophic statement which expresses his symbolizing of it. 
Definition is a positing in thought of the symbol of the sensa-
tion. Just as sensation v<as the matter for perception or for intuition, 
definition is the matter for j~dgment and inference. 
Whenever subsequent to the induction from terms guided by the first 
principles, an inference is established by deduction, then it has been 
demonstrated and is knowable. Psychologically, when that which is knm-.-
able is experienced, that experience is again matter, its definition 
matter and unknowable for succeeding demonstration. 
13. Iv1et., VII, x, 1036a, 1-10. (McKeon, BHA, 799) 
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We may draw the gener al conclusion that there is no identi-
cal object of which :it is ~ssible to possess both a defi-
nition and a demonstr ation. 4 
Before summarizing the rational and non-rational elements in 
Aristotle 1s philosophy, a provocative question needs to be mentioned. 
11 Are concrete, actual events rational or nonrational ? 11 This is the 
more general form of the questi on which might be made more Aristotelian 
by asking, "Is the material cause rational or nonrational? 11 
Philosophic knowledge to Aristotle is knowledge about the actual; 
it is not the actual itself. Philosophic knowledge is a representation 
of the actual by a combination of intuition and demonstration rendering 
th:e actual systematically comprehensible. This comprehensible statement 
may, and should in philosophy, be rationalistic in form. 
Nevertheless, the everrt itself is nonrational. In the same sense 
in which this matter was treated in the previous chapter, nonration~ 
here means rational plus. Before, during, and a f ter demonstrative philoso-
phizing it remains 11 given11 • 11v~ e can inquire about specific attri-
butes and changes and their causes, but not about the fact of its exis-
tence.u15 "Matter is unknowable in itself. 1116 
To Aristotle, then, the true philosophy conforms to the real and 
in doing so becomes rational. But the true philosophy never becomes 
the real; the real is always the true plus the givenness of existence, 
i.e., is nonrational. 
14. Post. Anal., II, iii, 9la, 5-10. (NcKeon, mvA, 162) 
15. Met., VII, xvii, 104lb, 6. (J:vicKeon, B\rjA, 811) 
16. :Het. , VII, x, 1036a, 9. (McKeon, BviA, 799) 
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c. Elements of Rationalism and Nonrationalism in Aristotle 1 s Philosophy • 
(1) Points of Effectiveness of Hationalistic 1-iethod as Applied to 
Aristotle's Philosophy. 
(a,) Rationalism demonstrates consistency among related proposi-
tions. Aristotle is the author of the original statement of the principle 
of contradiction: 
There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be 
deceived, but must always, on the contrary, recognize the 
truth-viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same 
time be and not be, or admit any other similar pair of 
opposites.l7 
(b) Rationalism expresses analytic factoring which represents a 
generally quantitative relation. The mechanical and arbitrary construction 
of judgments and inferences is indicative of the schematic, mathematical 
ideal to which Aristotle was definitely inclined. He was es pecially 
important in formulating the rules of analytic thought. 
(c) Rationalism reasons from acknowledged authority. Aristotle's 
philosophy is far from purely empirical. A priori principles and in-
tuitions played a large part in establishing the authoritative presuppo-
sitions of his philosophy. For example, the doctrine of contradiction 
(see above) and the doctrine of limit: 
The final cause is an end ••• for whose sake everything else 
is; so that if there is to be a last term of this sort, the 
process will not be infinite; but if there is no such term, 
there will be no final cause, but those who maintain the 
17. Net., XI, v, l06lb, 35. (~IcKeon, BVlA, 856) 
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infinite series eliminate the Good without knowing it (yet 
m one viould try to do anything if he were not going to come 
to a limit); nor would there be reason in the world; the 
reasonable man, at least, always acts fol8a purpose, and this is a limit; for the end is a limit. 
A third such principle is the doctrine of knowability: 
The thinking part of the soul must be ••• potentially 
identical in character with its object without being the 
object. Mirrl must be rllated to what is thinkable, as sense 
is to what is sensible. 9 
(d) Rationalism systematizes that which is present and known. 
Aristotle recognizes the limitation that rational systematization is 
effective only within the limits of the given. VVithin that limit his is 
a highly systematic and organic theory of philosophy. 
(e) Rationalism encourages the development of precise units of 
logical and grammatical construction. With respect to Aristotle as 
founder of the science, this is perhaps an understatement. 
(f) Rationalism describes a status quo situation. Aristotle 1s 
philosophy is a view of an enclosed universe; the unmoved~over is eternal, 
changeless, pure form; the forms in things are finite in number and 
fixed in nature. Largely on the grounds of his assumptions of limit 
and of knowability Aristotle presents a 11block-universe 11 • 
(2) Points of Inadequacy in the Rationalistic Method as Applied to 
Aristotle's Philosophy. 
(a) Rationalism cannot produce a satisfying concept regarding 
18. Met., II, ii, 994b, 5-15. (McKeon, BWA, 714) 
19. Org., III, iv, 429a, 10-20. (McKeon, BWA, 589) 
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certainty. Aristotle claims more certainty for his intuitions and pre-
mises than for the products of the process of rational systematizing. 
His concept of the dynamic whereby these intuitions are gained is 
sketchy and inadequate. The dogmatic logic-chopping which resulted 
from the attempts of succeeding generations to adopt Aristotle's cri-
terion of demonstrations resulted in arid arguments of common disrepute. 
(b) Rationalism cannot produce insight in problem situations 
without appealing beyond itself to empirical data. Aristotle had no 
clear conception of the nature of the inductive process nor of the pro-
cess of discovery of hypotheses. 
(c) Rationalism cannot demonstrate degrees of probability among 
propositions except in terms of mathematical frequency. Definitions, 
for Aristotle, are posited and without truth value; fonnal logic prescribes 
only affirmative or negative judgments of validity; and no criteria of 
validating premises is supplied. The idea of probability in this 
particular respect appears to have been completely ignored by Aristotle. 
(d) Rationalism cannot escape the given and that which is actually 
present in thought. Such 11 escapes 11 are provided only through empirical 
observation at one extreme of the activity of mind and through intuition 
at the other extreme. They are not organically and synoptically inte-
grated into his method. 
(e) RatiOnalism does not draw knowledge-beliefs into attention in 
order to create an integrated system of beliefs. Aristotle did not depend 
upon a thoroughly rationalistic system to create his system, but instead 
added complementary inductive processes at every stage of demonstration. 
(f) Rationalism cannot express the unique properties of wholes 
nor the truth of developing experience in process. .Aristotle posited a 
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nonrational factor in all experience which transformed the "knowledge" 
into "experience" whose relation to further knowledge was that of matter 
to form. The idea that kno-vrledge can be transformed into a synoptic 
principle of experience is notably absent from Aristotle 1s philosophy. 
(3) The Pattern of Rationalism in Aristotelian hilosophy. 
(a) The rationalist introduces a pattern of necessity into the 
interpretation of events. In order to achieve the ideal of necessity 
and essentiality, Aristotle ruled out all the sphere of accidental 
and transient events. 'rhe pattern of necessity like the ideal of mathe-
matical certainty vv-as a pure postulation on his part. 
(b) Rationalistic principles tend to mental conservatism with 
respect t o r efl ective select ion, verification, and systematization. 
Aristotle 1s empiricism was specifically formulated to meet this objec-
-tion to a thoroughly; rationali~tic philosophy. 
(c) Rationalism tends to describe a mechanical, static meta-
physical system. As remarked above, Aristotle 1s ontologic al and cosmo-
logical schemes represent a block-m1iverse. 
(d) The similari ty of the realm of objects and the r ealm of ideas 
is a presupposition of r ationalism. The doctri ne of knowability was 
r emarked above. 
(e) Rationalism depends upon a system of a priori t r uths. These 
truths have been expressed as the various doctr ines vlhich . \vere posited by 
Aristotle as purely f ormal presuppositions of his system. 
(f) Rationalism applied to psyc hol ogy t ends t o intr od uce (a) 
separation of mind and b ody and (b) a rigi d faculty psychology. The 
separation in the case of Aristotle 1 s philosophy is expressed in form . 
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and matter. His psychology is a faculty psychology, e.g., the nutritive, 
appetitive, sensory, locomotive, thinking faculties. 20 
(g) Rationalistic ethics is characteristically a rigidly imper-
sonalistic system of values. Aristotle's ethics is naturalistic and 
empirical, but it is not integrally systematized with his metaphysics 
and, to that extent, is not a rationalistic ethics. The separation of 
ethics and metaphysics may have been desirable at that time in the history 
of thought but the continued divorce of theory and practice has to a 
large extent sterilized philosophy of its proper significance in modern 
times, contributory thereby to arid intellectualism. 
(h) Rationalism tends toward ari all-inclusive formula. While 
the common interpretation is unfair in some respects, . Aristotle has been 
judged to attempt a complete system by formal deduction. Just to the 
extent to which he avoided over-extension of his scheme of rationalistic 
deduction was he able to expand his philosophy into a coherent and in-
tegrated system. 
The father of rationalism, the founder of the 'philosophy of 
statement' constructed a philosophy in which the rationalistic elements 
are dominant, but he also explicitly marked out some of the inadequacies 
in the method and consistently avoided over-extending his method into 
territory in which it was not adequate. 
2. Berkeleyan Spirit and Ideas. 
a. Historical Background. 
The rule of scholastic rationalism in philosophy continued with-
20. Org., II, iii, 414a, 30. (HcKeon, BVJA, 559) 
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out r adical dissent roughly from Augustine to Bacon. Crude as it was, 
Bacon's substitution of the authority of experience for the authority 
of dogma serves a fair dividing point between medieval and modern 
thought . Using Bacon's empirical premise and attempting to synthesize 
that pr emise with mathematical rationalism, Hobbes produced a mechan-
istic materialism whose doctrines ran counter to both the scholastic 
philosophy and the popular dogmas of the church. Locke made an im-
pressive, but ~nconsistent, attempt to justify ,the new methodology by 
pointing out one way in which it could be used and not contradict 
dogma. 
This is only a fleeting sketch of the philosophical situation in 
which Berkeley emerges. To justify the empirical methodology for wider 
popular and scholarly acceptance, he undertakes to point out that it 
does not lead to atheism (so he must refute Hobbes) nor to skepticism 
(so he must show the scholastic-minded how the familiar heaven and earth 
can be constructed with these new materials). 
b. Berkeley on the Stages of Knowledge. 
(1) Introduction. 
If one is inclined to believe that history repeats itself, t here is 
an engaging analogy between Greek philosophy and the philosophy of the 
early modern period. Pre-sophistic philosophy and scholasticism were 
primarily concerned with an external world--external in the sense of 
being outside the individual's 6\~ private experience. The Greek world 
was more the world of nature while the scholastic world was the realm 
of dogmatic revelation, but both were external to individual experience. 
Sophistic philosophy and British empiricism changed the emphasis and 
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concern from an objective realm of common experience to the subjective 
rea.lm of individual experience. One should not draw the analogy too far, 
but the subjectivist tendency grov.rs steadily from Bacon to Hume, then the 
philosophic reconstruction switches to Germany somewhat as Socrates, Plato, 
and Aristotle reconstructed philosophy from its subjectivists sophistry 
in Greece. 
Berkeley denies the reality of universals, i.e., of abstract ideas, 
and likewise denies the existence of any material substance vlith any but 
sensible qualities or even the existence of such sensible substance un-
perceived. 
Berkeley attributes much of the confusion and error in philosophy 
to the notion of abstract ideas. 
To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, 
as when I consider some particular parts or qualities 
separated from others, with which, though they are united 
in some object yet it is possible they may really exist 
without them. But I deny that I can abstract fr om one 
another, or conceive separately those qualities which it 
is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can 
frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars 
in the manner aforesaid--which2iast are the two proper acceptations of 'abstraction'. · 
In turn, the false notion of abstract ideas is charged to the mis-
use of words: 11 I come now to consider the source of this prevailing 
notion, and that seems to me to be language •1122 \'lords are not only used 
in different and unclear meanings, but they are used for other purposes 
than communication, e.g., 11 the raising of some passion, the exciting to 
or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular 
21. Berkeley, PHK, 513. All following references are from Berkeley 
until a change is indicated. 
22. PHK, 519. 
dispositi.on. 1123 Berkeley urges, then, that one attend to ideas in their 
11bare and naked 11 state, instead of attending to words: 11 I confine my 
thought to my own ideas divested of words.n24 
Berkeley says persons know either by sense or by reason. 25 Those 
things which they know by sense do not depend upon their own wills; 11there 
is therefore some other will or spirit that produced them. 1126 And, 
The ideas futprinted on the senses by the Author of nature 
are called real things; and those excited in the imagination, 
being less regular, vivid, and co~tant, are more properly 
termed ideas, or images of things. 7 
In addition to regularity, vividness, and constancy as marks of the 
real, he mentions publicity in a later reference. 28 
Ideas are inert and passive, totally unlike spirit, but which 
exist only as they are perceived.29 
A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being~ as it 
perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it 
produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the 
wi 11 • Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or 
spirit; for all ideas ••• cannot represent unto us, by way 
of image or likeness, that which acts.30 
v~·ords and ideas cannot represent spirit. "Leave out the power of 
willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else 
wherein the idea can be like a spirit.u3l While one does not and cannot 
have ide as of spirit, he can [!.ave 11 notions 11 of them by means, largely 
unexplained, of his own soul.32 
23. PHK, 520. 28. PHK, 551. 
21+. PHK, 521. 29. PHK, 531. 
25. PHK, 528. 30. PHK, 531. 
26. PHK, 532. 31. PHK, 572. 
27. PHK, 533. 32. PHK, 572. 
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(2) The Method of Obtaining Insight. 
It is the nature of mind or spirit to will, to think, and to per-
ceive,33 or, as Berkeley describes it in another place, to reason and 
to sense.34 In still another place, spirit is described as understand-
ing and will.35 In the case of the latter and more formal definition, 
appare ntly both sensing and reasoning are part of the understanding. 
It should be noted that imagining is not part of the understanding, 
but part of the will: 
I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary 
and shift the ~cene as often as I think fit. It is no more 
than willing • .3.b 
Berkeley assumes explicitly that the human mind is capable of 
satisfying its curiosity for knowledge about its experience. This is 
Berkeley 's version of the doctrine of knowability: 
It is a hard th~ng to suppose that right deductions from 
true principles should ever end in consequences which can-
not be maintained or made consistent. e should believe 
God ha.s dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than 
to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he 
had placed quite beyond their reach.37 
Berkeley constantly reminds the reader to consult not the objects 
of perception but rather th perception and the perceiving process it-
self. The Pandora's box of subjectivity and introspection is opened 
and its implications are no even yet manifest. One of the primary 
problems of Berkeley's and 11 succeeding philosophies is to distinguish 
33. PHK, 572. 36. PHK, 532. 
34. PHK , 528. 37. PHK, 510. 
35. PHK, 531. 
the imagined from the d. In recent times the psychological 
concept of projection whereb the individual mind 'projects' its 
imaginings on the envirornnen raises the problem into a new dimension 
of complexity. 
Berkeley's empiricism dispenses with the Aristotelian ideal of 
demonstration; he rejects as unnecessary the concept of intuition by 
which first principles are k Imagination, reason, and percep-
tion are the sources his philosophy. 
None of these · is elaborated to any great extent. The 
process by which the individ derives the 11 notion11 of ot her souls is 
also quitetenoous, In one p ace reasoning is equated with inferring.3B 
(3) The Method of Verificat' n. 
While it is the natur of spirit to act, it is not true it must 
or does function accurately. Thinking is misled by language, passion, 
prejudice,39 and imagination not regulated by reason.40 
Hylas: 
'fruth is defined earl in the Dialogues when Philonous queries 
Are you content to a::imit that opinion for true, which upon 
examina.tion, shall appear most agreeable to common sense, 
an:i remote from Sk pticism? 
Hy las : ·fith all m heart. 41 
This statement does n t include the preceding discussion which 
definitely included absence f contradiction in a sense that could be 
38. PHK, 528. 
39. PHK, 54B. 
40. PHK, 549. 
41. D'HP, 9. 
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interpreted as systematic i lusiveness. 
As has been mentioned previously, reasoning is more apt to be cor-
rect if it deals with experience than· if it is content with 
dealing with words. 
Therefore, according 
natural, given activity of s 
as it deals with the materi 
o Berkeley, L~sight is gained through the 
Insight is refined and corrected 
of perception rather than that of imagina-
tion, with raw experience ra her than its symbols: words; and it is 
evaluated by the criteria of common sense, positive belief, and 
systematic connection. 
(4) The Method of Relation. 
Consistency (the abs nee of paradox) ~s the primary tool of relat-
ing and correlating the cons ituent parts of Berkeley's thought. The 
Dialogues are the best examp e of this demand for consistency. Whenever 
any idea is found to be inca istent with introspective experience (i.e., 
a correspondence criterion) 't is discarded. The presumption of systematic 
interrelatedness ience is carried out consistently. 
The laws of logical 
as being valid and useful. 
with Berkeley, empirically v id. 
terms will ever validate the • 
Berkeley's contentio 
are accepted without explicit question 
terms involved in inference must be, 
No amount of reasoning with abstract 
language is often misused, that it may 
not be used abstracted from xperiences, that it (nor even ideas) can 
describe spirit, is one of t e strongest directives to empirical in-
vestigation that to his cause. Ironically, just as 
his 'refutation of skepticis to become a step toward Hume's radi-
cal skepticism, Berkeley's caution against misuse of language is used 
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by later philosophers (e.g., Bergson and Positivists) as a symptom of 
the distorting power of the hole human reason. 
Discussion of rnal relationship within Berkeley's philso-
phy would be incomplete with ut at least mentioning the influence of 
his religious conviction tha God was the Author, the Orderer, the 
Creator, and Sustainer of th whole scheme of things. One of the argu-
ments he uses against an un rceived matter is that it might be con-
ceived as co-eternal with Go , which is unthinkable to him. God 
is that "Spirit 'who works i all, 1 and 1by whom all things consist •. 11 42 
c. Elements of Rationalism nd Nonrationalism in Berkeley's Philosophy. 
(l) Points of Effectiveness of Rationalistic Method as Applied to 
Berkeley 's Philosophy. 
(a) Rationalism demo strates consistency among related proposi-
tions. Berkeley's thoroughg ing consistency revealed to him the in-
adequacy of Locke's differen iation of primary and secondary qualities. 
The critics of Berkeley's id alism have found few inconsistencies in 
his conclusions. 
(b) Rationalism expr sses analytic factoring which represents a 
generally quantitative relat on. While Berkeley was a discerning intro-
spectionist, he was not an a ~ ute analyst. His system does not carefully 
factor, distinguish, and dif'erentiate as much as one might wish. Could 
it be that he was deliberate y skeptical of Hobbes 1 mathematics? 
(c) Rationalism reas ns from acknowledged authority. That acknow-
42. PHK, 574. 
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ledged authority is his own private experience. Since that authority 
is not explicitly a cohere whole, it does not dictate a closed system, 
but provides for an nalistic, unfolding, developing system. 
(d) Rationalism sys ematizes that which is present and known. 
Berkeley's reasoning has no only systematized that which is known, 
but he has then speculated eyond the evidence of experience to fill 
l in the void of the unknown such a way as to give his critics an 
opportunity to accuse blocking off further investigation. 
(e) Rationalism enc ,urages the development of precise units of 
logical and grammatical co truction. Y.lhile formal logic is adopted 
uncritically, rationalistic are avoided by the caution against 
general and abstract langua 
(f) Rationalism des a status quo situation. Berkeley avoids 
a rationalistically closed ystem by using an empirical base. The base 
of experience constantly pr vides additional evidence of novelty to prevent 
a static picture of reality 
( 2) Points of Inadequa.cy i the Rationalistic 1-1ethod as Applied to 
Berkeley's Philosophy. 
(a) Rationalism cannot produce absolute certainty. Berkeley gives 
up the attempt to achieve Aristotle's ideal of demonstration. But, he 
contends that the evidence is sufficiently convincing as to be conclusive 
as against skepticism or atheism. 
(b) Rationalism cannot produce insight in problem situations. 
Berkeley does not depend upon reasoning to produce insight, but instead 
upon perceiving, :imagining, and reasoning. The specific manner by 
which any of these means provide clues for the solution of problems is 
not analyzed by Berkeley. Reasoning is a native quality of the spirit; 
the process is too patently accepted. 
(c) Rationalism cannot demonstrate degrees of probability among 
propositions. In respect of probability, Berkeley follows the more ty-pical 
rationalist pattern. The criteria of co~non sense, nonskepticism, and 
systematic inclusiveness having been applied, a kind of acceptance which 
is sufficient to the case is implied. This is not scholastic demonstration 
but it is plainly believed adequate and not to be belittled by the appli-
cation of some mathematical concept like probability.43 · 
(d) Rationalism cannot escape the given and that which is actuAlly 
present in thought. In this respect, Berkeley is definitely anti-ration-
alistic; the given is definite, personal experience not conceptualized 
or even rationally intuited. 
(e) Rationalism does not draw knowledge-beliefs into attention 
in order to create an integrated system of beliefs. Berkeley would 
admit this statement and would say that experience in all its inclusive-
ness does serve up to the investigator novel and expanding knowledge-
beliefs for reason to systematize. 
(f) Rationalism cannot express the unique properties of wholes 
nor the truth of developing experience in process. Again, Berkeley 
is no rationalist. Empirical evidence directs his position that spirits 
as agents are such wholes and are wholes in development. 
(3) The Pattern of Rationalism in Berkeley 1s Philosophy. 
(a) The rationalist introduces a pattern of necessity into the 
43. cr. PHK, 529. 
14]. 
interpretation of events. In Berkeley's system, spirits are free 
agents, the only conceivable kind of free agents. 
(b) Rationalistic principles te:hd to mental conservatism with 
respect to reflective selection, verification, and systematization. 
There was little conservative about Berkeley 1s philosophy; it has served 
as a base and a guide for radical and absolute idealism ever since . it 
was first propounded. 
(c) Rationalism tends to describe a mechanical, static meta-
physical .system. Such a static system is avoided by the empirical instead 
of the rationalistic base. 
(d) The similarity of the realm of objects and the realm of i deas 
is a presupposition of rationalism. Berkeley had his version of t he doc-
trine of knowability; •·lith him it was a matter of religious faith. His 
metaphysical idealism, however, provides homogeneous material with which 
reason may work systematically. 
(e) Rationalism depends upon a system of a priori truths. One 
of the primary ftmctions of Berkeley's philosophy was to demonstrate 
that the system of a priori truths of the scholastic philosophy was not 
necessary to a consistent philosophy or a fairly orthodox t heology. 
That function having been served, science is given the greatest encourage-
ment to proceed with its experimentation. 
(f) Rationalism has no explanat i on of the phenomenon of insight. 
Ne ither has Berkeley. He merely points to its sources. 
(g) Rationalistic psychology tends to introduce (a) separation 
of mind and body and (b) a rigid faculty psychology. Berkeley avoids 
both of these products by failing to analyze rigorously his concepts 
of spirit and age nt, explicitly emphasizing instead their unity and 
wholeness. 
3. Leibnizian Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact. 
a. Historical Background. 
Appro.D.mately two thousand years after Aristotle, the establish-
ment of modern philosopny in the systems of thought of Locke, Descartes, 
and Spinoza reopened the realm of thought to critical study and called 
for mw syntheses. Leibniz was to attempt such a synthesis. 
Descartes had cut off the world of matter from the world of spirit, 
and Spinoza maintained the distinction short of reconciliation in God. 
Descartes claimed as valid knowledge only those self-evident, innate 
ideas which the method of doubt could reveal but mt produce, while 
Locke disclaimed all innate ideas and remained skeptical of certain 
knowledge being produced empiric ally. 
Here was a philosophical disagreement of the first order and one 
some~1hat analogous to the early Greek contes:t about permanence and 
change. Cartesian rationalism seemed to provide a philosophy of perman-
ence in its self-evident truths and Locke 1s simple ideas provided a 
picture of Heraclitic flux. Just as the Atomists of early Greece had 
resolved the opposition in atomism, Leibniz suggests an atomism 1for 
his day. In contradistinct,ion from Democritus and Leucippus, however, 
he con::eives his atomism in spiritualistic rather than naturalistic 
terms. 
b. Leibniz on the Stages of Knowledge. 
(1) Introduction. 
Every monad is an entelechy in which the process of its develop:nent 
is laid in germ and each monad tends to self-activity in the direction 
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of that developnent. This idea of entelechy is closely related to that 
of Aristotle, 44 but while Aristotle uses the term prjmarily in the sense 
of the end toward which the process of developnent tends, Leibniz con-
ceives entelechy more as the "substance or force which contains within 
itself the principle of its own changes". 45 
All simple substances or created Monads might be called 
Entelechies, for they have in them a certain perfection ••• ; 
they have a certain self sufficiency ••• which makes them the 
sources of their internal activitiei6and, so to speak, incorporeal automata. (Theod. 87.) 
All monads are characterized by perception,47 the representation 
of the whole, and by appetition, 11 the activity of the internal principle 
which produces change or passage from one perception to another. 11 48 
Some monads (animals) are, in addition, possessed of memory (which 
entitles them to be called souls )49 and some of these animal monads 
(rational minds) also are endowed with "knowledge of necessary and 
eternal truths 11 .5° 
These necessary and eternal truths are customarily referred to 
as truths of reason and are to be distinguished from truths of fact. 
Truths of reason are simple, self-evident, eternal, necessary proposi-
tions; truths of fact are contingent, compossil:?le propositions systemati-
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31. Our reasonings are groUIXied upon two great principles, 
that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false 
Aristotle, Met., H, 3, 
Leibniz, MON, 229, N. 
a change is mted. 
Ibid., #18, 229. 
lbid., #14, . 224. 
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Ibid., #19, 230. 
Ibid., #29, 233. 
1043a, 35 and 8, 1050a, 22. 
All following references are to Leibniz until 
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that which involves a contradiction, and ~ that which is 
opposed or contradictory to the false; 51 
32. And that of sufficient reason in virtue of which we hold 
that there can be m fact real or existing, no statement true, 
unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and 
not otherwise, although these reasons usually canno·t be known 
by us. (Theod., 44, 196.) 
33. There are also two kinis of truths, those of reasoning 
and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and 
their opposite is jmpossible: truths of fact are contingent 
and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, 
its reasons can be found by analysis, resolving it into more 
simple ideas and truths until we come to those which are 
primary.52 
While truths of reason neet the criterion of sufficient reason, 
their primary distinguishing characteristic is the necessity involved 
in their statement in accordance with the law of contradiction. Truths 
of reason are binding upon all monads, even God. All monads, according 
to Leibniz must conform to the laws of reason, mathematics, and the 
good. In this position he stood with the Scholastics over against 
that of Duns Scotus which had been adopted by Descartes. This point 
is evidence of Leibniz 1 belief in the principle of continuity in exis-
tents: God's understanding differs from man's only in degree, not in 
kind. For Descartes, the difference of man 1s ·understanding from that 
of God was one of kim. 
We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that eternal 
truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend on 
his will, as Descartes, and afterwards M. Poiret 
appear to have held. That ifl true only of 
::cmtingent truths, of which the principle is fitness 
51. Theo., 44, 169. 
52. MON, 31-33, 235-236. 
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(convenance) or choice of the best, whereas necessary truths 
depend solely on His understanding and are its inner object. 
(Theod. 180-184, 185, 335, 351, 380.)53 
The independent existence of eternal truths is discovered by 
human, rational minds through experience. They are present in seed 
ani discovered in experience, but experience is mt the efficient cause 
of knowledge, as Locke would cla:im, because the activity of the intel-
lect in dealing with the perceptions of the self is the unique ani 
efficient cause of revealing those truths. 
Our mind is the source of necessary truths, and however 
many particular experiences we may have of a universal 
truth, -we cannot assure ourselves of it for ever by in-
duction without knowing its necessity through reason ••• 
The senses may suggest, support, and confir.m these truths, 
but cannot demonstrate their infallible a.nd perpetual 
certainty. 54 
Although there might arise some misapprehension about the source 
of sensation appearing f'rom outside the monad in quotations like the 
preceding, this was not Leibniz 1 intention. All experience, possible, 
146 
compossible and necessary is an internal creation of the entelechy within 
the individual monad; any appearance 11as if11 external is to be explained 
by his doctrine of pre-established harmony. 
The Monads have no windows through which anything could 
come in or go out.55 
Every Monad is, in its own way, a mirror of .the universe, 
ani as the universe is ruled according to a perfect order, 
there must also be order in that which represents it, i.e., 
53. MON, 46, 242-243. 
54. NEHU, I, 1, #5. Erdmann (ed.), WP, 209b; Gerhardt (ed.), PSL, 
v, 76-77. 
55. MON, #7, 219. 
in the perceptions of the soul, and consequently there 
must be order in the body, through which the universe is 
represented in the soul. (Theod. 403.)56 
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Pre-established harmony is carried to its logical conclusion in the 
system of Le:ihniz and issues in a system whose 11 harmony11 is a rigid pre-
scription of predestination by which all things are mutually determined. 
In the notion of each individual sUbstance all its events 
are contained, along with all their circumstances ani the whole 
sequence of external things. 57 
Not only are the Eternal truths systematized in the bonds of necessity, 
but even that which appears contingent and accidental to human minds is 
also completely detennined ani demonst-rable to God. Such demonstration 
is beyond human capacity, however, by the very finite nature of that 
capacity. 
The differences between necessary and contingent truths 
is indeed the same as that between commensurable and incom-
mensurable numbers. For the reduction of commensurable 
numbers to a common measure is analogous to the demonstration 
of necessary truths, or their reduction to identical truths. 
But, as in the case of surd ratios the reduction involves . an 
infinite process and yet approaches a common measure so that 
a definite but unending series is obtained, thus also contin-
gent truths require an infinite analysis, which God alone can 
accomplish. Accordingly it is by Him alone that these truths 
are krown a priori and with certainty. 58 
Once more, now, perception becomes the focal point of the process 
by which knowledge is revealed. Leibniz conceives the possible exis-
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to eternal truths which He finds, chooses, and wills the beet possible. 
'While formal self-consistency ( Cf. Descartes and Spinoza) would obtain 
within any of these possible universes, only the actual 11whatness11 
of the existent universe is the clue to the system of which existence 
is. predicated. 
In the natural [i.e., logicalJorder, the statement that 
a thing is what it is, ~ prior to the statement that 
it is mt another thing.!>9 
Thus, again, it is shown that the law of contradiction is inade-
quate to reveal the system of the existent universe; the law of suffi-
c ient reason operates to validate even the eternal laws of reason. 
It is one of my great maxims, that it is good to work 
out proofs of the axioms themselves.60 
The actual existent universe in its thorough understandability is 
represented as the "compossible 11 in distinction from the merely pos-
silile. The compossible is true :in its systematic relatedness to ante-
cedent ani consequent and atterxiant perceptions. 
The interrelatedness of I.e ilinizian concepts has made it necessary 
to expound at some length the diversity of tenns employed, but now it 
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(2) Method of Obtaining Insight. 
Koowledge js obtained as the principle of appetition drives the 
rational soul to successive perceptions. Complex experiences which 
perceptions bring before the mind as object are ordered and conceived 
under the principles of contradiction and of sufficient reason. Ex-
perience itself has some structure through association of ideas, but 
this structure js confused ani inadequate due to the inherent nature of 
finitude of the perceiving subject. The confusion is reduced by the 
intellect or the reason which is activated by experience (not a product 
of it) and exercises its systematizing nature either according to eternal 
truths of reason or to sufficient truths of fact. 
Association produces the same effect {;.s if long custom had 
verified their connexion_7, though the same reason does not 
exist. Authority and custom produce also the same effect 
as experience and reason, and it is not easy to free one-
self from these inclinations.61 
Although it has seemed advantageous to explore the possibilities 
of alternative decisions, the result of this peregrination is now in-
es-capable: the mini achieves insight and knowledge as it is spun out 
or unwound from its own nature, and motivated according to its own 
nature. All kmwledge is established a priori; there is no other than 
that which is given. 
(3) Iviethod of Verification. 
Compossibility as the essence of the law of sufficient reason is 
the criterion of validating existence after internal systematic consis-
61. Leibniz, N&E.; 1.1., 33. ,lErdmann (ed.), LOP, 296a; Gerhardt (ed.), 
PSL, V, 252_!, in Latta (tr.), MON, 233. 
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tency has shown the formal relations. In the great majority of particu-
lar occasions, the reduction of propositions to ultimate truths of reason 
is a task of which finite minds are incapable. However, the systematic, 
relating activity of the mind grants its approval to those propositions 
which express 11 coherence 11 within the frame of reference in which the 
occasions take place. Since particular occasions are related and 
understandable by the Infinite Mind and since the Infinite Mind acts in 
conformity to the eternal truths, then the law of sufficient reason, 
or the principle of compossibility, reveals actual truth, not clearly 
and distinctly, but clear eoough for practical purposes. 
Thus, in this system, not just a formal system is required, but 
also a coherent representation of experience. However, ultimately 
the experience is itself completely formal. 
(4) Method of Relation. 
Leibniz 1 version of coherence as compossibility is also, as has 
been pointed out, the systematizing principle of his thought, but once 
more it is oot discovered, tested, ani validated, but posited. He be-
gan with the assumption of the principle of continuity among a system 
of individual sUbstances and the doctrine of pre-established harmony 
whereby to explain changes in individuals without jeopardizing the 
integrity of the whole. Whereas Descartes had admitted the undetermined 
am accidental by reservation to the will of God the establishment of 
all the laws of reason, Leibniz reads these truths of reason into the 
very nature of the universe and thus provides for God and 11 fulgurations" 
whose natures and accidents are all in conformity with the stipulated 
harmony. To say this is valid relating is analogous to taking a group 
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of child 1s blocks and, upon instructions, dividing them into groups of 
threes, then claiming that the nature of the blocks is expressed by the 
groups of threes. 
c. Elements of Rationalism and Nonrationalism in Leibniz 1 Philosophy. 
(l) Points of Effectiveness of Rationalistic Method as Applied to 
Leibniz 1 Philosophy. 
(a) Rationalism demonstrates consistency among related proposi-
tions. One of the two acknowledgei principles of reason in Leibniz 1 
system is the principle of contradiction and identity. As leibniz uses 
the principle, it is not only an in:lepend.ent principle in its own unique 
function with respect to truths of reason, it also interpenetrates and 
systematizes the realm of occasions which are the particular province 
of the principle of sufficient reason. 
(b) Rationalism expresses analytic factoring which represents a 
generally quantitative relation. The continuity and the interrelated-
ness of the scheme of epistemology and ontology proposed by Leibniz is 
a projection of formal logic into metaphysics. The demonstration and 
deduction of formal logic, patterned on the ideal of mathemat i cal rea-
soning is hypostatized by Leibniz in his spiritualistic atomism. 
(c) Rationalism reasons from acknowledged authority. Leibniz 
.found. it necessary to put his whole system in essence in e~.ch indivi-
dual. The macrocosm reveals the totality only by revealing its own 
nature. Self-evident distinctness guided by subjective criteria of 
consistency and compossibility is the supreme authority. The entire 
philosophical system unfolds from the posttuates which are not derived 
but injected. Fundamentally, these principles are (1) intensive 
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(qualitative) substance rather than extensive substance (cf. Descartes 
and Spinoza), (2) principle of continuity of individual substances, 
arxl (3) the doctrine of pre-established harmony. 
(d) Rationalism systematizes that which is present and known. 
Since the totality of experience is reasonable and understandable, 
everything that is must be present (even if only in genn) and at the 
same time must be known (even if the perception is extremely vague and 
confused). 
(e) Rationalism encourages the development of precise units of 
logical arxl grammatical constrmtion. Formal logic is deemed adequate · 
to the entire task of und.erstarxling for, as was shown above, t he 
principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz pennits his logic to dictate 
his metaphysics. On this point Bertrand Russell, a close student of 
Leibniz 1 thought, says: 11Leibniz was a firm believer in the importance 
of logic not only in its own sphere, but as the basis of metaphysics. 1162 
(f) Rationalism describes a status quo situation. The infinity 
of possible existences is present in the thought of God and His will 
has chosen the best possible. While any given segment of the world 
process is not static, the totality of its characteristics and the total-
ity of its future and past are present and determined. The plenum is 
exhausted, present, and complete. 
(2) Points of Inadequacy in the Rationalistic 1.'-fethod as Applied to 
Leibniz 1 Philosophy. 
(a) Rationalism cannot produce absolute certainty:. The eternal 
62. Russell, HWP, 591. Cf. 595. 
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truths upon which the philosophy is fonnulated are, after all, assump-
tions whose only validity is their capability· to perform the tasks for 
which they are called. 
As to eternal truths, it is to be noted that at bottom they 
are all conditional and say in effect: such a thing being 
supposed, such another thing is.63 
(b) Rationalism cannot produce insight in problem situations. 
Leibniz had no place for unpredetermined experimental investigation. 
The ground of every insight was the touchstone of inherent nature in 
pre-established harmony. 
(c) Rationalism cannot demonstrate degrees of probability among 
propositions. In customary rationalistic fashion Leibniz refuses to 
admit probability. Unlike Descartes, however, who ruled that proposi-
tions were absolutely true or absolutely false, Leibniz attributed de-
grees of truth to all propositions. Their respective standing however 
was mt on the scale of probability but on the scale between confusion 
and distinctness. 
(d) Rationalism cannot escape the given and that which is actu-
ally present in thought. Leibniz recognized this fact by stipulating 
that everything possible is given and present in thought. 
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(e) Rationalism does not draw knowledge-beliefs into attention in 
order to create an integrated system of beliefs. Leibniz 1 system 
actually invalidates judgment. In so far as appetition incites the 
monad to new perceptions, just to that extent these perceptions fur-
nish the mind with representations that are true (though possibly con-
63. Leibniz, ~, iv, ll, #14, ffirdmann (ed.), WP, 379b; Gerhardt, 
(ed.), PSL, v, 42SJ, in Latta (tr.), MON, 60 .• 
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fused). The mind can do nought but recognize the truth in the perceptions. 
The content of the perceptions and the concomitant activity of the mind 
are both determined. 
(1') Rationalism cannot express the unique prope.rties of wholes 
nor the truth of developing experiences in process. Le i bniz can make 
no sense out of any level of experience, by his nethod, except the 
whole • One compresent whole is his forte for rot even the 11 fulgura-
tion" of a single individual monad could be accomplished without the 
deterffiination of the whole process in its harmony. 
( 3) The Pat tern of Rationalism in Le :ibniz 1 Philosophy. 
(a) The rationalist introduces a pattern of necessity into the 
interpretation of events. Necessity rules every occasion in the uni-
verse from the standpoint of the Infinite Mini of God in Leibniz' 
philosophy. 
(b) Rationalistic principles tend to mental conservatism with 
respect to reflective selection, verification, and systematizati on. 
Terms like "conservatism" have ro meanirt..g in a deterministic system. 
Externally one canremark that one of Leibniz' objectives was the har-
monization of faith and reason. In the adventure of ideas he can be 
characterized as so conservative as to be a radical reactionary. 
(c) Rationalism tends to describe a mechanical, static metaphy-
sical system. In his spiritualistic atomism, Leibniz makes all souls 
mechanical and, as remarked previously, all possibility is exhausted 
in his system. 
(d) The similarity of the realm of objects and the realm of ideas 
is a presupposition of rationalism. Le:ibniz unhesitatingly rules out 
all the unknowable by comprising all existence as knowable in reasen 
or in fact and positing the eventual reconcilability of the two. 
(e) Rationalism depends upon a system of a priori truths. Leib-
niz 1 philosophy could be described as either completely a priori, or 
at least founded upon the postulates of intensive substance, continuity, 
and harmony and the doctrines of the nature of reason. 
(f) Rationalism has no explanation of the phenomenon of insight. 
Leibniz' only suggestion is that the universe is arranged that way. 
(g) Rationalistic psychology tends to introduce (a) separation 
of mind and body and (b) a rigid faculty psychology. Although mind 
and body are unbridgeably separated by con5isting of differexit, dis-
creet monads, the pre-established harmony of monads maintains a con-
eomitant action, a kia:i of oecasionalism. Leibniz describes the_ 
action of soul monads in terms of their faculties, for example: per-
eeption, ap:r;er.ception, and appetition. 
4. Kantian Categories and Sensations 
For Kant, 11there are three· absolutely irreducible faculties of the 
mir:d, namely, koowledge, feeling and desire."64 The mir:d deals with the 
-
phenomenal world (the object of koowledge) by means of concepts or of 
speculative reason. It deals with the transcendent order (tne object of 
desire) by means of imperatives or of practical reason; and with the 
relation of knowledge to desire (the object of feeling, the pleasure or 
pain principle) by means of organizing particulars under universals, 
i.e., judgment. 
64. Kant, KU, (ed. Hartenstein), 183. (Watson (ed.), POK, 311.) 
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The human reason in dealing with itself and its experiences has 
many and devious processes by which, according to the Kant ian philosophy, 
it is made a part of the transcendental unity of the noumenal self. 
In the first place, the reason must deal with itself and its native, 
a priori, characteristics: "Reason has :iisight. only into that which it 
prod~es after a plan of its own.u65 Under the form of the phenomenal 
and as dealt with by speculative reason, this process ~uld be as follows: 
(1) The mind is an a priori synthetic unity of apperception, by 
which is meant that as it enters into the phenomenal order it retains 
its identity of character and of action through the welter of changing 
experiences. This identity and fundamenta,l unity of the self is not 
attained as a product of experience but i.s transcendentally (i.e., 
necessarily and eternally) presupposed and prior to that experience.66 
(2) The mind (i.e., the understanding) in its relation to the 
phenomenal simultaneously prescribes its forms, the categories, which 
rise immanently within the unity of apperception, as it receives and 
treats mpressions of the sensibility reporting the content of perception. 
11 Understanding can perceive nothing, the senses can think nothing. 
Knowledge arises only from their united action. u67 
11 The t:iJne has mw come to ask whether better progress may not be 
made by supposing that objects conform to our knowledge.u68 
(3) The categories, "conceptions which a priori prescribe laws to 
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tion or the actualization of the categories is accomplished with the aid 
of the imagination. The imagination operates in the process of (1) 
receiving sense-impressions and (2) revealing the categories by means of 
the schema of the understanding which are intermediary quasi-categorical 
universals limited by comparison with the categories because of the 
paucity of experience in which the self has engaged. 11f,fhe schema isJ 
the consciousness of a universal process of imagination, by which an 
image is provided for a conception.n70 
Judgme.Bt; _ is. the intermediary between the realm of the trans-
cendentally a priori and speculative and the realm of the transcendentally 
a priori and practical. Judgment does not yield knowledge, but it does 
yield a satisfaction 11 as if11 it were knowledge. 
There must then be a principle which unites the supersen-
sible sub-strate of nature with the supersensible, that 
is involved practically in the conception of freedom. And, 
although that principle does not lead to a knowledge of the 
supersensibl.e, am hence has no realm peculiarly its own, 
it enables the mind to make a transition from the theoretical 
to the practical point of view.71. 
Seen from the above is the general framework of the understanding 
with reference to its own internal operations, that is on its subjective 
side. The objective side has its history also which must now be sketched. 
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The argument against Kant that a realm of supersensible noum.ena is 
superfluous ani unusable for any philosophical purpose is well 
illustrated in this quotation. Kant divides the mind into knowledge, 
feeling and desire. He says that which "enables" the mind to move 
from the theoretical to the practical is not knowledge. It cannot 
be feeling or desire as he uses those tenns. It remains nothing. 
The sensibility receives mpressions fran unknown 1somewhats 1 
external to the unity of the self, organizing those mpressions first 
by projecting upon them, or better, by screening them through the forms 
of space and t:ime. Under the forms of space and time the various senses 
report a complex apprehension of the object purely as given, as a 
perception. 72 
Now pure perception is n:m-existent as it is remembered that along 
with the sensibility the imagination and the ~erstanding are comtempor-
aneously positing and developing the schema of the ~erstanding and the 
categories. 
Still a third contribution to the organization of experience of the 
phenomenal order is contributed by the pure reason. Spontaneously and 
without regard to the content of experience by which the sensibility and 
the ~erstanding interpret experience, the pure reason, on its own 
warrant, then, dogmatically and persistently pushes forward the notions 
of unity, necessity, and externality. 73 The pure reason, likewise, 
prescribes the rules and techniques of general logic which are given 
to it. 74 
The _interpretation and organization of the phenomenal order, then, 
according to the Kantian philosophy, is a synthesis of the activity of 
the sensibility, the understanding, the reason as practical, the faculty 
of judgment, and the pure reason which operate interrelatedly and con-
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out of their custanary habitat for purposes of examination. 75 
Now Kant believed. that knowledge of the phtmomenal order, as re-
lated above, was not knowledge of the essential nature of things; it was, 
literally, knowledge only of the appearing or phenomenal. 
Things in themselves cannot be known by means of the cate-
gories, ard all that remains is t~6think them under a name that indicates something unknown. . 
It is therefore a natural illusion which leads us to suppose 
that a primiple which properly holds only of things that are 
presented as objects of our senses is applicable to all things 
without exception.?? 
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Reason would, therefore, canpletely transcend its proper limits, 
if it should undertake to explain how pure reason can be pract-
ical, or, ~hat is the same thing, to explain how freedom is 
possible. 7 
We must, therefore, suppose the empirical laws of nature to be 
possibly infinitely various, and to be for us contingent or 
incapable of being known a priori.79 
In evideme of the noiU"ationality of the conception of the !hecno-
menaJ. order as ultimate he pointed to the various paralogisDB and anti-
.nomies to which the understanding leads.80 These antinomies can only be 
relieved by the fundamental conception of a back-lying order in reality 
not revealed to the understaniing. "Transcendental illusion ••• is dle to 
the use of principles that have no bearing upon experience and therefore 
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To him there were intimations of another order primarily hidden 
from observation but to which clues were in evidence such as the con-
tinuing unity of the self in experience, 82 in the nature of moral 
experience wherein not objects but an imperative 11 ought 11 dominated the 
attention, and in the field of judgment where the concept of purposive-
ness yields aesthetic pleasure. 
The transcendental application of the means of understanding to 
the realm of free agents liK:ewise leads into contradiction when one 
compares the realm of freedom and of nature, but (1) this comparison 
is not a proper field of man's reasoning activity, and (2) the trans-
cendental application is a synthetic insight required to make any rea-
soning and any moral activity possible. 
A unity which is demanded by our intelligence, but which is 
known as in itself contingent, necessarily presents itself 
to us as the idea that objects are purposive.83 
While the transcendental application is defended for human judg-
ment as having 11the same validity as if it were an objective or con..; 
stitutive principle" ,84 still this is no authority for the transceooent 
judgment regarding causality in nature, freedom in human nature, or 
purpose in their combination. 
The a priori synthetic proposition represented by the categorical 
ought discloses, in deduction, the basis of an intelligible (as con-
trasted with a merely phenomenal) world through the concepts of freedom, 
immortality, and God. 85 Kant says there is no conceptualization of the 
82. Kant, KpR (Ed. Hartenstein), 59,106. (Watson (ed.), POK, 279,288.) 
83. Kant, KU (ed. Hartenstein), 190. (Watson (ed.), POK, 316.) 
84. Kant, KU, 417. (Watson (ed.), POK, 33?.) 
85. Kant, KpR (ed.Hartenstein), 302, 306, 307. (Watson (ed.), POK, 
255, 256, 257 .) 
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unierstanding whereby these postulates of freedom, immorts.lity, and C'.r<>d 
can be integrated into the phe:nomenal order of the wnerstanding, but 
that 11reason sees itself compelled to take its stand /Jor these postu-
latesJin order to think .itself as practical". 86 
While he points out that the postulates of practical reason cor-
roborate and parallel some of the demands of speculative reason, Kant 
surprisingly does not proceed to demonstrate their necessity (at least 
the postulate of .freedom, upon which the other two depelli) in order to 
justify the claims of the understanding to rationality through valid 
choice of alternatives. Kant extends the compulsion of the idea of free-
dom only to the reason as practical. 
The claims of practical reason, just as the claims of the under-
standing or of pure reason, involve the individual in a dialectic of 
self-contradiction. The principle of the pure practical reason, the 
categorical imperative, is impossibly inexperienceable, being always 
empirically countered by a consideration of consequences or of desires of 
the individual. 87 Thus the function of judgment is called in to mediate 
the realms of speculative and practical reasons to relate the particular 
under the form of the universal. "Judgment will be the faculty of 
subsum.ption under rules. u88 
a. Kant on the Stages of Knowledge. 
(1) The Stage of Insight. 
86. Kant, KpR (ed. Hartenstei~, 306. (Watson (ed.), POK, 256, 257.) 
87. Ibid., 257. (Watson (ed.), POK, 233.) 
88. Kant, KrV, (A) 132, (B) 171. (Watson (ed.), POK, 83.) 
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The principles of logic are rigidly structuralized in the philosophy 
of Kant as categories of the understanding. In those problems of the 
human mind in which ratiocination is involved, the primary and elemental 
means of solving the problem is thus by the application of the rules 
of formal logic. Kant was criticized by his successors, particularly 
Hegel, for his uncritical adoption of the traditional logic. 
V~hen problems of reason get beyond the level of mere logical valua-
tion, Kant has a fairly elaborate system of description of the means of 
insight. 
In the realm of the understanding, the schema of the understanding 
is a natural, spontaneous agency of integration of the faculties of 
sense, pure reason, and the imagination. Kant might well have written 
a second version of Plato 1 s "Myth of the Charioteer": The sensibility 
is an unruly and unpredictable animal (as in Plato), but it is not mean 
in character. The reason is high-born and lofty as in Plato, but unlike 
Plato, Kant conceives it also to be not inclusive of all the significant 
aspects of reality and therefore it is quite as much a problem to the 
charioteer as is the sensibility. 
In the realm of the practical the catalyst of insight is the prin-
ciple of universality. Kant declares that to weigh the maxim of one 1s 
conduct according to its validity for universal application would yield a 
consistent, person-centered ethics. 
In the realm of experience as a whole, comprising both nature and 
freedom, the faculty of judgment moderates, integrates, and synthesizes 
the rival claims through analytic and reflective judgments. Analytic 
judgments are deductive reasonings while reflective judgments are induc-
tive. Kant expresses his preference habitually for analytic judgments 
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by the simple expedient of referring to reflective judgments as "mere" 
reflection or by labelling them "merely" reflective. g9 
A personal conviction plays a large part in the critical stage 
of Kant 1 s philosophy regarding the ascendancy of nature over freedom. 
Kant rejects the claim of reason in favor of the urgent demand to pre-
serve the integrity of the moral life. Tb.is urgency is based pr:lmarily 
on conviction, rot on deduction. 
(2) The Stage of Verification. 
\Uthin each of the realms of freedom and of nature and in dealing 
with the function of judgment, Kant 1 s primary and elemental criterion 
of the true is the logical concept of consistency. However, this is no 
arid consistency of the Leibnizian pattern. It comprises reason but 
also imagination, sensation, desire, and choice. Kant, historically, 
began a groping toward a criterion of inclusiveness and of organic system 
(note his deference to norganized beings" and to the "kingdom of ends") 
which he did not even quite define specifically, but which has been 
taken up in increasing concern by those who have come after him. 
(3) The Stage of Relation. 
In Kant 1 s relative weighting of analytic and reflective judgments 
is revealed his preference for the more rationalistic and precise deduc-
tive analysis over the more difficult inductive process which is also 
~. The mechanism of teleological process has different characteristics 
than the mechanism of static proc~sses. Kant may be charged with 
substitution of meanings in his attempt to show that judgment really 
mediates nature and freedom. 
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deemed to be more susceptible of error. 
The 11analytic 11 of the understanding is valid and reliable; the 
dialectic leads to transcendent hypotheses that get entangled in antinomies 
and contradictions. 
The schema of the understanding is the knowledge-form of the self 
or consciousness which lives through its experiences organizing and re-
lating them in process. The schema of the understanding is, however, 
at least partially a non-intellectual grasp of experience which must be 
treated by the discursive reason before experience acquires a rational 
meaning. The innate and imminent principles of reason can correct or 
modify the errors of the schema due to the paucity of experience or the 
error in sampling of the intelligible world by an individual's experi-
ence. Significantly enough, Kant makes m provision for speculative 
reason to be corrected by experience in the realm of nature. Science 
would be m further than Aristotle with Kant's speculative reason. 
c. Elements of Rationalism and Nonrationalism in Kant 1 s Philosophy. 
(1) Points of Effectiveness of Rationalistic Method as Applied to 
Kant's Philosophy. 
(a) Rationalism demonstrates consistency among related proposi-
tions. Formal and logical consistency is the primary criterion of Ka.ntian 
philosophy. But at the same time this criterion is adopted, Kant de-
clares there is a fundamental bifurcation of experience between nature 
and freedom and that even the totality of experience does not necessarily 
nor certainly yield to the critical philosophy a valid picture of reality 
as it is in itself. Thus 1 while Kant uses the criterion of consistency, 
he limits its application very severely. 
(b) Rationalism expresses analytic factoring which represents a 
generally quantitative relation. In Kant's philosophy this remark is 
valid. The pure speculative reason is most at home in the realm of 
nature, the space-time order of quantitative relations. The categories 
are prime examples of analytic factoring of experience, whether they are 
deduced as Kant claims, or whether they are adopted uncritically from 
Aristotelian logic as some of his opponents charge. 
(c ) Rationalism reasons from acknowledgsi authority. The auth-
orities in Kant 1 s philosophy are mt one but two: the ma.themat ical 
and quantitatively related realm of nature and the value-dominated, 
morally significant realm of freedom. The co-existence arrl interre-
lationship of these two constitute the central problem of Kantian philo-
sophy. With such diverse elements, it is mt surprising that the 
rationalistic product of their commingling is not quite satisfactory to 
either. With logical and/or algebraic exactness, a rationalistic treat-
ment of dissimilars does nst produce a genuine synthesis. (Cf. Hegel.) 
(d) Rationalism systematizes that which is present and known. 
Kant speaks of speculative reason as mt only systematizing what is pre-
sent and known but also subject to a natural illusion because of its 
native teniency to fill in the structure of experience by projection 
from the known to the unknown. The mind is mt merely passive in know-
ledge, as Hume "WOuld declare, but is active by means of the categories 
and the pure speculative reason; it constitutes the form of things .!!:!!. 
experienced and erects a theoretical scaffolding to link together the 
data of experience. 
The peculiar principle of reason in its logical use is to 
find for every conditioned knowledge of understarding the 
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unconditioned, and so to complete the unity of knowledge.90 
(e) Rationalism encourages the developnent of precise units of 
logical ani grammatical construction. The modes of the formal, logical 
judgment become, in Kant's philosophy, the categories of the understand-
ing. These categories are, as remarked before, constitutive in the 
experience of nature, not by themselves but a.ugmented by sensation and 
ime.gination. The precision of logical construction is qualified in two 
important respects: (l) by the experience of the moral imperative and 
(2) by the difficult and not-too-accurate processes of reflective judg-
ment which are absolutely necessary to produce the insights that relieve 
the antinomies and contradietions of partial and less-inclusive posi-
tiona. 
(f) Rationalism describes a status quo situation. Kant avoids 
a status quo situation by his concept of freedom for moral agents and 
also by the concept of purpose for both nature and personalities. 
(2) Points of Inadequacy in the Rationalistic Method as Applied to 
Kant's Philosophy. 
(a) Rationalism cannot produce absolute certainty. Kant specifi-
cally relinquished claim to certainty for his philosophical conclu-
sions. He did, however, declare that those conclusions were valid 
e wugh upon which to base a moral life. 
Reason is so perfect a unity, that if it were in principle 
inadequate to the solution of even a single one of the 
90. Kant, KrV, (A) 307, (B) 364. (Watson (ed.), POK, 139.) 
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questions which by its very nature it raises, we might at 
once with perfect certainty set it aside as incapable of 
answering any of the others ••• It is a true organic unity.91 
~'/hence could experience. derive the certainty it has, if all 
the rules that i~2follows were merely empirical and there-fore contingent? 
(b) Rationalism cannot produce insight in problem situations. 
Formal a priori synthetic propositions are produced in Kantian philoso-
phy as the activity of the mind in rendering phenomena comprehensible. 
The primary means of this production in relation to nature is the deduc-
tion of the categories. The primary means of this production in relation 
to freedom is the law of universality. If Kant is permitted his claim 
that the categories and the categorical imperative are deduced a priori, 
then one must admit his "critical" postulate that the mind prescribes 
its fonns to the objects of experience and the proposition that ·ration-
alism canmt produce insight is overturned. He says, 11Reason assumes 
. that it has in itself the power of originating action.u93 Kant claims 
that the speculative reason and the imagination do produce non empir-
ically insight in problem situations, but he counteracts that claim con-
siderably by contending that the insight in such cases is not valid until 
perception is added to conception or, in the larger contexts, until the 
practical philosophy is added to the pure philosophy. Further, he claims 
to show how the insights of a priori reason always lead to error. 
(c) Rationalism cannot demonstrate degrees of probability among 
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probable and to the contingent. While he gave up the claim of ultimate 
certainty regarding things as they are in themselves, he still · proceeds 
upon the attitude that the propositions of the critical philosophy are 
necessary and 11certain11 from the standpoint of human minds. 
(d) Rationalism canwt escape the given and that which is actu-
ally present in thought. Since the ultimate nature of things is not 
given or in thought there is in Kant nonrational., empirical provision 
for enlarging the present point of view. The device of the schema of the 
understanding is precisely for this purpose. 
(e) Rationalism does not draw knowledge-beliefs into attention 
in order to create an integrated system of beliefs. Kant contends the 
pure speculative reason does create an integrated system of beliefs, but 
that its base in experience is too narrow; so, the system is invalid 
when it is created. 
(f) Rationalism cannot express the unique properties of wholes 
nor the truth of developing experience in process. Kant was sufficiently 
empirical to pay deference to organized beings as having a peculiar 
status among existents. In the Critigue of Pure Reason he also refers 
repeatedly to the synthetic unity of apperception, but his philosophy 
concludes without a definite doctrine of personality and also., signi-
ficantly, without a doctrine of interpersonal cognition. 
(3) The Pattern of Rationalism in Kant's Philosophy. 
(a) The rationalist introduces a pattern of necessity into the 
interpretation of events. Kant agrees that the necessary is the 
rationalistic ideal, but like Aristotle he insists there is some material 
which cannot be treated with such exactness, e.g., the practical and moral. 
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To learn what are the special laws of nature, we must go 
to experience; but it is none the less true that only the 
a priori laws imposed by understanding tell us what is 
necessary for any experience whatever, and what is capable 
of being known as an object of experience.94 
(b) Rationalistic principles tend to mental conservatism with 
respect to reflective selection, verification, and systematization. If 
Kant had attempted a purely rationalistic system he would have been 
forced to rule out parts of the evidence, either of nature or of free-
dom, which did mt (as he saw them) fit into the same pattern. In this 
respect, he was more of a nonrationalist than rationalist. 
(c) Rationalism tends to describe a mechanical, static, meta-
p~ysical system. The realm. of nature as a phenomenon is such a system 
when viewed solely from the point of view of the speculative reason. 
When other than rationalistic methods are used in the fields of practi-
cal philosophy and of judgment, then the static system is dissolved and 
replaced by a dynamic one. 
(d) The similarity of the realm of objects and the realm of 
ideas is a presupposition of rationalism. That similarity is provided 
for in the Kant.ian philosophy by the "critical" point of view: the mind 
:¢e·scribes its relations to phenomena. 
(e) Rationalism de:pends upon a system of a priori truths. The 
discussion and deduction of this system of a priori truths is the major 
product of that part of philosophy which deals with the phenomenal 
order of nature. 
(f) Rationalism has n:> explanation of the phenomenon of insight. 
94. Kant, KrV, (B) 165. (Watson (ed.), POK, 81.) 
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Kant suggests an explanation by creating a nonrational faculty of the 
mind: the schema of the urrlerstan:iing. 
Synthesis ••• is due solely to the operation of imagination, 
a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without 
which we should have no knowledge whatever, but of which 
we are seldom even conscious.95 
If the schema of the understan:iing is not a faculty, and there is room 
for debate, then it is a rational concept resulting from the interplay 
of the understanding and the imagination. 
(g) Rationalistic psychology tends to introduce (a) separation 
of mind and body and (b) a rigid faculty !lSychology. The realms of mind 
and body are e~parated in Kant's philosophy as the realms of freedom 
and of nature. Kant 1 s psychology is a highly analytic, faculty psychol-
ogy. He speaks deferentially of personality and organized beings, but 
does not have any psychological theory of personality as a whole. 
(h) Rationalistic ethics is characteristically a rigidly imper-
sonalistic system of values. The ethics of the moral :imperative is a 
peculiar instance of rationalistic ethics. The Kantian :imperative is 
rigid and :impersonal in its total attention to its universality. The 
circumstance that one of the principles resulting from the elaboration 
of the imperative is the maxim to treat every person as an end, not as 
a means, does mt controvert this fact. A further · instance of the im-
personal character of the ethics is seen in the application of the 
principle of universality itself. Kant spoke of the virtue of truth for 
the sake of truth-telling as a universal principle. A person-centered 
95. Kant, KrV, (A) ?S, (B) 103. (Watson (ed.), FOK, 50.) 
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system of values would judge the moral quality of an agent by his 
motive for the weal or woe of those persons affected by the statement., 
not by the formal accuracy of the statement. If one 1s motive is kind-
ness and .consideration (e.g., to the child, the ill, etc.) then that 
motive may dictate a formal untruth, but the agent may still will the 
maxim of his motive to be universal. Kant did not apparently, escape 
his rationalism sufficiently to see this complication of his doctrine. 
171 
Chapter IV 
A SUMMARY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY 
Preface 
The foregoing investigation has brought out the characteristics of 
rational and nonrational philosophy both in method and content. These 
characteristics form a check-list according to which any particular 
philosophy can be analyzed to show whether that philosophy inclines more 
to rational or ncnrational characteristics or whether it attempts some 
synthesis of these factors. Subsequently1 then1 the philosophies of 
Lovejoy, ·1ontague and Tsanoff will be subjected to that analysis. 
1. Biographical Data 
Arthur Oncken Lovejoy was born October 10, 1873 in Berlin, Germany. 
He did his undergraduate work at the University of California where he 
graduated with an A. B. degree in 1895. He received a Master of Arts 
degree from Harvard in 1897 and honorary doctor's degrees from the Uni-
versity of California (1924) 1 University of Missouri (1939), Princeton 
University (1940) and Kenyon College (1941). He taught philosophy at 
Leland Stanford Jr. University, 1899-1901, Washington University, St. 
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Louis, 1901-1908, and the University of Missouri, 1908-1910, before going 
to Johns Hopkins University in 1910 where he remained until his retirement.1 
As the title to his contribution to Contemporary American Philosophy,2 
Professor Lovejoy describes his philosophy as "A Temporalistic Realism. n3 
The construction of even an outline of Lovejoy's philosophical system is 
a difficult task because his major literary concern has evidently not 
been the formulation of a system. He has confined himself chiefly to 
the role of critic and historian of ideas 1 both current and past 1 which 
role makes it necessary to piece together fragments of his own stand-
points in philosophy as these have been interpolated into critical analysis 
or historical reporting. However, there are two articles which are es-
pecially helpful in this enterprise: (1) his presidential address to the 
American Philosophical Association,4 and (2) his contribution to Contem-
porary American Philosophy.5 In the former he discusses philosophical 
methods; in the latter he discusse~ his metaphysics. 
Three major points of his philosophical credo, however, are obvioUs 
from the role and the method he has assumed as critic and from the topics 
upon which he has chosen to comment. These major points are . (a) the 
analytic nethod, (b) epistemological and metaphysically qualitative dual-
ism, and (c) his concern with the implications of the problem of time 
which has issued in his metaphysical temporalism and in his special inter-
est in the history of ideas. 
2. Methodology 
As was mentioned above, in his presidential address to the American 
1. Runes, WWP, 156. 4. 
2. Adams and 11ontague (eds.) ,CPA.5. 
3. Lovejoy, Art. (1930)2 
• 
2 Lovejoy, Art. (1917)2• Lovejoy, Art. (1930) • 
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Philosophical Association, Lovejoy spoke directly to the question of the 
methods of philosophy. 
First of all, and in contrast to the function (to edify) which 
might be assigned them in the eyes of the general public, "philosophers 
should acquire the disinterested curiosity which characterizes the gen-
uine man of science."6 He would omit the almost universal interest of 
philosophers in value. He claims that the capacity for edifying and 
for scientific investigation are not often found in the same person. 
An eagerness to serve the spiritual needs of one's gene-
ration is a generous and noble thing; but it is a very 
different thing from an eagerness to probe an intricate 
logical problem to its obscurest elements and its nicest 
distinctions. The type of mind that performs one of these 
functions well is likely - though there are perhaps rare 
exceptions--to perform the other rather badly.7 
The causes for error in philosophizing and the causes for some of 
the great amount of disagreement among philosophers are traced to a 
number of subjective sources: 
1. The overlooked considerations.8 Lovejoy conceives philosophy 
as requiring genuine inclusiveness and exhaustive analysis among data and 
reasoning. The following excerpt is typical of the characteristic way in 
which he approaches a problem: 
Nothing seems rore called for than an attempt at clear 
differentiation of the separate pragmatist assertions and 
tendencies .9 
Through literally scores of magazine articles this is the way in which 
6. Lovejoy, Art. (1917)2, 138. 
7. Ibid., 134. (Plato did both well, also Hegel.) 
8. Ibid.' 141. 
9. Lovejoy, Art. (1908)4, 6. 
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he begir~: analytically and systematically to point out the variety of 
"considerations" involved in the topic at hand, 
2. The (false) appearance of the adequacy of necessary reason-
ing. 10 Empirical facts supersede a priori or implicator~r reasoning in 
Lovejoy 1 s treatment. He maintaill..s a sense of caution with respect to 
conclusions, referred to else'\tvhere in this dissertation as tentativeness 
and open-mindedness. He emphasized the sense of the probe.ble, the chance 
of multiple implications, and the elusiveness of 11 considera.tions 11 • 
3. Revelation.11 Lovejoy contends the philosopher is subject to 
mystical experiences which confuse rather than clarify his task which is 
to marshal systematically and 11 scientifically11 both data and reasonings. 
·J"hile he asks for inclusiveness, it is for the objective data of the 
natural sciences. Self-experience is not included as paxt of the rele-
vant data. 
4• Failure to enumerate methodically the elements of a problem.12 
His treatment is essentially and almost exclusively anal~~ical, e.g.: 
The greater philosophers have been distinguished not by a 
more insatiable lust for the synthesis of abstr use ideas, 
but by a superior talent fof the analysis of the corrunon 
ideas used in all thinking. 3 
He consistently ignores the synoptic approach, refers to it deprecat-
ingly as a mystical experience. 
5. Failure of philosophers to confer in groups with respect to 
10. Lovejoy, Art. (1917) 2, 142. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid., 148. 2 13. Lovejoy, Art. (1906) , 194. 
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certain problems.1L~ It will be recalled that the nee-realists had just 
published their collective work15 and probably the volume on critical 
realism (which was published in 1920)16 was at least projected. 
Oversight in logical observations ••• may ••• result from 
inevitable limitations of the logical sensitivity of any 
individual mind.l7 
(It should be noted that four of the five points deal positively or 
negatively with inclusiveness.) 
6. Lack of a common set of initial postulates •18 The possibility 
of coming to agreement on such a set of postulates was seriously pro-
posed although intervening experience has seemed to lead in the direction 
of making such agreement less likely. 
7. Failure to deal with isolated problems.19 Lovejoy's prefer-
ence for analytic treatment of material led him to urge that problems be 
isolated and treated piece-meal in order that the considerations pertinent 
to them might be carefully collected and that they might be genuinely 
inclusive. In line with this means of dealing with problems he urged 
the technique of exploring "hypothetical reasonings 11 : if such and such 
20 be true, what follows? 
8. Need to develop a catalogue raisonne for philosophy. 21 Such a 
catalog or dictionary would classify the isolable problems and their 
considerations in such a way as to form a nucleus of opinion regarding 
basic philosophic data which would counteract somewhat its state of an-
14. Lovejoy, Art. (1917)2, 150. 19. Lovejoy, Art. (1917)2, 155. 
15. Holt, et al, TNR. 20. This is the procedure he follows 
16. Drake, et al, ECR. 2 for the deve1opnent of the argu-17. Lovejoy, Art. (1917) , 151. ment in RAD. 
18. Ibid., 153. 21. Lovejoy, Art. (1917)2 , 159. 
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archy. 
Such a catalog or dictionary should offer criticism of proofs 
brought forward, should examine internal consistency among propositions, 
and should explore external considerations bearing upon the topics. 22 
a. As to the Source of Data 
The 11 raw material" from which a philosophy is developed is, to 
Lovejoy, the objective order from which one gathers observations of 
the world of physical science, i.e., materialistic. Not only is experience 
the source of data for reasoning, but also reason is an inunanent devel-
opment within experience. But there is a restricted concept of experience 
here, excluding self-experience and values (if it is possible to exclude 
value while striving for truth!). 
An early definition of temporalism stated that it was merely an 
analytic method of precise location of the moment of existence of any 
•t• 23 propos~ ~on. It might be suspected that the concept of reason and of 
logic would bear some significant relation to such a definite statement, 
but nowhere again is reference made to a temporalistic logic. 
In Lovejoy's system there is neither a Kant ian a priorism nor a 
Platonic realism. Universals are immanent in experience and the mind is 
receptive in this process, not prescribing its forms to the experiential 
flux. 
11Formal logic is itself a non-existential science, ••• a realm to 
which the whole notion of 'existence 1 is alien. 1124 And while there might 
22. Lovejoy, Art. (1917) 2 , 162. 
23. Lovejoy, Art. (l9ll)~, footnote, 599. 
24. Lovejoy, Art. (19ll) , 662. · 
177 
be some ambiguity here as to whether he meant the form or the content of 
logic, in a later discussion of John Dewey he is more explicit: 
111111uch of his /J5ewey'sJlanguage seems to suggest a belief in 
an independently existing realm of lo~ical reals. But I take 
refuge again in an e~cluded middle! LFrom the context; either 
psychic or menta1J11 5 
The nonstructural character of logic is aff irmed in another connection as 
Lovejoy remarks, "Since this way of putting it {;ou:rrl logicJ is abstract 
and formal, it may be worth while to illustrate the difficulty.n26 In 
spite of his urging methodological self-consciousness, 27 apparently his 
only justification·for treating the data of philosophy with logical an-
alysis is that psychologically the human mind will not endure contra-
. . 28 d1.ct1on. 
This curt sununary of Professor Lovejoy's treatment of logic would 
be incomplete without referring again to his acceptance of prominent 
empirical facts (particularly t he sequential order of experience and of 
all re ality) without regard for their logically or rationally demonstrable 
character. So far as this investigator can discover, there is completely 
lacking a criterion according to which these empirical facts are selected. 
They just are selected and their nonrationality is freely admitted. 29 One 
of the psychological attri butes mentioned is the retrospective character 






Lovejoy, Art. (1922)~, 540. 
Lovejoy, Art. (1909)2, 490. Lovejoy, Art. (1917)1, 144. Lovejoy, Art. (1904)2, 165. Lovejoy, Art. (z930) , 96; Art. (1922)4, 515; Art. (1927)1, 179, 
and Art. (1910) , 693. 
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All that we call empirical knowledge consists primarily of 
memories, taken as true §>Srtrayals of past events as they 
were when they happened. 
b. At the Stage of Insight 
Lovejoy's analytic method emphasizes three constituent factors oper-
ating at all three stages of knowledge. These factors are: absence of 
contradiction, systematic exhaustiveness of observation, and respect for 
discreteness. 
Concerning absence of contradiction, he says: 
It is not psychologically possible for a rational mind to 
believe a really self-contradictory pr~£osition, when it 
once fully envisages that proposition. 
The peculiarity of human nature to which most of the seri-
ous philosophical ideas of mankind Lare due_7 ••• has been ••• 
the deeper-lying and more insistent need of avoiding self-
contradiction in the formulation of one 1 s own personal 
experience.32 
In his concept of contradiction that which is self-contradictory 
destroys itself and he refers to the product as a "wholly empty notion".J3 
W'ith reference to systematic exhaustiveness, the subject is treated 
most fully in his presidential address in which he urged (1) attention 
to the overlooked considerations, (2) enumeration of the elements of a 
problem, (3) group consultation, and (4) a dictionary of corrunon ltfamilies" 
of considerations.34 Earlier he had applauded that 
30. Lovejoy, RAD, 307. 1 
31. Lovejoy, Art. (1904) , 165. 
32. Lovejoy, Art . (1904)~, 148. 
33. Lovejoy, Art. (1909)2, 497. 
34. Lovejoy, Art. (1917) ' 142-159. 
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understanding which comes vlith the sense of having looked 
a problem through and through, from foundation to top and 
of having note~5everything pertinent that there was to note about it. 
The idea of discreteness finds most repeated reference in relation 
to the experience of temporality.36 Lovejoy's position is that an exper-
ience of distinct and continuing quality cannot be transformed by logical 
manipulation into something quite different. Actually, his whole book, 
The Great Chain of Being, is an elaboration of the theine that the Eternal 
cannot be temporalized, nor vice versa. His almost exclusive attention 
to analysis yields parts and elements and it is part of his creed that 
these elements be treated independently, at least hypothetically.37 
The lust to reconcile the irreconcilable is one of the 
besetting temptations of the metaphysical temperament.38 
Lovejoy credits Schelling with the most important early attempt to 
reorient thought and logic to a developing, evolutionary object. Schelling 
is quoted as saying, 11All demonstration is merely a progression in identi-








But true philosophy and truly objective science are not 
a chanting ototautologies. Their object is always a con-
crete thing. 
Lovejoy, Art. (1910)3, 104. 
Lovejoy, Art. (1930)2, 89; cf, ECR, 
Cf, ~B, Chapter IX~ 2and RAD, 257. LoveJoy, Art. (1930) , 91; cf. Art. 
In GCB, 324. 
Ibid., 
67, and Section LJ., below. 
(1912)2, 692; and RAD, 315. 
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Lovejoy's empirical observation showed him this development in ob-
jects; apparently he never saw it in thought; his reasoning remained 
analytic and static. 
Respecting his empirical temporalism, Lovejoy agreed with Bergson 
that intellect 11 freezesll the developnental into static and "quasi-
spatial categori~s".41 
c. At the Stage of Verification 
Lovejoy, in common with critical, realists, depends upon both logi-
cal and empirical verification and in their use does not claim demonstra-
tive or absolute certainty. 
The critical realist does not pretend to the possession of 
a theol'"'J vlhich will make knowledge as completely demonstrable 
as mathematics, but ••• the most reasonable ••• facts of experi-
ence point to the three following conclusions: (l) ••• other 
minds ••• (2) ••• percepts refer to and correspond with existent 
entities ••• and (3) ••• (we) can make those ... entities the ob-
jects of o1IT thoughts ••• and by reasoni~ about them come to 
conclusions about them which are true.4G 
That this lack of mathematical certainty is not crippling is at-
tested to in the claim that it is a universal practice. 
Indirect verification LViz., r etrospection or judgment regard-
ing uniformity of natureJ is, •• one of tht3commonest and most inescapable limitations of human thought. · 
All strictly pragmatic verification is indirect verification.44 
41. Lovejoy, Art. (1930)2~ 88. 
J¥.. Drake, et al, ECR, 105. 
43. Ibid.' 70. 
44. Ibid., 71. 
lSl 
Significantly, Professor Lovejoy's attention to the 9roblem of time 
prevents his analytic, logical rationalism from being rat i onalistic 
dogmatism. 1'emporalism 11 is a kind of philosophy which is naturally ready 
to recognize its own results as provisional, and to leave much to the 
f uture H. 4.5 lliore of this later. 
It might be assumed, as has been hinted, that this preoccupation 
with analysis and logical rigor would prescribe a thoroughly rational-
istic criterion of truth to Professor Lovejoy. This is not exactly the 
case. He has a dual criterion of truth: logical demonstration and empiri-
cal observation. Philosophers are, he says, 11 eager and impatient ration-
alizers of the scheme of things 11 , 46 and he criticizes them for it. 
A temporalist 9hilosophy ••• would insist that whatever 
empirically is temporal is so irretrievably -- that its 
temporality can by no dialectical hocus-pocus be trans-
substantiated.47 
The more impressive empirical experiences, then, are brute data 
with which the philosopher must deal and, according to Professor Love-
joy, must deal deductively. \~hen discussing the metaphysical status of 
data, he later says that 11the consequences of the /J..dea of the Chain 
of Being_7 ••• show the hypothesis of the absolute rationality of the 
cosmos to be unbelievable 11 , l~8 but there is no evidence in his published 
thought to indicate the.t he considers or would favor the developnent of 
an evolutionary, synoptic logic to supplant his rather narrow, analj~ic 
45. Lovejoy, Art. (1909)~, 502. 
46. Lovejoy, Art . (1930) , 88. 
47. Ibid., 89. Cf., ECR, 67. 
48. Lovejoy, GCB, 329. 
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logic. In this respect it would appear that Professor Lovejoy mi ght 
have used with profit his advice to the American Philosophical Associa-
tion to be "methodologically self-conscious" .J+9 
Lacking a concept of synoptic reason, Lovejoy's criterion of 11 con-
sistency11 is mere absence of contradiction; it is not a coherent consis-
tency catching up values and logic and the objects of experience. 
In spite of the demand for systematic inclusiveness which Jnight well 
have led him toward coherence, Lovejoy ignores the data respecting values 
in his treatment of the various problems which comprise his publications. 
There is only one article on ethical theory,50 and his much referred-to 
presidential address urged philosophy to avoid the attempt to edify,51 
which really means a plea to omit values, or at least evaluation. 
Returning to verification, it was pointed out in Chapter II that 
one of the alternatives to dogmatic certainty are the concepts of prob-
able reasoning and of reasoning about probabilities. 
The notion of probability here can legitimately express 
only our inability to determine with precision, under 
certain conditions, where the particle is ••• ; t his inde-
terminateness of our knowledge 5~annot properly be treated as a property of the particle. 
Relinquishing claim to demonstrable certainty, Lovejoy claims that prob-
able knowledge is valid and leads to truth. Although in the passage 
quoted above he does not attribute probability to objects, he does have 
a metaphysics of indeterminacy as well (cf. below). 
49. Lovejoy, Art. (1917)~, 144. 
50. Lovejoy, Art. (1907) 2• · 51. Lovejoy, Art. (1917) • 
52. Lovejoy, RAD, 284. 
lSJ 
The logical concept of discreteness, keeping things separate which 
are experienced as separate, is emphasized not only in criticism but also 
in metaphysics. 
\'lith respect to the principle Qf excluded middle I am afraid 
that I am a confirmed habitu~ • .?3 
And note also his reference to Dewey's thought cited above.54 
In the same vein he urges upon philosophy the habit of dealing 
with 11 isolable questions piece-meal II. 55 
Upon any metaphysical theory deserving of serious consider-
ation reality is an aggregate of partes extra partes ••• 
Existents, in short, >'lhether they are physical or mental or 
both, are many, they are boun~ed, and the bounds of their 
being mean mutual exclusion.5 
Its metaphysical employment and a kind of principle which helps to de-
fine his sense of empirical verification are exemplified typically in 
the following : 
Thought can and mt~t transcend the moment, overleap temp-
oral limits. But in so doing it also always falsifies the 
moment, it loses the unique quale of temporal transition 
itself.57 
The same two considerations which thus led me to reject 
absolute idealism ••• both assert the separateness, the 
mutual existential externality, of certain parts of 
reality. 58 
In summary, Pratt says of critical realism regarding the topic of 
53. Lovejoy, Art. (1922)4, 539. 
54. cr. footnote 25. 2 
55~ Lovejoy, Art. (1919) • 
56. Lovejoy, RAD, 315. 
57. Lovejoy, Art. (1910)~, 692. 
58. Lovejoy, Art . (1930) , 96. 
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verification: 
The critical realist has nothing novel to suggest, but 
merely points to the common methods of experience and 
reasoning. 59 
d. At the Stage of Relation 
11 Tempora1ism11 , as conceived by Professor Lovejoy is not only a 
metaphysical doctrine, but also a methodology. 
Temporalism may be taken mere1y60 as the designation of 
a certain method of analysis ••• of existence, the relative 
temporal locus, of each entity g1 process or relation 
referred to by any proposition. 
The emphasized constituent factors of this method of analysis are, 
once more, absence of contradiction, systematic exhaustiveness of obser-
vation and analysis, and respect for discreteness. 
As a method of systematizing knowledge, temporal location has some 
merit; it can assign a posi~ion to any event according to its date . 
Hm..rever , the chief incentive in the classification of knovdedge is the 
assignment of significance. Importance or truth apparently has little, 
if any, correlation with date of origin. Lovejoy's temporalism functions 
with dates of occurrence of events; it is not satisfactory regarding 
concepts which have at least three factor s: (l)I now (1950) entertain 
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the concept of 1492; (2) their referent (s), i.e., 14.92; (3) t heir validity 




Lovejoy, ECR, 99. 
Lovejoy certainly abandons the use of t he word 11 merely11 in his other 
references to his po~ition. 
Lovejoy, Art. (1911)), 599, footnote. 
In the Revolt against Dualism, Lovejoy lists the c riteria of system-
atizat ion in more customary terms: Knmvledge-claims are e liminated 
which are (l) 11 at variance with one another ••• 11 , (2) 11 at variance with 
empirical facts •• • 11 , (3) or at variance with 11 inferences from empirical 
62 
facts 11 • 
3. Epistemology 
The sub ject of knowledge , the epistemological problem in ge neral, 
has been a ma jor concern of Profe ssor Lovejoy. His main objects of 
c ritical analysis have been the epistemological bases of Absolut e Ideal-
i sm, Nee- Realism, and Pragmatism or Instrumentalism. 
His epistemological position is, according to the author 1 s own 
testimony, t ·raceable to his general metaphysical position. "The accep-
tance o f a temporalistic and pluralistic metaphysics thus carried with 
it t~ .~ceptance of an e pistemological dualism.n63 This epistemology 
wa.s required by the empirical experience of time. One of the common-
places of experience is the time-transcending reference of thought . 
The type of cognitive--or putatively cognitive--experience 
with which a systematic epistemological inquiry ought to 
begin is not perception but retrospection, or, more specibi-
cally, remembrance. This is the primary mode of knovdng. 4 
The lfhow11 of mediate knowledge being thus made intelligible 
primarily by a scrutiny of intertemporal knowledge, of which 
the mediate character is certain, the purely epistemological 
paradox supgosed to in...'lere in any dualistic theory of perceptim 
disappears. 5 · 
62 . Lovejoy, RAD, 261. 2 63. Lovejoy, Art. (1930) , 97. 
64. Lovejoy, RAD, 304-305. 
65. Ibid., 313. 
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The possibility that memory reconstituted the past in existence upon 
the turn of thought was rejected as inconceivable. In the second 
place critical realists reported their belief in the privacy of the 
content of persons 1 experiences. 66 Then, it has been pointed out 
that regardless of what kinds of things are given metaphysical status, 
Professor Lovejoy acknowledges the difference in kind between the psychic 
and the natural order in the present stage of the world and to provide 
for any kind of intelligible meshing of the two (and of minds interact-
18'7 
ing among themselves), he must and does come forward with a representational 
theory of knowledge: 
It is in this act of transcendent reference that knowing 
as a psychological phenomenon-in so far as it is more 
than bare sensation Without meaning--consists. 67 
The transcendent reference in knowledge involves critical realists 
in the supposition that the object is more than just the percept or 
concept68 (contrast the rationalistic idealism of Hegel, Bradley, etc., 
and the empirical idealism of Berkeley). The mediate character of 
knowledge69 is an instrument of scaling-<iown the privacy of persons 70 
but only relatively. Critical realism .then is epistemological dualism 
in which the object of knowledge is known as object and not content.71 
One of the principal criticisms levelled at nee-realism, and epis-
temological monism in general, is the inability of these theories to 
66. Drake, et al, ECR, 101. 
67. Lovejoy, RAD, 315. 
68. Drake, et al, ECR, 99-100. 
69. Ibid., 102. 
70. Ibid., 101. 
71. lbid., 102. 
account satisfactorily for the existence of error. In order to avoid 
the same difficulty, it is evident that even the representational theory 
of kno""VTledge must not "mesh" too closely. It does not. 
For the critical realist ••• all our knowledge (beyond bare 
sensory content) is a kind of foreign commerce, a traffick-
ing with lams in which the traffickers do not live, but from 
which they may continually bring home good store (sic) of 
merchamise to enrich the here-am no..,.;. And like all such 
traffic, it requires first of all a certain venture of belief, 
instinctive with most men, deliberate and self-conscious with 
those who reflect.72 
LK'nowing the past and other selves areJ beliefs not derived 
through reasoning; they are not 'necessary' in the same sense 
that their opposites are self-contradictory; and they ob-
viously can never be, in the strict sense, 'empirically' veri-
fied, because they consist in affirmation of the possibility of 
a knowledge of existents which are not, when known, immediate 
data in experience. But they are beliefs which umerlie the 
whole-of human life as it is actually lived by us.73 
The belief in the possibility of knowledge of other selves and of the 
physical world is a postulate, a postulate which at one and the same 
time is ~taphysical and epistemological in nature. This postulate is 
the basis of the argument in The Revolt Against Dualism. 
~e have been asking only whether, when the existence of a 
rea174 and at least in some measure knowable physical world 
is postulated, either sort of dualism Lidealistic or 
realisticJcan be avoided without contradict~~n either of the 
implications of itself or of admitted facts. 





Lovejoy, Art. (1922)~, 515. 
Lovejoy, Art. (1930) , 96. 
It is not clear whether 11 real 11 means .;;;.s~ub~st::-:ant~.;.;l.;;;.. a;;.;l;;;,:l~y.......,;a~n=:d~m:;;.;e~t;....;;a~p~hy~s..;;i;....;;c..;;a;;.;l;;.;J"""y 
real or whether it just means experientially real. It is at least 
the latter and possibly also the former. 
Lovejoy, RAD, 259. 
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be denied. nour examination of these efforts seems to show that the 
result of th~ experiment is negative.••76 Furthermore, all (both) cases 
of the alternative have been considered: 
What are called physical entities or events may either be 
supposed to possess the same kinds of characters as percepts 
and mages and to be in the same spatial and temporal order 
with them (or in the same type of spatial and temporal order), 
or they may be su2posed not to do so. Both alternatives have 
been considered.77 
The revolt--within the realistic provinces of philosophical 
opinion--against dualism, both psychophysical and epistemo-
logical, has failed.78 
'What of the revolt in the idealistic camp? 
Such a theory obviously offers us no hypothetical expla-
nation, of a scientifically serviceable sort, of the actual 
characters, diversities, and laws of connection, of our 
perceptual content ••• Neither, then the arguments examined, 
nor, I think, any others which have ever been proposed, pre-
sent convincing reasons for holding that the perduring inde-
pendent background of our sensory content consists either of 
other such content of wholly unknown percipients, or of other 
consciousnesses, which by some unknown sort of action upon 
us cause our sense-data. In the absence of such reasons, we 
do well either to proceed upon the hypothesis that the cosmi-
cal background is 7~f a non~ental sort or to admit our ignorance as to its nature. 
From the contention that modern physics has shown that the data 
are distorted in the perceptive process and thus the conclusions of 
thought are invalidated, whether that alteration is urged from either 
the realistic or idealistic interpretation, Professor Lovejoy demurs. 
76. Lovejoy, RAD, 261. 
77. Ibid., 262. 
78. Ibid., 264. 
79. Ibid., 273. 
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Contemporary physics, then, does not seem as yet to have 
given the death-blow to man's natural belief that he lives 
in a physical world which is, in its general structure and 
the modes of relatedness of its components, somewhat like 
the world which he perceptually experiences.80 
This conclusion, implemented by the total argument, establishes three 
propositions: 
(a) There is an ·order of existences or events which persists 
when unperceived; (b) this is causally related to our sensa; 
(c) the pa~iculars belonging to it cannot be identified with 
our sensa. 1 
These premises and certain empirical data lead to three other conclu-
sions: 
We have ~wer t§2act upon this L"extra-perceptual, neutral, causal11_jorder. 
Certain percepts or images /dreams, etc.Jdo not initiate 
(or are not correlated with) processes capable of continu-
ing during interperceptual intervals and producing observable 
terminal effects identical with those observable when the 
entire sequence of intermediate stages has been attended to ••• 
Tactual and kinaesthetic sensations have a different and more 
constant relation to the physical causal order than do visual 
percepts or images. 
If, like everyone else, we assume that there are many perci-
pients, and that they can through language convey some infor-
mation to one another ••• , we fi~d that each of them is able to 
act upon the other percipients. 3 
80. Lovejoy, RAD, 297. 
81. Ibid., 298. 
82. Apparently the "act" is interpreted in the physical or mechanical 
sense of pushing or pulling. Against the claim of instrumental know-
ledge to 11 participate 11 in affecting reality (at least in the pri-
mary qualities1 Lovejoy claims that objective knowledge would be 
thereby invalidated. "If I can be said truly 1to know' •• .I know 
it would have been if my cognitive act had not occurred." (RAD, 292.) 
83. Ibid., 298. 
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Finally, now given the epistemology of dualism, what is the choice between 
metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism? It is realism. 
Are the causal processes in the external world which are 
initiated by motions (i.e., by those which other men perceive) 
also of the nature of motions? ••• I think certain considera-
tions which, though not demonstrative, make an affirmative 
answer to the question the more plausible. S4 
These considerations are enumerated as follows: 
(a) In the first place it is at least not impossible that 
the processes which cause and link together the percepts 
of different persons are of the same general sort as the 
causal sequences which empirically occur within our perceptual 
experience. No fact of experience, obviously, can prove the 
contrary. 
(b) It is a simpler assumption ••• that they are of the same 
sort as those perceived, rather than of some wholly differ-
ent sort ••• 
(c) The space in 'Which our perceptible effective bodily 
movements take place, whether or not they are literally 
parts of a single Space, are at ~ events congruent; they 
fit together in a remarkable way. 
In this way the final epistemological question is decided: 
The plain man's prejudice in favor of the belief that he 
has a body which moves in a pUblic space, and that, in 
general, the causal processes in the persistent, neutral 
world consist (at least in part) of the motions of bodies, 
will mt by this doctrine be corrected, but rather confirmed. S6 
The insertion 11at least in part" is extremely signi~icant, it appears, 
because it points once more to the difficulty in the general metaphysical 
84. Lovejoy, RAD, 299. 
85. Ibid., 299-300. (All of these seem to point to the idealism he 
rejectsJ) · 
86. Ibid., 302. 
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theory as to the status of the plain man's eq~y persistent prejudice· 
that his experience is also an indubitable part of the total sum of 
reality. 87 The ambiguity is not relieved, however, and in a real 
measure added to in what follows. 
By way of summary of the discussion of knowledge, it may be said 
that, to Lovejoy, knowledge is a hypothetical and tentatiye act of faith,88 
an act committed naturally (i.e., instinctively or functionally) under 
the very co mit ions of life as it is lived. 89 
No judgment concerning a particular existent--other than ••• 
the private datum. ••• --can conceivably obtain experiential 
verification in any literal sense; for the existent complex 
of ideas which is the content of the judgment can never, by 
any finite and temporal knower, be brought into the same locus 
with the existent to which it ~fers. Since our knowing is 
characteristically concerned with beyonds, we know by faith.90 
Its means is transcendent reference and this means is consistent between 
the various kinds of knowledge, i.e., memory, perceptual knowledge, etc. 
"The modus operandi of the transcendent reference in mem:>ry and in per-
ception is thus far, then, precisely the same.u91 Knowing exercises a 







Thought can and must transcend the moment, overleap temporal 
limits. But in so doing it also always falsifies the moment, 
it loses the unique guale of temporal transition itself. 92 
Cf. the following Section. 
Knowing is a "venture of faith when we go about our business tenta-
tively taking . that which now appears to us as evidence of that which 
truly has been and i~ to be 11 • (RAD, 309.) 
Lovejoy, Art. (1930) , 96. -
Lovejoy, RAD, 318. 
Ibid.-, 313. 2 2 
Lovejoy, Art. (1912) , 692. Cf. Art. (1930) , 91. 
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Knowing is a phenomenon by which the simple lo9~tion of 
things is circumvented without being annulled. 
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As to the efficacy of knowing to affect the data from which the know-
ing results, Lovejoy rejects instrumentalism because it seems to him to 
make knowledge infallible _and he likewise rejects perspectivity because 
it denies the possibility of any genuine knowledge. 11The line must be 
drawn somewhere between these extremes.n94 It is apparently, though not 
definitely, drawn where knowledge has a recognizable effect in the public 
space and time ani even then only when observable at least potentially 
to other minds. 
Upon realistic premises ••• there are, in short, changes in 
certain physical structures which generate existents i"The 
wholly unique phenomenon of the production" (supra)J that 
are not physical in the sense in which those structures are; 
and these non-physical particulars are indispensable means to 
any knowledge of physical realities. Repellant as this con-
ception still is to many scientific men, there is no conclusion 
of empirical science about the physical world--supposing that 
there in any sense is a physical world--which is better estab-
lished; the proof oTthis is set forth in the first seven of 
these lectures.95 
One comment at least require s to be made upon this statement. There is 
some evidence in physiological psychology that there is an energy coordi-
nate of all conscious activity. Such an energy co-ordinate would be 
either furxiamentally related to the conscious content, partially or 
intermittently related, or unrelated. If fundamentally and constitution-
ally related, either the causal order must be broken or the integrity of 
the mental life is destroyed. If totally unrelated, then any efficacy 
93. Lovejoy, RAD, 315. 
94. Ibid., 317. 
95. Ibid., 319. 
of the content of knowledge is denied. If partially or intermittently 
related, (this would seem to be the most likely way for Professor Love-
joy to reply), there would certainly be required a tertium guid to 
explain the means by which and the occasions upon which the gears are 
engaged. Such a tertium guid is not referred to; a possible oblique 
reference points to a pragmatic criterion of what is necessary for 
thought, is: 11 The pragmatic method is necessarily a special form of 
what I have elsewhere referred to as the 1temporalistic method 1 .u 96 
Finally, error in human minds is due, according to Lovejoy, to the 
inherent distortion which the nature of knowledge entails97 and to human 
finitude, man's lack of capacity to know all. This latter is most strik-
ingly expressed in the myth concluding The Revolt Against Dualism. 
The rnw anhl.al must be enabled to frame some general mage 
of the Whole--not, indeed, of all the things which are parts 
of the Whole, for that is not a gift possible t~gmortals-­
but of the nature of a Whole having many parts. 
4. Hetaphys ics 
The basic point of departure in Lovejoy's metaphysics and epistem-
ology is the idea of Time. The most indubitable fact of experience is 
asserted to be that experience is temporal. 99 11The first and fundamen-
tal empirical truths §elating to temporality, makeJa philosophy ••• 






Lovejoy, ECR, 78. 2 Cf. Above. Also Art. (1912) , 
Lovejoy, RAD, 321. 2 Lovejoy, Art. (1930) , g7. 
Ibid., sg. 
2 
692; Art. (1930) , 91; and RAD, 315. 
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The metaphysics and epistemology of Professor Lovejoy are both 
deduced from the interpretation of the time problem. The statement that 
"the acceptance of a temporalistic and pluralistic metaphysics thus 
carried with it the acceptance of an epistemological dualism"101 indi-
cates that, to him, the metaphysical doctrine is primarily responsible 
for the epistemological. 
Temporalism is defined most fully in an article, 11 The Problem of 
Time in Recent French Philosophy11 from which comes the following: 
By temporalism in metaphysics ••• ! mean any doctrine which 
maintains the following four propositions: first, that time 
is not 1ideal• ••• as unreal; second, that temporal succession 
and duration constitute a qualitatively unique mode of 
reality; third, since the experience of tem~oral succession 
involves an essential distinction between LPast and future_7 
••• reality as a whole can at no moment be truly called com-
plete, self-contained, an organic unity; fourth ••• the total 
stnn. of given reality receives from moment to moment an increase 
in ~ sort of content.l02 
It was remarked above (Section 2.c.) that Lovejoy does not claim 
a high degree of certainty regarding the truth status of his view. In-
deed, he says at one point, "Rationality, when conceived as complete, 
as excluding all arbitrariness, becomes itself a kind of irrationality. n103 
Individual experience, human history and geological science all point to 
evolutionary mvelty recurring through time. Lovejoy conceives that this 
novelty is not implicit in nor demonstrable from its preceding conditions; 
hence 11 arbitrary11 and 11 irrational11 • An incomplete world, one in which 
increment occurs, 11 is, in short, a contingent world ••• If we may employ 
101. Lovejoy, Art. (1930) 2 , 97. 
102. Lovejoy, Art. (1912), 11. 
103. Lovejoy, GCB, 331. 
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the traditional anthropomorphic language of the theologians, we may say 
that in it Will is prior to Intellectu.104 
\' ith respect to the above definition of temporalism, the follow-
ing questions must be amplified: (1) \ihat, more specifically, is the 
role of time in this scheme of things? \fuere is the emphasis: tempo-
ralistic realism or realistic temporalism? Is time the agent in his 
cosmology or is it the scroll upon which the agents inscribe their 
stories? (2) \'~hat is the status of the world of physical science, the 
order of public space and time? (3) \'/hat is the status of consciousness, 
particularly of the human sort, and co-ordinately the place of reason 
and logic, valuation, and knowledge? This order of questioning will, it 
is believed, lead systematically through the primarily metaphysical 
position. 
a. Time 
Professor Lovejoy's metaphysics is pluralistic, yet is pluralistic 
in a sense which most philosophers would call dualistic • To follow the 
author 1 s example in analysis one could well say that this is not a 
11temporalistic realism" but a temporalism and a realism. Time is not 
~onceived as comprising the biting edge of an ~lan vital such as Bergson 
advocated; it is the category which gives to events their sequential 
relation; it is the absolute delineation of the real from the unreal; it 
is scroll not agent. 
This is Professor Lovejoy!s alternative to the eternalistic Absolute 
104. Lovejoy, GCB, 332. 
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Idealisms of Hegel, Royce, et al. His objection to these systems stems 
from his almost life-long antipathy to rationalistic attempts to recon-
cile the emergent and temporal with any form of eternalism. This long-
lasting concern is best exemplified in his major work, . The Great Chain of 
Being, of which this is the theme.105 Such systems, he says, . ignore the 
basic empirical fact of experience and are thus irrelevant to life.106 
Eternalism 11has produced in philosophy logical irresponsibility, an 
unwholesome sort of other-worldliness, and an intellectual priggish-
ness.11107 
If it is suggested that the concept of time being developed here is 
a very elusive one, Professor Lovejoy agrees. He says: 
Thought can and must transcend the moment, overleap temporal 
limits. But in so doing it also always falsifies the moment, 
it loses the unique guale of temporal transition itselt.l08 
Real time is an aspect of reality highly resistant to any 
attempt at thoroughgoing conceptual clarification and rationali-
zation.l09 
The doctrine LtemporalismJis incompatible Ifbh the more 
extreme sort of rationalism in metaphysics. 
In the same series of articles referred to above, Lovejoy identifies 
three kinds of time: objective, subjective, and referred.lll Objective 
105. Cf., 11A divine completion \vhich was yet B£i complete in itself.11 
(GCB, -50.) Also, 11A rigorously rational world. • .must be in ~iilliam 
James• term, a 1block-world 1 in the strictest sense, a scheme of 
things determined throughout and once for all by •necessary truths 1 ; 
in final analysis there are no contingent facts • 11 (GCB, 328.) 
106. Lovejoy, Art. (1909)2 , 501. Cf. GCB, 329. 
107. Lovejoy, Art. (1909)2, 501. 
108. Lovejoy, Art. (1910)2, 692. 
109. Ibid., 693. 
110. Lovejoy, Art. (1912), 12. 
111. Ibid. J 531. 
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time is the only metaphysically real; subjective t:i.m.e is the recognition 
of the experience of succession in consciousness; and referred time is 
the date intended--past,112 present, or future--by a conscious agent. 
b. The Natural Order 
The other indubitably qualified citizen of this metaphysical realm 
is the scientific physical order (matter) conceived as energy in motion. 
Whether this is matter and energy or matter as energy is ambiguous. 
Lovejoy conceives empirical philosophy dealing with a history in which 
emergents appear as one in which: 
The lower precedes the higher, not merely in the history 
of organic forms and functions, but universally; there 
is more in the effect than was contained, except as an 
abstract unrealized potentiality, in the cause.113 
His 11matter11 has potentialities some of which have been realized 
in the course of time, but those which have been realized are not the 
only potentials and the past course of realization is no persuasive assur-
ance that this course will be maintained. 
Moving matter and (or) energy have, in the various inte-
grations of which they are capable, a very great and admis-
sable diversity of accomplishments, including even the power 
to generate that which is not matter nor energy nor motion •• • 
We clearly can draw no cogent inference as to the range of 
these powers, and, none, therif9re as to the probability of 
a continuance of the process. 4 
The first essential of their physicality ••• would have to do 
primarily with the~ of their existence ••• :filling the 
temporal gaps between actual perceptions.ll5 
ll2. Re the importance of reminiscence see, Lovejoy, ECR, 67. 
113. Lovejoy, GCB, 317. 
114. Lovejoy, Art. (1927)1, 181. 
ll5. Lovejoy, RAD, 267. 
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The further differential question regarding matter and/or energy 
as to whether it is one or many is also left ambiguous. Either matter 
is many and thus some kinds have different potentials than other kinds 
which would account for the possibility of changes in the direction 
evinced by emergent featu~es of the material order, or this matter-
energy substance has antithetic constituents so that any direction is 
the immediate caus e of frustration of other (equally) likely possibles. 
There is one hint that the plurality of matter may be the preferred 
alternative. In the review of DeLaguna 1s Dogmatism and Evolution, he 
makes this remark, 11 1 can observe in science no such universal tendency 
to exhibit all the empirical forms of reality as organically related 
by reciprocal logical implication11 .ll6 One other point of implication 
would be Lovejoy's constant reference to the logic of analysis of 
partes extra partes. · The combination of materialistic r ealism and of a 
logic of analytic factoring into simple wholes provides a clue to a 
materialistic pluralism. Admittedly this is tenuous but it is the only 
evidence at hand. 
Having ascribed fundamental metaphysical reality to time, and hav-
ing the scientif ic evidence of time as the amazingly long, methodical 
process of creating the universe which the modern man can represent in 
both its complexly interrelated current pattern as well as in the patterns 
exhibited through the past-having all t his, Lovejoy surprises his reader 
116. Lovejoy, Rev. (1911), 537. The identification of logical and or-
ganic is indicative of the singular lack of a synthetic, synoptic, 
truly organic principle fuller than mere logic according to which 
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the temporalism of past and present might be projected in expectation 
for the future and according to which irrationality is not the final 
word, but rather reasonableness. 
by rejecting this whole testimony of time itself as a demonstrated basis 
for cogent inferences about its directions. 
In treating the subject of emergence, Professor Lovejoy feels that 
there is no complete, logical demonstration. He says: 
and: 
The subject is one on which we have .no means of arriving at 
objective conclusions unless it be through more or less 
probable inference from experience.117 
The argument for existential emergency may involve some-
what complex and difficult reasonings, and therefore at-
tain a less high degree of probability.ll$ 
Thus, he admits the lack of certainty in this field. Then he warns 
further that 11we must distinguish between heuristic rules and proposi-
tions of fact" •119 
In conscious consideration of both his cautions, he observes, "any 
system, therefore, of which the history is that of an 'evolution• ••• 
eo ipso betrays a nonrational strain11 • 120 In spite of its being non-
rational, in spite of its being only probable, and in spite of the 
danger of heuristic thinking, he affirms emergence. But the testimony 
inscribed on time passed and ever bearing into the future, is not demon-
strably cert ain evidence regarding the nature of events past, present, 
or future. 
117. Lovejoy, Art. (1927)1 • 
118. Ibid., 175. 
119. Ibid., 174. 
120. Ibid., 179. 
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His surprising reticence to draw the implications of his own 
defined reality is compounded as the story of the nature and place of 
consciousness unfolds. 
The agnosticism referred to in the preceding paragraphs regarding 
the character and direction of the universe is modified somewhat in The 
Great Chain of Being. Rather deprecatingly, he says: 
To acknowladge that such questions Las why and of what 
character the world_lare necessarily insoluble or mean-
ingless is to imply that ••• the world is in final analysis 
nonrational, that its being at all, and its possessing the 
extent ••• and diversity ••• and its conformity to the very 
curious set of primary laws ••• -that these are just brute 
facts for which no intelligible reason can be given ••• 
The history we are to review is thus ••• a part of the history 
of Western man's long effort to make the world he lives in 
appear to his intellect a rational one.l21 
c. Consciousness 
Professor Lovejoy has designated his system as pluralistic. It has 
been shown that time and matter are two members of that pluralism. Whe-
ther or not matter is pluralistic has been hazarded in the affirmative. 
The most obvious next candidate is consciousness or some phase 
of it. No1-1, this kind of consorting of the material ancl. the psychic in 
the same metaphysical basket is not the customary thing in modern philo-
sophy. Rationalistically, prejudicially, or however it may arise, philoso-
phers are usually wont to give preference among the sorts of existence 
which they recognize and to designate those preferred sorts as meta-
physically real and to leave the less distinguished sorts somewhere else. 
Professor Lovejoy does not participate in this customary method of selection: 
121. Lovejoy, GCB, 47. Cf. 327. 
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I am unable, in short, to see any inconceivability in the 
supposition that 'reality' may be of a mixed character ••• 
in some cases purely 1mental 1 and in others 1 extra-mental' •122 
Having suggested the possibility, he positively affirms the irreducible 
guale of psychic experience. 
A plan of action must be a •psych~ existence 1 , in a perfectly 
definite and intelligible sense. 3 . . · 
To know about another's experience is never the same as hav-
ing it-this seemed to me a try~h upon which the 'multi-
personalist' rightly insisted. 4 
Yet it is pertinent to remark that there is no claim here for metaphy-
sical reality. Having prepared the way for a "mixed character11 in the 
metaphysically real, he fails to assert metaphysical reality for con-
sciousness even though claiming for it a distinct character. Here again, 
it seems that Lovejoy is not taking his metaphysical 1itouchstone 11 seri-
ously. Time, one is told, is the basic reality. In the course of time 
emergents appear, and when they appear, something is added to the uni-
verse which was not there before. This is affirmed repeatedly. For 
example: 
If evolution takes place at all, the suin total of the uni-
verse cann~t remain constant, but must be subject to aug-
mentation. 25 . 
Now Professor Lovejoy must be asked what is the reality of a time 
that does mt confer reality upon t he events and the characters playing 
122. Lovejoy, Art. (1930)2 , 86. 
123. Lovejoy, Art. (1920)1 , 629. 
124. Lovejoy, Art. (1930)~, 95. 
125. Lovejoy, Art. (1909) , 487-488. 
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their parts in the objective sequential mode? Does the later date of 
some emergents disqualify them from classification in the real universe 
of the current time? If the later date makes this difference, what date 
would he choose at which to define metaphysical reality? V.Jhy that date 
instead of any other? Having selected any date, what would the descrip-
tion be but an eternalism based on some Urgrund? \iould this not again 
disqualify such a philosophy from human relevancy? 
The argument presented here reduces itself to this situation: 
At an arbitrary Time, symbolized by A, there is present in the cosmos 
Content .~; at subsequent Times B, C, and D, there emerge in the cosmos 
Contents .£, £, and £• Time, as the process of succession beginning 
before A, extending through B, C, and D on into the present and future, 
is declared metaphysically real. Content ~ is likewise given status as 
metaphysically real. Why? Because of its exitence in Time A. Contents 
£, £, and £!., are, therefore, eqtial.ly qualified to be considered metaphy-
sically real by their occupancy of points in real Time. The denial of 
reality to contents £, £, and £ invalidates the reality of Times B, C, 
and D with respect to time A. If Time were the only reality then all the 
contents might be given equally indeterminate positions, but having 
permitted content ~ in the inner circle, one must also admit .£., £, and £• 
5. Values 
Values, in Professor Lovejoy's philosophy, are subjective and rela-
tive. It has been remarked above that he conceived the function of 
scientific philosophizing as quite distinct from that of "edifying". 
Nonetheless he testifies to the value of a life that "outruns its argu-
ments" and of passionate commitments. His generous eulogy of Royce 1 
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place among philosophers and in society (in his presidential address)~26 
his liberal dedication of patriotic effort in both Vlorld \" ars--these 
evidences point to a kind of fuller and warmer actuality than the 
philosophy that Lovejoy permitted himself in his devotion to 11 science1'. 
The most rigorous logician, it is to be hoped, is also a man, 
with ideals for which he is impassioned, with loyalties that 
outrun his arguments, with working hypotheses about the world 
and human life that transcend any present possibility of proof .127 
But, the suggestion that general, objective values exercise any 
potent motivation is dismissed. 
I suppose that the theory that we first of all desire s~me 
general and abstract good is now sufficiently exploded. 28 
In place of an objective scheme of values generally bindi ng upon persons, 
there is proposed the theory that selves find certain adjectives or quali-
ties of character which they do approve and that all choices are made in 
relation to those approved characteristics. 
L9ught is_lthe implicit appeal to ••• the predicates of the 
self conceived as chooser and doer.129 
This desire to conceive of the self as acting in a manner 
which the ego can, at the moment of choice, regard with 
satisfaction is the ultimate motive in all deliberate 
c hoos ing.l30 
This scheme of values is not regarded as an easy system of quick gratifi-
cation nor of avoidance of the painful. The moral man is an earnest 
126. Lovejoy, Art. (1917)2• 
127. Lovejoy, Art. (1917)~, 137. 
128. Lovejoy, Art. (1907) , 36. 
129. Ibid., 38. 
130. Lovejoy, Art. (1906)3, 327. 
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seeker of approved predicates. 
It is indeed notorious that the 'majority of laymen' believe, 
even in their reflective moments, that it is preferable to 
develop the possipilities of human intelligence and feeling to 
a high point at the cost of a good deal of displeasure, 
rather than to enjoy the unbroken bliss of the cheerful moron.l31 
There is little point, according to Lovejoy, in saying what a man 
ought to desire. Referring to self-interest as a desire of the self-
conscious, he dePlores the school of 'enlightened self-interest', saying, 
"All this has nothing to do with the 1ought 1 ; it is ••• what he most does 
desire 11 • 132 
That Lovejoy was capable of keen insight in ethic~l matters is 
revealed by his pointing directly to the critical question of rationalism 
in ethics (Cf. Chapter I, Section 3, c, (4).) regarding legalism and 
dogmatism versus spontaneous creativity: 
To be catholic without being characterless: to have and 
apply standards, and yet to be on guard against their 
desensitizing and stupefying influence, their tendency 
to blind us to the diversities of concrete situatj_ons 
and to previously unrecognized values; to know when to 
tolerate, when to embrace, and when to fight.l33 
Nevertheless, because of the distinction which he drew between the 
11 science of philosophy" and the "edification of the public 11 , and in 
spite of his oft-repeated demand for inclusiveness of all the consider-
ations of problems, Professor Lovejoy kept the ethical issues and vital 
concerns of life rather consistently divorced from his consideration; 
there was no synthesis of the fields either in his method nor in his 
system of thought. 
131. Lovejoy, Art. (1906)3, 325. 
132. Lovejoy, Art. (1907) 37. 
133. Lovejoy, Art. (1906)3, 327. 
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Chapter V 
TI-lE: RELATIVE USE OF RATIONAL AND IDNRATIONAL C0.£1CEPrS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY 
1. The Rational and Nonrational in Lovejoy's Methodology 
a. Lovejoy ~ s Relation to the Problem of Certainty 
The primary philosophical methodology by which Professor Lovejoy 
attempts to produce a reasonable system of thought is the method of 
rationalistic analysis and induction from observation of empirical data. 
He admits that this method does not fit all the data; thus 1 there are 
large areas in which the data are not organized demonstratively.1 
Although rationalistic 1 analytic deduction is the pr:ime..ry method 
of producing reliability, it is :oot the exclusive method. There is at 
least one case of appeal to practical consequences (in the analogy of 
thought to "traffic in foreign ports producing the goods"). The 
reasons for the compulsiveness of the tjme experience are never elabor-
ated upon, but apparently the experience of time has its own indubi-
1. Cf. Chapter IV 1 Section 2 1 c. 
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table self-compulsion. 2 
Thus, the nonrational attempts to produce a reasonable credibility 
in Lovejoy's philosophy are limited to (1) the pragmatic appeal to 
consequences and (2) sensory-based empiricism. The main . attempt is by 
formal rationalistic procedure. The product of this mixture is not a 
high degree of certainty, Frofessor Lovejoy admits, and he assigns these 
reasons: 
(a) Man's knowledge is alw~s incomplete because of his inability 
to know the whole. Only that mini which could know the whole of exis-
tence could produce an accurate and demonstrative account of reality.3 
(b) Knowledge, in the human, epistemologically dualistic pattern, 
has a nonrational base in the incomplete representation (or sometimes 
actually distorting representation) of reality in thought. 4 
(c) The parts of reality which are better known still seem to 
offer the probable belief that there is a nonrational factor in reality 
itself. 5 
(d) Ma.n 1s knowledge, even if it were accurate and exhaustive, 
would still be incomplete because of the reality of the time process. 
This reality dictates that the cosmos ani its constituents are always 
incomplete. 6 
(e) The mere complexity of the relationships and factors involved 
in the major philosophical problems urges upon any observer the proba-
bility that error will creep in regardless of caution. 7 
2. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 3. 
3. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 3. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, c. and Section 4, a ani b. 
6. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 4, b. 
7. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, c. 
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(f) Probable belief is reasonable belief. Logical demonstration 
is wt required in philosophy for either belief or action. In fact it 
is jmpossible [See (d) aboveJ. 8 
Frofessor Lovejoy's concept of error as resulting in a large measure 
from the finite character of the human mind and the incompleteness of 
reality at any given moment in the tjme process, predisposes him to the use 
of provisional and tentative results.9 As such, these provisional and 
tentative propositions have the nature of pragmatic usefulness rather than 
constitutive description which the determination of real chance among the 
data WQuld indicate. 
Lovejoy does admit the likelihood of a nonrational factor in reality 
and in that respect speaks of genuine metaphysical probabilities, but these 
are so tenuous that the nature of the future developnent of "things" is 
largely unpredictable.10 He prefers to remain agnostic rath~r than -to 
commit himself even to probabilities; he refuses to enter into conjecture 
as regarding the direction and duration of historical trends in the 
universe. 
This avoidance of predictive probability does not deter -· . his use 
of provisional and tentative probability. Methodologically, he urges upon 
philosophers the objective study of the 11considerations 11 of "hypothetical 
reasonings" .n When he recognizes so e~licitly the claim ~d validity 
of inclusiveness, why Professor Lovejoy did not espouse coherence as a 
criterion ani as a method can only be explained by supposing a deep-set 
8. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, c. 10. 
9. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, esp. c. 11. 
Cf. Chapter IV, Section 4. 
Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2. 
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prejudice for the more restricted rationalistic criterion and method, 
and perhaps a fear of guilt by association (coherence of absolute 
idealism). 
b. Lovejoy on Insight 
The situation with respect to insight is somewhat similar to that 
of certainty. The respective roles of the rational and mnrational are, 
however, drawn IOOre clearly. Fundamental insights, such as the character 
of all representative knowledge, are empirical products of such common 
experiences as reminiscence and anticipation. This venture 1 not being 
demonstrable, is part of the natural experience which has been tested and 
proved in the ex:periences of memory and knowledge of other persons before 
it is ever criticized. The JOOSt important conscious apprehensions (such. 
as time) are nonrational (i.e., empirical) in origin, experiences carry-
ing their own validity with them.12 
These miU'ational sources of fundamental insights are admitted 
freely.l3 But, with their products thought has just begun. Professor 
Lovejoy depends upon the logical and rationalistic processes to analyze, 
compare 1 ani sort the data until they conform as nearly as possible to 
the pattern of rationalistic demonstration.14 The source of the logical 
criteria themselves seems open to question. They might be self-evident 
rationalistic principles but the reported reference to the psychology 
of contradiction v.ould indicate the source of the logical criteria is 
the need of the mini to resolve contradiction. 
12. Cf. Chapter Dl, Section 3. 
13. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, a. 
14. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2. 
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Thus, the oonrational means to produce insight in ~ofessor love-
joy's philosophy are, genetically; (1) dependeme upon a pragmatic 
empirical faith in the ultimate knowledge relation and (2) the logical 
criteria which are applied in working over the basic knowledge appre-
hens ions, have their som-ce in the psychological necessity of the human 
mini to avoid contradiction.1 5 The most important oonrational means of 
imight in Lovejoy's philosophy is empirical observation and scientific 
inclusiveness. The genetic 11roots 11 are inferences but emphasis upon 
exhaustive treatment of data and complete collection of data is explicit 
and oft-repeated.16 (Naturally, the application of logical criteria is 
the essence of the rationalistic procedure in philosophy.) 
c. Lovejoy and Attempts to Escape the Circle of the Given 
Although Professor Lovejoy recognizes that the chief bar to accu-
racy of a philosophy constructed by man is its characteristic incomplete-
ness, still the data upon which his philosophy is constructed are severely 
limited in scope. Some kinds of empirical data are sought, especially 
those coming from the concern with the problem of t:ime. He deals with 
"objective" problems piece--meal and does so as a matter of principle. 
One could describe his method in this respect as a temporalistic posi-
tivism.17 
The one other significant appeal to new data is revealed in the 
short article referring to ethics. Here he appeals to experiences of 
obligation and offers an original interpretation of these data. No 
15. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, c. 
16. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2. 
17. Ibid. 
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apparent attempt is made to set the results of these two areas of exper-
ience (the experience of perception and the experience of obligation) 
in any organized relationship to each other.18 Lovejoy is wary of the 
"edifying" and this caution, as we have seen, has prevented his develop-
ing a synoptic point of view. 
Thus, essentially, Professor Lovejoy's concern is with the ration-
alistic treatment of the limited, empirical data. The data are arbi-
trarily restricted in scope in spite of Lovejoy's own constant demands 
for inclusiveness. 
d. Lovejoy's Attempts to Systematize the Focus of Attention 
Practically the same report is to be made with respect to attention 
as was made regarding the given in experience. The functional, native 
basis of human reason prescribes the way it acts and the basis is just 
postulated. Man thinks, in so far as he is endowed and applies himself, 
2ll 
in the method of formal logic. Since his mind works that way the matter of 
attention takes care of itself: sorting, classifying, comparing, dif-
ferentiating, relating through analysis--but, he has no idea that 
discipline does not improve the native endowment and he gives consider-
able time and effort to this discipline. Lovejoy has no concept of 
the development of mental content; he has only a static concept of 
inclusiveness of observation.l9 
e. Lovejoy's Attempts to Preserve the Unique Properties of Wholes 
The formal logic of classes, which Professor Lovejoy refers to as 
18. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 5. 
19. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, b. 
partes extra partes is followed with "rigor and vigor". Wholes as 
classes are preserved at the expense of the relations among them. 
Wholes as organic unities are largely ignored in spite of lip-service 
to the temporal process including emergents, evolution, etc.20 Incip-
ient positivism shows itself again in the temporal discreteness of past, 
present, and future. Any systematic view referring to that process is 
ridiculed. This experiential base plus the logic of classes rule out 
systematic, organic wholeness in Professor Lovejoy's philosophy. 
2. The Rational and Nonrational in Lovejoy's Metaphysics 
a. The primary ideal of a rationalistic philosophy is the internal rela-
. 21 
tion of a continuous, complete, demonstrative consJ.Stency. 
Professor Lovejoy's philosophy accepts theideal of demonstrative 
consistency as the theoretical ideal toward which thoUght aims; he rejects 
the ootion of attaining it as being an irrational mtion. This study 
has pointed out some places (the treatment of emergents and the treat-
ment of ethics) where that systematic consistency has mt been achieved. 
Further, Professor Lovejoy concludes that the data furnished by the world 
of experience are themselves disjunctive and therefore also admits that 
the philosophy describing the situation will be characterized by non-
rationality. 22 
b. Rationalistic philos::phy factors its material analytically, empha-
20. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, d. 
21. These sub-topic headings are derived from the analysis and defini-
tion of rationalism in Chapter I. Discussion of that derivation is 
not repeated here. 
22. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 4• 
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sizing quantitative relations. 
Professor Lovejoy's philosophy is primarily rationalistic in 
depending upon a.nalysis. The logic of partes extra partes prescribes a 
pluralistic metaphysics. The suitability of treating material substance 
by such a logic is exemplified in the wa.y in which he misuses the 
temporalistic principle in order to retain the priority of the mater:i,.al-
istic bases of his metaphysics.23 
c. Rationalistic philosophy reasons from acknowledged authority. 
The acknowledged authority of Professor lovejoy's philosophy is 
the self-evident nature of logical analysis and the self-evident valid-
ity of some empirical experiences. The empirical imperative is primary 
over 11the rationalistic urge". 24 
d. Rationalistic philosophy systematizes that which i.s present. and 
known. 
As was pointed out above systematizing was the a:im even if com-
pleted only partially. There i.s a more radical correlate of this prin-
ciple of rationalism which is that, having systematized the present and 
kmwn, it tenia to account for the remainder in such a way as to dis-
courage further inquiry. Unfortunately, in two respects that is true of 
this philosophy: (1) The present ani known is l:imited to certain 
kinds of data and the logic prescribes the separation within the totality 
of these kin.is of data. 25 (2) The second judgment is that there is a 
23. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2. 
24. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, a and c. 
25. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2, a. 
213 
nonrational element in reality which prohibits systematic projection of 
the analysis of the past and present into the future; Lovejoy even re-
strains himself from such projection on his own hypothetical grounds.26 
e. Rationalistic philosophy is characterized by precise units of logi-
cal and grammatical construction. 
This characteristic has been repeated so often that it is not 
necessary to do so again. The logic of classes, the discreteness of 
thought complexes and of the experiences of time, these are absolute 
units in Professor Lovejoy's philosophy.27 
f. Rationalistic philosophy describes a status guo situation. 
In spite of the nearly central position of the time-process, it 
has been pointed out that Professor Lovejoy sets up a metaphysics using 
the materials present at an arbitrary point in that time-process. His 
principle of explanation (matter and energy in motion) is inconsistent 
with his empirical principle of B2thod (real time). Nevertheless, 
Lovejoy's philosophy is nonrationalistic in its concept of real time 
and of new emergents in the ti.m.e-process.28 
g. Rationalistic philosophy does oot express the unique properties of 
wholes oor the truth of developing experience in process. 
Professor Lovejoy's philosophy contains wholes of logical classes, 
not synthetic or organic wholes. In this respect his rationalism de-
feats his temporalism. He conceived thought as an inadequate frame for 
26. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 4, a, b, and c. 
27. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 2. 
2S. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 4. 
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evolutionary development; so, while he believed in an evolutionar.y 
cosmos he had no intellectually dynamic principle which could accom-
pany it. 29 
h. The rationalist introduces a pattern of necessity into the interpre-
tation of events. 
Professor Lovejoy is truer to his temporalism in this respect than 
to his rationalism. Having admitted emergents into the scheme of things 
am being unable (or unwilling) to ascribe a clear-cut potentiality of 
the emergents of consciousness, values 1 etc. 1 to that pre-emergent stuff 
he procla:ims himself to be an agnostic regarding the direction of events. 
Furthermore, he specifically recognizes the temptation to state concepts 
in terms of necessary thought and he tries rather successfully to with-
stand the temptation.3° 
i. Rationalistic principles tend to mental conservatism with respect 
to reflective selection, verification, and systematization. 
The relative extent to which Professor Lovejoy goes into the empir~ 
ical order for data is limited. It is a self-limitation imposed prin-
eipally for the purpose of making philosophy "scientific 11 by delimiting 
consideration of personal values, moral and aesthetic data. Therefore, 
while he urges inclusiveness and extension of empirical data on one 
hand, he arbitrarily fences off part of the data on the other. 31 
29. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 41 c. 
30. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 21 c. 




j. The similarity of the realm of objects and the realm of ideas is a 
presupposition of rationalism. 
While the formal logical categories are adopted uncritically 1 never-
theless the time problem does draw out the j'OOgment that conceptualiza-
tion destroys the distinctive guale of at least that form of experience. 
Otherwise 1 he claims that pragmatically and functionally the reasonable-
ness of the presupposition of interaction is detennined in the majority 
of persons long before they are capable of rational criticism of the con-
cept.32 
k. Rationalism depends upon a system of a priori truths. 
There are no a priori principles in Professor Lovejoy's philosophy. 
The rationalistic principles of formal logic are imminent in experience. 
The nonrational principle of temporalism is the self-evident compulsive-
ness of common features of experience.33 
1. Rationalism cannot produce insight in problem situations without 
appealing beyond itself to empirical data. 
To Professor Lovejoy, the search after knowledge is a process of 
observation and classification of objective data. The resolution of 
contradiction in experience is a native characteristic of a human mind. 
This is no explanation of how positive insight can occur in experience 
and Lovejoy offers no constructive theory in this direction.34 
32. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 3. 
33. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 41 a. 
34. cr. Chapter IV I Section 2, b. 
m. Rationalistic ethics is characteristically a strict, impersonal 
system of values subject to the twin dangers of dogmatism and of 
legalism. 
Professor Lovejoy has mt developed a system of ethics. He has 
suggested an original idea in the value situation by saying choice is 
made in reference to approved predicates desired by the self. As he 
says, this is a theory of what is, rather than of what ought to be. It 
is a highly relativistic theory ani appears very unlikely to leni itself 
to systematizat:ion. At any rate the idea is empirically based, not 
rationalistically deduced.35 
n. Rationalistic psychology tends to introduce (a) separation of mini 
ani body and (b) a faculty psychology. 
The psycho-physical relation is treated in the epistemology in such 
a way as to divorce mind and body. The metaphysical prejudice in favor 
of the material over the psychical is another evidence of the separate-
ness of the two comepts in his philosophy. It ll1B¥ bear repeating once 
more that the temporalistic principle, if observed, would have altered 
this metaphysical judgment. Professor Lovejoy has not expressed him-
self sufficiently on the psychology of the self to warrant judgments about 
the pres~nce or absence of a faculty psychology.36 
o. Rationalism tenia to develop an all-inclusive formula which is over-
extended, i.e., an unverified hypothesis which is treated as proved, at 
the expense of the content of experience. 
35. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 5. 
36. Cf. Chapter IV, Section 4, c. 
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Professor Lovejoy's method found its roots in a protest against 
the rationalistic, eternalistic formulas of Hegel, Royce, ani Bradley. 
In so far as he follows that protest, it is nonrational1 i. e., empiri-
cal. There is mt sufficient evidence of methodological self-conscious-
ness (which he called for before the American Philosophical Association) 
to make his protest genuinely positive, dynamic, and inclusive. On the 
other hani 1 however 1 he specifically leaves the door open for new re-
sul.ts in thinking, new emergents in time, and certainly disclaims com-
pleteness. Again, this is attributable to his temporalistic principle.37 
P• Rationalistic philosophy has been characteristically a truncated 
philosophy which did not adequately represent the existential ideals, 
attitudes, and values of personal life, wr did it adequately point to 
its own transcendence in the total life of the person or of society. 
Professor Lovejoy specifically rejects this concept of the function 
' 
of philosophy although he just as specifically endorses such a concept of 
the function of a person. 
Not only does the synoptic philosophy toward which this disserta-
tion is leading attempt to preserve for philosophy the function of dealing 
with all experience (while Lovejoy would seriously delimit it), but it 
would also try to establish a more advanced concept of its function as 
a science. In most of the physical sciences there are technicians and 
there are experimental investigators; both are essential, but the main 
expectation of experimental investigators is that they shall contribute 
to the discovery and systematization of knowledge. The technician may do 
3 7. Cf. Chapter IV, Sect ions 2, c 1 and 4. 
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this occasionally 11 but this is mt his main function. 
Professor Lovejoy 11 in truth, would not only remove philosophy from 
the role of "queen of the sciences" 11 but he would reduce the role of 
the philosopher to that of the technician.38 
The intelligent man at this stage of history demands a synoptic 
insight in philosophy 11 an insight which points beyond the statement of it 
to the 11concrete universal" which is reasonable !!E existent or poten-
tially realizable in the life of the person and of society. 
38. Cf. Chapter iv, Section 2. 
219 . 
Chapter VI 
A SUMMARY OF TH& PHILOSOPHY OF Wn.LIAM PEPPERELL MONTAGU& 
1. Biographical Data 
William Pepperell Montague was born in Chelsea, Massachusetts, 
November 24, 1873. He received A.B., A.M., and Ph.D. degrees from 
Harvard in the successive years 1896, 1897, and 18<)8. For his disser-
tation he wrote on An Introduction to the Ontological Implicates of Prac-
tical Reason.1 The first year after he received his doctorate, he was an 
instructor at Radcliffe and docent at Harvard. The years 1899-1903 were 
spent as an instructor at the University of California, after which he 
went to Barnard College, Columbia University where he has remained. He 
has been the Johnsonian Professor of Philosopny at Columbia. 
2. Methodology 
Dr. Montague 1s philosophical method is many-sided. All w;zys of 
obtaining philosophical know·ledge are amiably admitted to have their 
places and their values. This amiability is tempered only by a firm 
1. Montague, IPR. 
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restriction that each method remain within its proper sphere. In both 
The Ways of Knowing and The Ways of Things there are five classes of 
knowable objects and six "methodological schools" listed as follows: 
1. The domain of objects and events that can be experi-
enced only by other minds than our own. 2. The dual do-
main (A) of ultima.te and non-instrumental values, (B) of 
a suppo~ed ultimate and ineffable truth. 3. The domain 
of commensurable and abstract relations. 4. The domain 
of particular facts and concrete relations. 5. The domain 
of individual and social conduct.2 
1. Those preferring the testimony of others in whom they 
have complete trust or faith are 11 Authoritarians." 
2. Those preferring inner feeling or intuition are the 
"Intuitionists" or "Mystics". 
3. Those preferri~ the principles which seem self-evident 
to reason are the "Rationalists 11 .3 
4. Those preferri~ the evidence of sense perception or 
experience are the ."Empiricists". 
5. Those preferring the successful consequences of apply-
ing a belief in practice as a criterion of its 
validity are the "Pragmatists". 
6. Those who regard mne of these criteria either when 
taken separately or when combined with others as adequate to 
justify our beliefs are the 11Skeptics 11 .4 
Note that the method is related, in each case, to the source of 
the beliefs. In other essays, Dr. :tviontague remarks that empiricism and 
rationalism are the two primary methods and that the others are secondary. 
Although the two primary methods of testing the truth of a 
judgment or the reality of what it asserts are on the one 
2. Montague, WK, 225. 
3. In WK, cf. above, Montag·ue describes the function of rationalism quite 
differently, though not antithetically: 11the domain of abstract com-
mensurable relations". He remarks that mathematics is perfect know-
ledge. (WK, 113 and .229.) The concepts of space and time and number 
are closely related. GiK, 114.) 
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4. Montague, WT , 39. Cf. WK , 224-234. In such a list Montague has chosen 
what he considers the mo::Jt characteristic phase of a method. He ad-
mits that it is not universally valid. The entire Part I of WK is 
a discussion of the inter-relationships of methods. 
hand the Empiricist's retail method of adding new bits of 
experience, and on. the other hand the Rationalist's whole-
sale appeal to the already attained, yet these fundamental 
methods are, of course, in no sense inconsistent with the 
various secondary methods ••• (1) ••• (Authoritarianism); 
or (2) ••• (Mysticism); or (3) ••• (Pragmatism).5 
Still another article, in discussing methods of dealing with one of 
the traditional antinomies of Zeno, lists and discusses a slightly · 
different group of methods: 
I. The Method of Skepticism; II. The Method of Ultra-
rationalism; III. The Method of Ultra-Empiricism; IV. 
The Relational Theory; V 6 The Punctiform Theory; VI. The DoUble Aspect Theory. 
In the context it develops that the relational theory is an empirical 
theory and the punctiform (i .• e., logic of fixed classes) theory is a 
rationalistic hypothesis; the advantage and disadvantage of each being 
harmoniously integrated in the doUble-aspect hypothesis. 
The question is now to be answered whether the joint use of five 
or six methods in the philosophizing of Dr. Montague constitutes an 
eclecticism or whether they are somehow aufgehoben into a systematic 
unity. Dr. Montague, . himself, refers to the product of these methods 
as a "federation". 7 . This is the best description of the situation; 
eclecticism is not quite fair to the systematic interrelatedness some-
times achieved in the philosophy; and organic unity .would certainly 
be an exaggeration with res~ect to a method which frequently balances off 
rationalism against empiriej2m and vice versa. 
5. Montague, WT, 269-270, reprinted from Art. (1928). Cf. also WK, 130. 
6. Montague, WT, 206, reprinted from SHI, vol. I. 
7. Montague, "W~, 51, and WK, Chapter VII, 211-234. 
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The method of empj~icism may rightly be regarded as the 
most widely applic:able and reliable of al.l. It is the 
only suitable method !or the domain of particular facts 
ani relations, and it is usually susceptible of being 
applied at least :indirectzy and as a check in the other 
domains.s 
Empiricism and rationalism not only aid o~ another posi-
tively, but serve as checks upon one another 1 s errors ••• 
There are four stc~es in the complete inductive-deductive 
cycle: (1) the initial experiences that set the problem 
and the imagining of a hypothesis that seems promising; 
(2) the combination of the ~w hypothesis with old or 
previously accepted principles; (3) the deduction, from 
the combination of its hypothetical consequences; (4) the 
verification of those consequences by further experiences • 9 
Note that points 1 and 4 are~ empirical; 2 and 3 are rationalistic. 
The ill-fated venture of .t-ew Realism also had its methodological 
implications: ''We wanted, first of all, to introduce into philosophy 
the two methods that had been so profitably employed in science: the 
method of co-operative work, and the method of isolating problems and 
tackling them one by one •1110 These two factors are both obviously 
adopted on pragmatic grounds, but the second (isolating problems) has 
already been referred to above (the "punctiform" method) as a rational-
istic method, but perfect analysis, leading to simple entities, is far 
more punctiform than is mere isolation of problems. 
With respect to the question of certainty, Montague admits the 
impossibility of the ideal o,f logical certainty for human minds. One of 
the uncertainties is the ex:t.stence of other minds, but 11the probabilities 
• •• are overwhelming11 •
11 
8. Montague, WK, 230. 
9. Montague, WK, 128. 
JO. Montague, WT, 660, reprinted from Art. (1930). 
ll. Montague,_ WK, 209. 
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More generally he r~marks, 11 No knowledge attainable by the human 
mind is absolutely certain •• ,, To retain toward all problems a measure of 
open-miniedness is as difficult as it is important. n12 
Probable knowledge, then, is important to Montague: 
The principle of probability ••. has the peculiar virtue 
of enabling us to measure the probability that a series 
of conjunctions is causal rather than casual. 3 
The prevalence of t.rue causality a.rxi the accompanying 
guarantee that the uniformity of nature will hold in the 
future as in the past is proved against the skeptic, 
not indeed with certainty, but with overwhelming 
probability .14 
The knowledge situation neither precludes nor ensures 
that identity of perceived object and existent object 
which constitutes perceptual truth. There is always 
the chance of error. 5 
3. Ontology 
According to Dr. Montague, the comprehenied totality of being both 
subsists and exists. As exi:!!tent, it comprises those compossible events 
occup,ying position in the space-time order. The principle of compos-
s ibility would appear to be Bome general unierived and unexplained ten-






Existing substances or things ••. are to be considered 
as in some way analogous to ~rmutations or perspectives 
of the totality of essences.l6 




Montague, WT, 274. 
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/jhe universe e.xhibitsJrar less than maximum compossibi-
lity but with an indeterminate, unending evolutionary trend 
toward more ani more harmony or perfection ••• the survival 
and gradual ascendancy of the more compossible or inclusive.17 
In addition to the universe as it is and has been or will be, 
there is the realm of subsistence which comprises every possible object 
of thought in its generality. 
The subsistent includes everything that can be made an 
object of' discourse, ani that can be exemplified in more 
than a single instanee.l8 
"Everything" includes illusion, paradox, and error. But Montague narrows 
his connotation of the subsistent when he speaks of' mathematical and 
logical systems: 
The realm of universals ani the multiple systems of 
implication which ·that realm contains are in no sense 
arbitrary or indeterminate or plastic • • • All the 
geometries and all the algebras are among these s,ys-
tems ••• Truth is never created; it is f'oun:l, partly by 
the senses, partly by the intellect.l9 
Montague objects to ob jective idealists• accounting for the system 
of the given and the agency of the existent by an infinite will. On 
his basis the given is accounted for only by postulation and there is 
no agency of the existent. 
A very strange consequence of Montague 1 s theory is its lack of a 
definitive status for the purely rational sciences of logic and JL&the-
maties, indeed of all general thought. They, just as all other general 
17. Montague, WT, 275. 
18. Ibid.' 271. 
19. Montague, WK, 125. 
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ideas, subsist along with error, paradox, and negation in a. heterogen-
eous totality. Existent objects are subsistents plus membership in the 
space-time order; existents, a.s :ooted above, are not systematically 
compossible--only relatively so and tending to be more so. The strange-
ness in the situation consists in the miracle that there is any compossi-
bility a.t all considering itn sources and its modus vivendi and that 
. 20 
there should be perfect rational systems (i.e., mathematics and logic) 
within the completely heterogeneoll3 subsistent seems to be nothing but 
compounded miracle. Montague 1s system requires a. purpose in a will of 
some sort (an agency to intellectual order) to account for the existen-
tial (relatively) compoesible order. Without it there is a. deep irra-
'·tional.ity a.t the base of his system of existence. 
Dr. Montague conceives the existents which comprise the physical 
world a.s an accretion (stored experience) of energy patterns. Fields of 
physical energy are the basic units of existents. What the basic 
units of subsistence are is left undefined except, to rule out that which 
cannot be thought and is singular in number. In the interaction and 
intra-action of fields of force the energy components are modified arrl 
transformed. The most important of the tra.rui>rmations is from active, 
kinetic energy to a comparatively static, potential energy. As fields of 
force are transformed from kinetic to potential energy there accrues a 
20. 11The mathematical concepts of number, space, time and of velecity 
which is the ratio of space to time, for.m homogeneous systems in 
which almost limitless deductions are possible." Montague, WK, 129. 
Mathematics, he says, is a non~xistentia.l science with respect to 
application; with respect to itself it is difficult to say what its 
status is. 
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new factor in the universal history: temporal relationship to the past 
and present which, as a determinant of the nature of things issues in 
living things. Those living things whose individual history achieves a 
determining status along with inherited history are anmals; those 
animals which have achieved a high level of trans-temporal reference, 
and so of individuality, are persons. 
A materialistic, realistic interpretation of reality is strenu-
ously and skillfully proposed by Dr. ¥iontague. 
Nevertheless, in addition to the points already mentioned, there 
remains another objection to the two realms of existence and subsistence. 
Montague says: 
Every invisible thing is in the same flace as the visible 
thing which varies directly with it.2 
The existence of mental processes in space would seem to 
be equally a postulate of common sense and a desideratum 
of psychophysical method. 22 
In dealing with the issues of epistemology (cf. below) Montague 
claims that the chief objection to epistemological dualism is "the 
numerical duality of the space and time that is inferred and the space 
ani time that is perceived". 23 He goes on to say, "I cannot look be-
yond perceptual space; I cannot possibly conceive of any space external 
to (in the sense of discontinuous with) the space that I perceive.n24 
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21. Montague, Art. (1908)1 , 22. Montague has not revised his basic meta-
physics as he developed his theism (for which see below). The agency 
implied in a theistic position is not reckoned with hence these "realms" 
are artificially disconnected. 
22. Ibid.'· 29. 23. Montague, WK, 261. 
24. Ibid., 262. Surely fictional space (where Alice went to Wonderland) 
and geometrical spaces are definitely discontinuous with perceived 
space. Any space I perceive directly is also discontinuous in the 
sense that I can't move from any space I conceive to any space as 
conceived by you .in your mind. There is continuity, then, only in 
the situation believed-in (which are literally noumena). 
Naturally a monistic rootaphysicaJ. realist will have this difficulty 
and it is a double-edged difficulty. It applies not only to the epis-
temlogical issue, but more particularly to the metaphysical. 'ltlhen 
Montague has said, above, that, •tEvery invisible thing is in the same 
place as the visible thing which varies directly with it, 1125 one can 
use his own question to confound him; if the whole of space and time 
are conceived as existent, where can the whole, overwhelmingly larger 
realm of (physically referrent) subsistents be put? If the subsistent 
were ideal, it might be compatible; as physical it is incoherent. 
It will be seen as this description proceeds, that this realism is 
of an unusual kind, consisting of physical units inherently interrelated, 
exemplifying part of the subsistential realm with spatial relations to 
that realm, bearing not only the poterrtiality but also the actuality of 
all the spiritual aspects of life; still their primary nature is physi-
cal, not ideal. Sometimes these physical units think, (e.g. 11The 
intrinsic reference of an effect to its cause is itself cognizing.n26), 
but still their basic nature is always physical. 
Dr. Montague consistently claims when he is discussing the physical 
world that he is a metaphysical materialistic realist, but he says he 
means only that "things do not depend for their existence upon the fact 
- 27 
that we know them". This statement is repeated frequently in later 
articles. He attempts to define idealism as the contrary of this 
proposition, i.e., things do depend for their existence upon the fact 
25. Montague, Art. (190S)1 , 22. (Cited above, #21.) 
26. Montague, Art. (1945)~ 312. 
27. Montague, Art. (1907) , 101, and many others. The objective ideal-
istic realist can point out that he could also accept Montague 1s 
definition of realism. 
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that some knower knows them. Some idealists would fuu:nediately challenge 
the definition; objective idealists would constitute some of the chal-
lengers; idealists who consider willing more basic than knowledge would 
add to the challenge. 
Montague postulates his materialism on the basis of "scientific 
pragmatism", i.e., science works on the assumption of a materialistic 
universe and has been extremely successful; therefore, philosophy should 
imitate it. 
In his writing, }tlontague is considering the world of physical ob-
jects so much of the t:ime that one gets the impression that he is a meta-
physical materialistic monist, but it is not so. He is a dualist: the 
cosmos as extensive is material, as intensive is "animistic", to use his 
own word. (Cf. Section 7, "Theology", below.) 
As a materialistic realist Dr. Montague has· a physical realm of 
stibsistents from which intelligent will and purpose are somehow manifested 
in existence; his realm of existents has a progressively compossible order 
of nature, a species of human persons which can reason, recognize systems 
of truth and error, create values, etc. In truth he is more of an ideal-
ist than a materialist, and by the time this description of his philoso-
phical position is concluded this should be amply proved. 
4. Epistemology 
Twentieth-century American philosophy has been characterized by 
its attachment of major concern to the study of the problems of epis-
temology. In this stuiy ani concern, and in the rough-and-tumble of 
philosophical debate atte:rxiing them, Dr. Montague has been one of the 
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primary figures. As he related in an autobiographical sketch, 28 he 
reacted strongly against the absolute idealists' metaphysical deduction 
that the object of knowledge was constituted by the percipient. 
The first and cardinal fallacy of idealists was the ascrip-
tion of self-evidence to the proposition that the relations 
of the knower to the object known is an 'internal relation' , 
a relation such that the terms related are dependent upon 
the existence of the relation.29 
Consciousness as such could oot or did not affect the objects of know-
ing,; the effect -muld be the indirect product of the body to which it 
is related instead of directly constitutive. 
The realist may point out that consciousness, while not 
affecting objects in the act of revealing them, can and 
does change them through the action of the being to whom 
they are revealect.30 
Coupled with this negation regarding the constitutive function of know-
ledge was the positive conviction that physical science was accomplish-
ing too much of significance ta the sum ofl'knowledge to have its methods 
or its results treated so lightly as it was typically treated by ideal-
ists.31 
The revolt against metaphysical absolute idealism took him into 
a realistic position in which, associated with Holt, Marvin, Perry, Pitkin, 
and Spaulding, the foundations of a "new raiism11 were worked out and 
published.32 
28. Montague, Art. (1930), reprinted in WT. 
29. Montague, \iT, 240, reprinted from Art. (1937)3. 
30. Ibid. 1 244. 
31. Montague, WT 1 234. 
32. Montague, Art. (1910)3 and Holt, et al, TNR. 
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Significantly, the epistemological presentative realism (Neo-
Realism) in Dr. Montague's case was the direct product of association 
with Woodbridge during the period in which behavioristic psychology was 
being for.mulated.33 Objectively viewed, behavioristic psychology and its 
support for epistemological presentationism literally collapsed under, 
primarily, the proof that they not only destroyed the possibility of 
accounting for error, but that they also destroyed the possibility of 
rational thought or valuation. 
These sad trends toward behaviorism and positivism which 
have taken place in the last ten years and which I have 
attempted to describe, spoiled my interest in the move-
ment L,Neo-RealismJfrom which I had hoped so much good would 
result; and once more, as in the old daP. at Harvard and 
at Berkeley, I am left without a party.J4 
Perry and Holt defined the realistic behaviorism in terms of a 
"specific response"; and as Dr. Montague says, "an organism's response 
••• to an object must be a motion11 .35 His objections are fourfold: 
(1) It LconsciousnessJdoes mt resemble it LmotionJ 
in arry way unless in the S{P&ll proportion of cases in 
which the object is itself a motion of material particles. 
(2) It carmot be directed toward it except in those cases 
in which the object of our consciousness is a spatial 
event contemporary with the organism's motion. (3) It 
affords no clue to our ability to apprehend secondary qual-
ities, abstract ideas, other minds, or events of the past 
and future. (4) Worst of all, the organism's specific 
response or directed motion fails to provide .for the 
duration of ;•specious present 1 that characterizes every 
experience and significantly
6
differentiates it from all 
other events and relations.J 
33. Montague, WT, 659, reprinted from Art. (1930). 
34. Ibid., 663. See also WT, 245, reprinted from Art. (1937)3. 
35. Montague, WT, 246, reprinted from Art. (1937)~. 
36. Montague, WT, 24b, reprinted from Art. (1937) • 
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To the objective relativism ~sitivism (Montague's description)_737 
of Neo-Realism, Dr. Montague presents these criticisms: 
Objective relativism ••. neglect /:s J ••. the profound 
asymmetry of the relation between the veridical and the 
illusory objects of pereeption.38 
Real objects have two ways of producing effects Ldirect, · 
temporal-spatial effects as well as experiential effects 7; 
unreal or illusory objects have but one ~xperientia1~.~9 
l 1 1 •t 40 ts unmanageab e comp e~ y. 
That Dr. Montague has altered h:is epistemological position in 
recognition of the difficulties in which the former position placed him 
is definite. Exactly what ·the new position is is not so plain, but an 
attempt to define it must be made. 
There is a persistent tension in Dr. Montague 1s epistemology be-
tween the strictly epistemological elements and the accompanying meta-
physical interpretation. The relation of the knowing and the known has 
two aspects: numerical and qualitative. If numerical identity is 
adopted, the difficulties are that (1) the qualities predominant in 
the object in its tempera-spatial relation may be different from the 
qualities predominant in the object in the knowing relation, and (2) 
both may differ from the qualities predominant in the subsistential 
relation. Ani, given qualitative similarity or difference, the 
question of numerical identity in aey of the three relations is still 
· open. Now, to Dr. Montague, the object as known is not physically 
37. Montague, WT, 663, reprinted from Art. (1930), 
38. Montague, WT, 248, reprinted from Art. (1937) • 
39. Ibid., 249. 
40. Ibid., 251. 
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present in the mind as knowing; numerical identity is not proposed. 
We fim an extraordinary situation-a situation in which 
an organism or system of events is in a curious and unique 
rapport with other events whose loci and dates are differ-
ent from its own. Consciousness may, indeed, be defined 
as a situation in which certain events (the objects) enjoy 
a vicarious efficacy in spaces and times other t}!in their 
own--namely, those of the brain that knows them. 
Although 11rapport 11 may be equivocal, "vicarious efficacy in spaces and 
times other than their own" should not be; this is plain epistemological 
dualism. 
But the objective qualitative identity of the object as known with 
the knowing is proposed. 
To treat mini as a field of potential energy is to do 
justice both to its uniqueness of structure ani to its 
homogeneity wi~ the material world of which it is an 
integral part. 
Members of the existent order are of the same qualitative sort as sub-
sistents; so, he contenis all three realms are qualitatively identical. 
But it cannot be agreed that Montague is consistent at this point. Some 
qualitative identity may be admitted, but there is a persistent though 
inexplicable (at least unexplained) delineation of the existent from the 
subsistent and the uniqueness of the mental field consists not only of 
the guale of sensation, but also significantly of the fact of trans-
temporal reference. 
The peculiar rapport between an individual and the ob-
41. Montague, WT, 671, reprinted from Art. (1930). 
42. Ibid., 671. 
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jects of which he is aware extends to past and future 
and to the realm of the abstract. 43 
Thus, complete qualitative identity is not established. 
To return to the problem of mnnerical identity, "vicarious effi-
cacy" (hence dualism) was noted above. 
There is evidence that metaphysical realism is both temporally 
and logically prior to the epistemological issue in Montague's thought. 
Epistemological presentative realism (i.e., monism) is likewise deri-
vative from and secondary to the insistence upon preserving the exter-
nality of the object of the knowing relation. 
New Realism, in its eagerness to bridge the gap between 
the mind and its physical world • • • degraded the pure 
members of that world to an unseemly parity with the 
objects of error and fantasy ••• 
Critical realism has revived an old puzzle ••• in its 
eagerness to preserve the gap between the undisciplined 
hordes of mutually incompatible ideas and the single 
self-consistent of univalent material entities ••• 
The object of their joint devotion: a physical world 
existing independently of the mind!? that inhabit it and 
use it, remains inviolate at ij_ast as an object of faith 
if not as an object of proof. 
Probably the most repeated proposition in Dr. Montague's writings 
is this: 
Realism in its pr:imary meaning is, I think, generally 
conceded to be the view that things .do not depend for 
43. Montague, WT, 661. 
44. Montague, WT, 259, reprinted from Art. (1937)3. 
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their existence upon the fact that we know them.45 
In The Ways of Knowing, he says: 
Truth then consists in the correspondence or agreement of the 
judgments contained in the narrow and transitory experience 
system of the individual with the things and relations 
comprising the incomparably broader and more enduring e:q.s-
tence-system of which the individual is himself a part.46 
Montague talks so much of the identity of the objects of knowing 
and the objects of the existential and subsistential orders that one 
is led to think he is an epistemological monist from the repeated use 
of the word "identitY'', but it is m ,t so. He contends that the object 
•' 
of perception is identical with the object in existence or subsistence, 
but he does not assert the numerical identity of the percept or concept 





My view would hold • • • that it is only the determiners 
of the perceived chair that are inside your brain, and 
that the perceived chair may be in exactly the same 
extra-bodily space as the chair which we infer to exist ••• 
The chair in consciousness is controlled by intraorganic 
conditions, and ••• so long as these conditions are such 
as to make the chair a:ppear in the space where the real 
chair actually is, the two chairs are identical and our 
perception is true. 47 
I fear to identify the brain-states of the subject with the 
objects which are perceived by them ••• One-to-one corres-
pondence ••• , but they are not identical with the things 
which they mean.48 
Montague, Art. (1907)2, 101. Also1 Art. (1909)3, 460, 485, and 543; 
Art. (1910)3, 396; Art. (1931)1 , 172; Art. (1919), 628; and Art. 
(1924)4, 580. 
Montague, WK, 313. 
Montague, WK, 393. 
Ibid., 395. 
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While this ought to be conclusive, it is also true that at times 
Montague 11 leans over backwards" toward his former confreres in epistemo-
logical monism. Typical of this confusion is his objection to epistemo-
logical dualism on the grounds of "the numerical duality of the space 
and time that is inferred and the space and time that is perceived11 .49 
He says, 11 The trouble is, however, that I cann:>t look beyooo perceptual 
space; I cannot possibly conceive of any space external to (in the 
sense of discontinuous with) the space that I perceive.n50 "The attempt 
of epistemological dualism to maintain a numerical separateness of 
sense~ata and their causes fails completely .n5l 
Here he apparently endorses monism unequivocally. But, in the 
same chapter he disposes of another objection to dualism as of no merit 
although the argument is the same: that is 11the objection based on the 
supposed difficulty of comparing sense data with their causes". 52 In 
concluding that di.scussion he says, this is a specious objection. 11What 
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we cannot directly observe we can indirectly infer.n53 Is this not dualism? 
After discussing monistic realism and idealism and dualism, he an-
alyzes t~ee basic propositions upon which to federate an epistemology: 
All experienced objects have an independent meaning or 
essence that gives them a status of possible psychic 
existence. 54 
All entities are (selectively) relative to a self and 
possible objects of experience.55 
49. Montague, WK, 261. 
50. Ibid., 262. cr. footnote #24. 
51. Ibid., 264. 
52. Ibid., 257. 
53. Ibid., 260. 
54~ Ibid., 292. 
5~. Ibid., 297. 
The system of objects experienced by a self and the 
system of objects existing externally to that self and 
causing its experience can vary independently of each 
other. 56 
In relation to the third proposition he says in other places that the 
system of experience mt only .£!!! vary from the system of objects but 
also ~ vary; therefore a thorough-going monism is impossible and at 
least some dualism necessary. 
Although the two systems of objects may coincide to any 
extent, there is m necessity for such coincidence, and 
m guarantee that . it ' will continue. 57 
The article, "Confessi ons of an Animistic Materialist", is even less 
ambiguously dualistic: 110ur cognitive states reveal their normal . or 
most probable implicates, which may be but need not be identical with 
existing objects,n58 although "ma;y be" is monistic. 
One more comment seems needed regarding the nat ure of the known 
object. Iviontague says: 
To be a realist does not commit one either to empl.rl.CJ.Sm 
or to a~ ··priorism. You may believe that the only source 
of knowledge is sense-perception or that there are other 
and higher sources of knowledge, without prejudice to 
your realistic belief that the objects known may exist 
indepeniently of the knowledge relation. 59 
The existence of objects independently of the knowledge relation is the 
keystone and the touchstone of Dr. Montague's philosophy. Nevertheless, 
he mentions in his article "Consciousness a Form of Energyn60 the 
56. Montague, WK, 306. 
57. Ibid., 308. 
58. Montague, WT, 672. 1 59. Montague, Art. (1909) , 462. 
60. Montague, Art. (1908), reprinted in WT. 
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principle of compossibility by which a kind of integration has always 
been and is being perfected in the realm of existence. These latter 
statements do not seem exactly consistent with that oft-repeated pro-
•t· 61 posJ.: J.On. 
The fundamental nature of the perceived object is believed to be 
its material (energy-matter) configurations in the space-time order. 
In this, Dr. Montague is an epistemological and a metaphysical realist. 
Then, he likewise proposes that the fundamental nature of the self, 
that is the knower, is likewise a case of energy configurations in the 
space-time order. Since the object known and the knower are both of 
the same nature, there are not, according to Dr. Montague the diffi-
culties of interaction or parallelism or mystery which have accompanied 
the representative theories of knowledge of Descartes and his followers. 
His difficulty here is the supposition that consciousness is wholly 
knowledge. It is also :. largely conation, will, striving, and energy. 
This he often forgets; but his theory of energy seems separate from his 
theory of consciousness as mere knowing. 
The crux of the theory, as it appears to this investigator is the 
contention that there is a causal efficacy on the part of the objects 
of thought to produce sensational patterns in the mind of the knower. 
To attribute causal efficacy to the objects sometimes answers the cus-
to.mary objection to epistemological dualism that it can never be certain 
that the representation corresponds to reality. However, is it certain 
that what the object (air in motion) causes (coolness) resembles the 
object? This ascription, however, raises objection from another quarter. 
61. He has spoken recently of the intrinsic cognizing within events. 
(Montague, Art. /J..945}1 312.) 
238 
Dr. l-Iontague goes on from granting causal efficacy to the objects 
of knowledge to deny any causal efficacy to the knowledge relation. As 
regards the first part of this statement, he refers to Professor Dewey 
in an early article and says: 
['"Instrumentalism_]overlooks the part the environment plays 
in forcing itself and its specific qualities upon our notice 
• •• Truths are sometimes
6
achieved by us, but at other times 
they are thrust upon us. 2 
Many years later, he follows up this statement by asserting: 
Consciousness does not alter the objects that it discloses ••• 
The light of a lantern does not alter the stones that it 
illuminates; but it enables the bearer of the lantern to 
remove tnose obstacles from his path.63 
Consciousness does not alter its objects as pure knowledge - but 
as action it does. He forgets that will acts. 
Montague does not draw a distinct line between the possibility of 
consciousness affecting the constitution of its objects. While he says 
(above) it does not alter them, he says at another point: 
The realist may point out that consciousness, while :oot 
affecting objects in the act of revealing them, can and 
does change them t&lough the action of the being to whom 
they are revealed. 4 
Then, on the same page he makes such statements ae: 
The truth-seeker strives to make of his mini a colour-
62. 1-10ntague, Art. (1909), 486 (footnote). 
63. Montague, Art. (1945), 313. 3 64. lvlontague, WT, 244, reprinted from Art. (19.37) • 
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And: 
less mirror in which facts are seen exactly as they are, 
undistorted by hopes or fears. 
We can, to some extent, determine reality by our desires 
and shape the course of nature to our needs. But the 
overwhelming majority of the things in the world are be-
yond our power to change, though wt beyond our power to 
know.65 
If one returns to his basic statement about existence that exis-
tence is mt dependent upon knowing, does it mt follow that existence 
and knowledge vary independently66 and that knowledge cannot consti-
tute existents'? This ·is a way of attaining a kind of certainty-an 
arbitrary kind. But it is not helpful either to understa.n:l.ing or to 
explaining. Error is supposed to be a proposition attached to the 
wrong object: the status of the object-mn-existent but subsistent. 
Such a distinction is verbal only, with perhaps the exception of physical 
objects. A Fascist interpretation of political organization (presum-
ably a subsistent and mn-existent object) inflicts all the woes and 
tragedies which Montague claims the existent disparity (between what 
is and what ought to be67) inflicts. The error exists as psychological ' 
f~t (causal) even when its object does mt exist. 
A false proposition (e.g., Montague 1s favorite; t 'he earth is 
flat,) does not change the existent object, the earth, but it certainly 
changes human behavior. To stress the lack of effect upon the object 
65. Montague, WK, 153. 
66. Montague says so in so many words in WK 313 and 393. 
67. Cf. WK, 153• 
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as much as Montague does reduces drastically the importance of the 
effect upon minds and societies. Man's intellectual effort becomes a 
mer e epiphenomenon of reality. Again this is due to forgetting that 
mind acts as well as mirrors. 
Dr. Montague has gone too far in opposition to absolute idealism 
in making such statements. 68 Consciousness cannot be confined to 
passivity as Dr. Montague suggests. The main actual purpose of know-
ledge is not only to :reflect but also to alter or control the environ-
ment, behavior, or subjective conditions. Discovering a truth, i.e., 
remov:i:ng an object from mere subsistence to existence, while it empiri-
cally does occur and history records the striving for compossibility, 
Montague has rejected. Is it possible that Dr. Montague intended to 
suggest such a Calvinist metaphysics? On such a metaphysics and with a 
materialistic base there is no rationale for existence; there must be 
none for knowing. 
There is m bridge from existence to subsistence unless conscious-
ness builds the bridge. It is too simple (contrary to· the fact of the 
drudgery involved in scientific work) to say that objective reality- is 
presented in·toto, that nothing is (at least) selectively, new. It is 
irrelevant and irresponsible to say that the airplane and the atomic bomb 
are not new because all the possible configurations of their material 
components have existed for eons. - }finds, which have reached out from 
what is to what could be and have molded the existent into new forms 
68. There is one object with which it is patently not true to say that 
consciousness does not alter it: the self. Self-consciousness 
quite radically alters the un-self-conscious-self. Knowing alters 
the knowing self; it alters other known selves when communicated 
to them. 
after the pattern of their vision, have genuinely altered the objects 
of their consciousnel:B (es). 
The sensation in the mind is the distinctive guale of experience. 
Of genuine significance is Montague 1s remark: "Sensation, as such, is 
reality • • • the immediate appearance of the qualities of things in per-
ception is knowledge. It is perhaps the only kini of knowledge that 
can never be in error. n69 An infallible faculty of perception does not 
cohere with the discussion of the indepement. variables of objects and 
finite experience. (Cf. above.) 
Viewed objectively, the sensation is the process, supposedly tak-
ing place at the neural synapses, whereby the afferent energy patterns 
(of the causally efficacious object) are being relayed into the efferent 
energy patterns (of the volition of the individual, whether that voli-
tion is directed by instinct, habit, cogitation, or anything else.) 
In each and every case of this relay from the afferent to the efferent 
nerve patterns there is a quantitative loss in kinetic energy which 
remains in the nervous system as potential energy. The accumulated 
residues of experience represented in these deposits of potential en-
ergy are the memories of the imividual. The process of the transfer 
from afferent kinetic energy to efferent kinetic energy and stored kine-
tic energy is the objective description of sensation, while the sub-
jective descr:ipiion is just those gualia of experience which we do actu-
ally experience. 
Dr. Montague had previously explained70 that man's free mental 
activities were the product of that stage of emergent evolution in which 
69. Montague, WK, 187. 2 70. Montague, Art. (1929) , reprinted in WT. 
"time replaces space as the primary milieu of all that lives, 11 71 and in 
which 11 it is this critical excess in ~he strength of his memories that 
makes man capable of living more in the past arrl future than in the 
present. He is the absent minded animal. 11 72 This summary serves to 
bridge the gap between the discussion of epistemology and psychology. 
5. Psychology 
Dr. Montague observes that the afferent nerve movements must be 
redirected at certain synapses of the nervous system before being re-
layed out over efferent nerve structures. He further likens this 
redirection to the moment of rest between the forw&rd impetus and the 
rebouni of a ball against a wall. In both cases there is a moment in 
which there is no movement; in that moment there is nothing but a 
sheer potentiality. Then, Dr. Montague points out, it appears likely 
this is the time when sensation appears in consciousness and therefore 
concludes: 
Is it not overwhelmingly probable that the two simultaneous 
phenomena are identical an:i that the potential energy into 
which the motion of a neural stimulus is transferred is in 
itself the actual entity which we call a sensation?73 
Sensations are the potentialities of motions, motions are 
equally the potentialities of sensations. 74 
The mind is a hierarchical system of potential or intensive 
energies accumulated in the brain. 75 
71.. Montague, WT, 41.9. 
72. Ibid., 424. 
73. Ibid., 501. 
7 4· Ibid., 502. 
75. Ibid., 510. 
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After having arrived at the conclusion that the psychical has an 
essentially physical nature, Dr. Montague remarks that he can accept 
Descartes's dictum that the mind directs energies but does not add or 
sUbtract energies. 
Ren~Descartes has given the key to the solution of this 
great problem of psychophysical causality in this theory 
that, while the mini cannot add to the energies of the 
physical world, it can control the direction of those 
energies. 7b 
Where there are creatures with minds, the brain is the obverse 
of the coin while sensations are the reverse. The two are one. They 
act concomitantly. Dr. Montague observes that this unilateral relation 
between the brain and its states does not apply between the individual 
arrl the objects of his consciousness. 
Our epistemological theory of the relations of consciousness 
to its objects is quite indeperrlent of any psycho-physical 
theory of the relation of consciousness to the brain.77 
Disjunction between the brain as a system of energies and its 
states which can only be determined mechanically in a materialistic 
energy theory seems impossible according to Dr. M~ontague Is theory J al-
though he refused to identify them in The Ways of Knowing.78 At another 
point he says: 
The indirect determiners of our perceptual objects are many 
7 6. Hontague, WT, 508-509 ~ 
77. Montague, Art. (1945) , 314. 
78. Montague, \-lli:, 393. 
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and varied 1 but the direct and final determiners are alwa~s 
and exclusively the processes or states of the organisms. 9 
It appears that Dr. Montague was not aware of the research in psycholog-
ical investigation of brain function which indicates a generality of 
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brain function rather than an exclusively specific, locatable functioning. SO 
Just as the ~pistemological assertion that k00wledge cannot al-
ter its objects collapsed in application to self-knowledge, logic, mathe-
matics, an:l existent as differentiated from the subsistent-Or. Hontague 's 
psychological proposal that the brain and its states are inseparable 
falls apart when viewed by dynamic psychology. In Dr. Hontague 's psychol-
ogy is a physiological psychology undisturbed by critical examination. 
Note the following: 
To the extent that rrry brain contains the same structures of 
sensory-motor paths as that of rrry friend, the words that he 
uses to express his meanings will when I hear them arouse the 
same maanings for me. The only mystery, if it be a mystery, 
concerns the manner in 'Which the conscious zooanings in a man's 
mind are related to his con-comitant brain-processes.Sl . 
All the standard arguments against behaviorism which Dr. Montague 
himself approves elsewhere do not need to be recited here. It is only 
pertinent to point out that emphasis upon the materialistic aspects of 
his metaphysics might have inclined Dr. Montague to a behavioristic 
psychology, yet behaviorism must stand rejected along with radical skep-
ticism and solipsism as fruitless and self-defeating theories. 
~'lith regard to the problem of insight, Dr. Jvlontague says: 
79. Montague, WK, 300. 
so. Especially Lashley's experiments cited in Vaughan, GP, 157-159, and 
Burnham, WP. 2-4. Cf. Lashley, Bt-U. 
Sl. :tvfontague, Art. BR (1925), 581. 
The fact that as yet we know little about the mechanism of 
imagination and less about the basis of instinct, makes it 
possible to indicate only the general lines along which a 
solution might be sought.82 
Those lines are suggested by him to be that instinct is racial memory and 
instincts plus individual memory are the source of imagination. 83 By 
naming the materials he apparently thinks he has made an explanation, 
but it is only partial; the more important question: - How are such 
materials used to produce insight or imagination? -- is left unattended. 
In Montague's philosophy is an able and vigorous attempt to 
bridge the gap of mental and physical existence which has plagued philo-
sophy in modern times. But, in spite of its appealing architecture, the 
plan exhibits some weaknesses which a brief recapitulation will make more 
apparent. 
Reality comprises the existent and the subsistent. The subsistent 
consists of all non-singular objects of discourse while the existent 
consists of those relatively compossible events in space and time. So 
far as can be discerned the particularity of existents is fundamentally 
irrational, inexplicable but :nOt cut off from the observation of con-
sciousness (i.e., not unknowable). 
The existent order has been built (or has bui~t itself) up slowly 
out of primeval fields of energy. The totality of energy remains un-
changed from primitive fields of energy. The totality of energy remains 
unchanged from primitive to current times. 
82. Montague, WK, 55. 
83. Ibid. 
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Energy is of two kinds, of which visible motion is one; 
and it is only the sum·· of the two phases that is constant. 
The energy which is not motion but into wh~~h and from 
which motion passes is called 1 potential'. 
The existent and the subsistent are two metaphysical orders; the 
former logically, but only logically included in the latter--there 
being no agency, direct or indirect, whereby the one order effects the 
other. Only the ultra-rationalistic demand that every idea have an 
eternal, inunutable source would lead any philosopher to postulate such 
an irrelevancy as this realm of subsistence. 
The principle of compossibility which Dr. Montague mentions is a 
genuine tertium quid~ In this notion lies the possibility of the 
integration of the realm of existents, but it is barely mentioned in 
Dr. Montague Is extensive writing and is left unelaborated and uninte-
grated in his general system. 
As fields of force accrue "experience" :in the · passage of time, 
some become differentiated and form successively and progressively 
living, animal, and personal organization. This differentiation and 
the retention of individuality either of singular or species organi-
zational forms are unexplained and must be postulated. It may be 
that all energy and all matter are held to be capable of producing the 
organizational forms, but it remains that some have led the way and this 
priority should be considered. Dr. J.vlontague ~ s entire case rests upon 
the reality of the concept of a planning and directing potentiality. 
If all energy is characterized by the potentiality of personality, is 
it not a strange stubbornness that induces him to continue referring to 
84. Montague, WT, 496. 
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these energy units as a materialism? In truth his "animistic material-
ism" is much more animistic than materialistic and animism is still too 
weak a term for the evolution of personal, spiritual organization through 
species. 
6. Axiology 
Although the more customary term 11 axiology'1 is used to head this 
section, Dr. lv1ontague chooses to call his theory of value 11Kalology11 
to include both the aesthetic and moral aspects of experie~ce.85 He 
excludes logic and truth values in this connection. 
Unlike many aestheticians, Dr. Montague does not regard art as 
restr&cted to the objectification of beauty. 
A thing can be said to have esthetic significance of 
11value 11 which exe~Elifies the objectification of any 
emotion whatever. 
Esthetic values are not nere emotions but only such 
emotions as are objectified.87 
As art thus broadened and freed from it:.s ivory tower 
might regain, in our own sad days, all and more than 
all of the power and the gloSS which pertained to it 
in the great days of Greece. 
Dr. lYiontague! s kalology is a theory of value which, in both its 
aesthetic and moral aspects, needs to be based on the most inclusive 
principl.es. 
85. Montague, WT, 13 ff. 
86. Ibid.' 138. 
87. Ibid., 562. 
88. Montague, WT, 563, reprinted from Art. (1937). 
The judgment that is based on the more inclusive experience 
is superior to one based on only a fragment of that exper-
ience. 89 
Moral values are the product of 11 a secondary set of likes and dis-
likes"90 which comprise the conscience. Conscience consists of three 
"distinct" parts: prudence, sympathy, and suggestibilit y. 9l Prudence 
is that part of conscience concerned with the consequence of action 
upon one's self; sympathy is concerned with the consequences of action 
upon others. 
Man's distinctive glory lies not in the extent of his 
knowledge, but in the extent of his sympathy and in t~e 
vast cooperative life which is thereby made possible. 2 
Suggestibility is the part of conscience acquired from social 
customs and external authorities. It is the largest component of 
conscience; it is the "nonrational component", 93 decreeing unconditional, 
categorical imperatives. 
Dr. Montague believes that the suggestibility does not afford an 
adequate, intuitional base for ethical theory, that instead persons 
must educate their consciences so that their authoritarian decrees will 
be consistent with the highest and best values the person knows. 
Values cannot be reduced to pleasure; a man must still choose 
the kinds of pleasure he will pursue. 94 11 The true nature of moral 
89. Montague, WT , 128. 
90. Ibid.' 140. 
91. Ibid.' 141, also BU, 37. 
92. Ibid.' 150. 
93. Ibid., 142. 
94. l'iontague, WT, 156. 
249 
value consists in an increase of the substance of a life or a self ~,95 
The real quantity of a satisfaction depends not only 
and not mainly on the intensity of a pleasure that 
accompanies it, but essentialiy~ upon the size or volume 
of the ego that is satisfied. 
This quantitative note is followed in the elaboration of his ethi-
cal theory. Dr. Montague defines "virtue as the permanent potentiality 
of happiness.n97 · The possession of rational and spiritual values ' (i.e., 
virtues) adds a new dimension to the life of that being and this new 
dimension makes the life of reason and spirit infinitely more happy than 
the life of mere sense. 98 
Dr. Montague is not one to use such terms as 11dimension11 and "quan-
tity11 lightly. It must be assumed he means by such description to as-
cribe to the realm of value an objective, metaphysical status although 
it is rot discussed in connection with his direct discussion of the 
existent order. 
Reverting to the metaphysical discussion, then, the virtues would 
occupy not only a place in the subsistent realm but also in the exis-
tent. In the latter, presumably they enter into existence with the 
acquisition of the ability to transcend time to the extent that the 
personality chooses and directs its own activity. 
There recurs a previous objection to the general position being 





Montague, WT, 153. 
Ibid., 156-157. 




acc.ount for the lush growth of order, evolution, life, and spiritually 
eniowed fields of force. And if there is no more than this mere 
compossibility the whole subsequent story is one of countless repe-
tit:ions of miraculous occurrences. If all the luxuriant potentialities 
of things to come are created by the interaction of fields of force, 
these creations of potentiality are miracles of no small order. If the 
potentialities, mwever, vague, are present in the primal energy, then 
their presence there is of such significance and import that these 
characteristics are more important than the "stuff" in which they exist; 
hence the philosophy is no longer materialistic, but at least material-
istic-spiritualistic. 
Dr. Montague tries vigorously to keep near the center of the road 
between realism and idealism; his temency is to veer to the side of 
realism while his argllll.ent seems more accurately to place him closer to 
idealism than he cares to admit. 
In his ethics, too, he avoids the division of experience between 
the rational and tre valuable. His analysis of virtue leaves it plain 
that the rational is the valuable; the valuable is the rational. Although 
he does not explicitly say so, the conscience is an integral part of the 
reason. Yet truth, as such, is mt a value; truth is the correspondence 
of a proposition with its proper object. 
7• Theology 
God ••. is a self struggling to inform and. assimilate the 
recalcitrant members of his own organism or the recalcitrant 
thoughts of his own intellect. 99 
99. Montague, BU, 84. 
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Dr. Montague's concept of God is that of "a Cosmic 1 ind containing 
all that is, and consequently not only good but evil and indifferent 
. 11" 100 t hJ.ngs as we • 
God, who is perfect in His will to good, is limited by t hat in 
Himself which is not Himself.lOl Thus he holds to a 11finite God". As 
a personal self He is "limited in power by that totality of possible and 
actual beings which is vrithin Himself yet not Himself11 • 102 Thus the realm 
of the subsistent as well as the existent must be part of the "environ-
ment 11 in which God operates. 
The eternal problem of the relation of God to morality is a problem 
in Dr. lviontague 1s philosophy also. He explicitly says, 11 True morality 
is without sanction. 11103 Such a statement is ambiguous. It may mean 
that the good is so because the nature of the Universe guarantees it; 
Montague seems to mean the good is so in its own right without the notion 
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of future reward or punishment as in traditional religion. It would be 
readily agreed that, psychologically speaking, a deed committed directly 
for the good involved is preferable to one done with the hope of future 
reward. This psychological examination of motivation, however, does not 
remove the sanction or reward involved when the ethically 11 pure 11 act 
is observed objectively in the economy of the totality. Montague's concept 
of an inherent increase in psychic substance for the doing of the good and 
the accompanying penalty of continuing with a lesser 11quantity1 of 
psychic substance in the absence of doing the good is a genuine sanction, 
100. Montague, WT, 122. 
101. Montague, BU, 83, and WT, 123. 
l02. Ibid. 
l03. Hontague, BU, 63. 
albeit more subtle. 
The ."Promethean", i.e., the self -realizing moral personality, is 
t he person guided by the ideal, not the personality motivated by hope 
of reward or the fear of punishment. It appears that the Promethean is 
a moral struggle, but a religion without other forms of worship. The 
question might be repeated, what is a morality religion if the morality 
is without sanction? Or, how does God "struggle" without throwing His 
efforts and His approval behind the good, and by thwarting or attempting 
to thwart the evil? 
In a provocative statement which evidently would apply to both God 
an:i lesser personality, Dr. Montague says, 11The central truth about life 
[J.sJ •• • Piety to the actual is impiety to the ideal.11104 It might be 
suggested that worship of God is less desirable than worship of the non-
existent, subsistent ideal of perfectionJ 
At least one more point requires attention. Finite personalities 
or consciousnesses have developed in the evolutionary processes of energy. 
The divine personality is, however, eternal and infinite.105 In view of · 
the lat ter, is it not inconsistent to describe the primordial energy as 
unconscious? This whole survey tends to show that Dr. Montague claims 
to be more materialistic than the evidence of his thinking warrants and 
it appears that analytic piece-meal logic without any criterion of s y.:noptic 
coherence is at least partially accountable for much of the discrepancy 
an:i difficulty. 
104. :Iviontague, BU, 56. 
105. Ibid., 91. 
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Chapter VII 
THE RELATIVE USE OF RATIONAL AND IDNRATIONAL CO~EPTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF i'fn.:LIAM P. MONI'AGUE 
1. The Rational and Nonrationa.l in Montague 1 s Hethodology 
a. Attempts to Produce Certainty , 
Dr. Montague flatly says that uno knowledge attainable by the human 
mirrl is absolutely certain11 • 1 The method of rationalism is restricted 
in its validity to the domain of commensurable and abstract relations. 
Even so, it must y.i.e.ld precedence to observable and describable events.2 
The method of authoritarianism is validated for those experiences 
known only by other minds; intuitionism is approved for selecting 
primary values; empiricism ( 11the most widely applicable am reliable 
of all the nethods 11 ) for particular facts and relations; pragmatism 
is approved in the realm of human action (contrast with intuitionism, 
supra); ani skepticism is an important check against 11 a priori valid-
ity" am 11transceniental necessityl1.3 
1. Montague, ViT , 49-50. 
2. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 2. 
3. Ibid. 
254 
Dr. Montague 1 s method of producing a philosophy is pre-eminently, 
and by his own insistence, nonrationalistic, both as he conceives it and 
as this investigation has defined rationalistic m.ethodology.4 
The kind of practical probability which results from this feder-
a.ted nethodology, Dr. Montague claims, is adequate to moral and reason-
able action if accompanied by an objective open-mindedness for new 
evideme.5 The arialysis is simple am discerning except that there is 
little amplification on the subject of resolving conflicts between the 
various components, i.e., epistemology, metaphysics, 11kalology11 , and 
theology. When the testimony of conscientious witnesses is at vari-
ance, how does one choose between authoritarianism (with respect to the 
other person) ani empiricism (with respect to one 1s own experience)? 
Since there are only 11two absolute virtues ••. IA:>ve am Enthusiasm11 6 
is truth relative to individuals? Truth is an objective relation, not 
a value relation according to Montague. 7 An "objective relation", 
with respect to particulars,. without a value criterion as inclusive 
as synoptic coherence respecting larger wholes is inadequate. 
Other than the label federation, what is this collection of me-
thods? At least to this investigator, such a federation is (1) intellec-
tualLy, a sincere attempt at inclusiveness am (2) the product of a 
basically utilitarian pragmatism. As a matter of fact the adoption of 
aqy methodology is the product of a judgment to the effect that a given 
metmd w:>rks well, indeed better than any other. Even m::>st rationalism 
4. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 2 and Chapter I. 
5. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 6. 
6. Montague, BU, 58. 
7. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 6. 
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is similarly grounded. Rationalism becomes super-rationalistic (the 
phrase is .t-1ontague 1 s) when it is allied to emotional conviction which 
forces the rationalist to maintain his position in the face of contrary 
data from ot.her sources. This kind of super-rationalism is then based 
on mnrational emotion! Exclusive rationalism is untenable in any case. 
b. Attempts to Produce Insight. 
Since the sources of experience are used as the basis of Dr. 
Montague's method of arriving at a philosophical point of view (acquir-
ing a justifiable probability) those same sources of experience must 
be cited again as the roots of insight into the solution of problem 
situations. 
The most insight that can be produced by Dr. Montague's hypotheses 
is an accurate observational account of the present plus, possibly, the 
physical history through which the present has evolved. It does reveal 
the external 11 factness 11 , but it does not reveal the agency by which or 
the internal -history through which cosmic purposes evolve. In any 
comprehensive · temporalistic and evolutionary philosophy involving any 
indeterminacy for free agents both objective history and agency should 
be included. Unlike Professor Lovejoy, however, Dr. }-1ontague has suf-
ficient confidence in his method to be willing to speculate tentatively 
and hypothetically that the temporalistic system has some likelihood 
of maintaining its integrity both in direction and in character. 
Montague 1s account of imagination as the synthesis of memory and 
instinct is one of the rare hypotheses in this field. 8 
8. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 5. 
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It will be recalled that Dr. Montague proposes a federated philo-
sophical methodology in which authoritarianism, intuitionism, empiri-
cism, pragmatism, and skepticism are all repeatedly referred to as methods 
of obtaining insight from various kinds of experiences. In his evalu-
ation of the constituent parts of the federation Dr. Hontague 1s method 
in this respect is also predominantly nonrationalistic.9 
Epistemologically and metaphysically Montague establishes the 
· validity of knowledge on the apprehension of an objective relation be-
tween data. Establishing the mind as :passive in knmvledge he forgets 
the will is active in the objective environment ~nd never synthesizes 
the two in an adequate concept of the self. 
c. Attempts to Include Probability 
With respect to probability, Dr. lviontague accepts the essentially 
nonrational concept that all human reasoning has only probable validity. 
However, this judgment applies to the relation of thought to object 
rather than to the process of logical and/or mathematical thought. 
Nowhere in his writings is it suggested that the laws of logical thought 
do not have absolute validity nor is any other code of procedure sug-
gested as a substitute method of treating the data of experience. 
From whence come the formal laws of logic? They are sUbsistent 
nexuses in the nature of things. The philosopher proceeds to organize and 
systematize his experiences as if those formal laws of logic were always 
applicable. Yet, he finds repeatedly that things are not as they would 
9. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 2. 
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be if those laws were mechanically applicable;10 so, facts always pre-
. ll 
empt rationalistic JUdgment. There are so many ''recalcitrantu facts 
that every judgment no matter how well it appears documented and justi-
12 
fied is never more than a tentative, i.e., probable, judgment. 
d. Attempts to Escape the Circle of the Given 
The circle of the given (i.e., the data for philosophical system-
atization) is enlarged by constant attention to new experiences. Dr. 
Montague's emphasis upon the importance of philosophical open-minded-
ness pro~ides for that.l3 
The experiences of others, intuitions of values, pragmatic 
utilitarianism in human action, and empirical observation all checked by 
temperate skepticism serve to furnish the mind with new and expanded 
material according to Dr. Montague 's methodology. 1 4 
A more intricate problem respecting the "given" in Dr. Montague's 
philosophy arises in metaphysics rather than methodology. The totality of 
the fairly compossible actual is given as existent. All that is not 
and all that cannot be is given as subsistent. It is apparent that there 
is no genuine novelty in such a system.1 5 · There is only novelty "as 
existent or as subsistent 11 • During the course of evolutionary advance 







There ar~ "gaps" in the scales of biological evolution; there are 
stubborn and tragic pains and sufferings; there are errors of class-
ification and definition from which the logical laws do not protect 
one; proved principles serve as true in one realm and not in others 
(e.g., the second law of thermodynamics), etc. 




Cf. Chapter VI, Section 3. 
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(and vice versa). In order for such a system to maintain its identity 
in history, the later emergents must be postulated as present potentially 
in the prior state. The thorough-going way in which this potentiality 
is attributed to prior states is exemplified in what Dr. lYiontague calls 
his llpanpsychist postulate": 11 If sentience is based on matter it cannot 
be based merely upon some special distribution of its particles. nl6 
The realms of existence and subsistence are mediated by that per-
sonal spirit (God) working (struggling Nith love and with intellect) 
to select and arrange the best, most compossible order.17 It remains a 
puzzle why some such concept was not extended to finite human person-
alities so a synoptic and dynamic theory of selves would have been pro-
duced. 
If existences and subsistences as well as all their subsequent 
variations be conceived as given, the combinations of these items may 
well be infinite. If, in themselves, they are not infinite in number 
·when confronted by an infinite will the product can be nothing but. in-
finite. 
How can an infinite be conceived as given? The given is a limit; 
the infinite is unlimited. The two terms are antithetical. It is 
reckless use of language to speak that way (or to hold the opposite 
view that the totality, even if infinite, cannot be treated as given). 
At this point Dr. Montague's rationalism (i.e. his persistent belief that 
all objects of thought and being must have been eternally present which 
16. Montague, BU, 76. 
17. Cf. Chapter VI, Sections 3 and 7. 
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is one f orm of saying that thought can never create any of its objects) 
got ahead of and beyond meaningfulness. 
e. Attempts to Systematize the Focus of Attention 
Dr. l-font.ague commends including all the variety of experience in 
attaining philosophic judgment. Attention is to be guided by inclusive-
ness and also by tentativeness. The habit of open-m.ind.edness is pri-
marily mnrational in character. The attitude of inclusiveness may be 
either rational or nonration~ postulation of universality and necessity 
would be the rational teniency; the inclusion of novel and negative in-
stances in consideration inserts a nonrational element in every deliber-
ation. Negative instances are largely empirical. Dr. Montague asserts 
the Jriority of the empirical method and repeatedly stresses the dominant 
role of the material order ·in forcing objects upon the selective atten-
tion of the individua1.18 It may be summarized that Dr. Montague depenis 
primarily upon nonrational factors to direct attention in the philosophic 
enterprise. 
f. Attempts to Preserve the Unique Qualities of holes 
Dr. 'iontague is predisposed to analysis as a philosophic method. 
As is typical of analytic procedure, Dr. Montague finis distinctive 
organizational units or wholes, but they are :postulated, not developed 
(nor developing), deduced, or integrated; he has produced a kind of 
elementism of energy forms to which he attributes potentiality of all 
18. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 4• 
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the variety of existence.19 
Early in his career Dr. Montague conceived himself to be a meta-
physical realist. Even when later he discovered that his material 
elements of metaphysical reality have the characteristics of conscious-
ness, he does not review and revise his earlier conception. 
The potentiality of being is the sentience of being, and ••• 
as potentiality is ubiquitous and omnipresent so therefore 
is consciousness.20 
The persistent analytic :roode of thought, with synopsis functioning 
only in the field of methodology, has resulted in separate 11wholes 11 in 
the various fields of philosophy without coherence, interrelationship, 
. . t 21 or organ~c cons~s ency. 
2. The Rational and Nonrational in lflOntague 1s lv1etaphysics 
a. The primary ideal of rationalistic philosophy is the internal rela-
tion of a continuous (temporal) and complete (inclusive) consistency. 22 
By the concept of the realm of subsistence, by the doctrine of 
compossibility, and by the inclusion of a cosmic will struggling to achieve 
that compossibility, Dr. Montague embraces final consistency as the ideal. 
But, :oonrationalistically, he admits that empirical evidence does :oot 
show that the realm of existence does exemplify that ideal. 23 
19. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 3. 
20. 1'-':JOntague, BU, $2. 
21. Cf. Chapter VI. 
22. These topic headings were developed and discussed in Chapter I and 
Chapter II in defining the characteristics of rational and nonrational 
philosophy. Discussion of derivation is not repeated in this chapter. 
23. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 4. 
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He contends there is a sufficient outline available to make a general 
tendemy cognizable, although all the concrete items of fact do rot 
coincide with the outline. 24 Two points at which he does rot appear 
to be sufficiently empirical are: (1) recognition of the discontinuity 
of conceived and perceived space and (2) the experiential unity of the 
self. 
b. Ra~ionalistic philosophy factors its material analytically, empha-
sizing quantitative relations. 
In the preceding section of this chapter it was remarked that Dr. 
Montague preferred the use of analysis and that this method resulted 
in a kind of elementism favoring material and quantitative relations. 
That this is the typical product of rationa.list'ic method, Dr. Montague 
hjmself states: 
The method of rationalism is applicable • • • to bodies of 
particular facts in so far as commensurable relations hold 
between them. In other words, deductive reasoning is of use 
in applied mathematics and in all concrete sciences to the 
extent that the material under investigation is susceptible 
of quantitative treatment.25 
The sense of analytic discreteness is co~tributed to by Montague 1 s prac-
tice of collecting his published articles into a book without, apparently, 
revising them in relation to each other. 
24. Cf. note 10, above. The most persistent 11gap11 is where object A 
in the physical world has different characteristics than the iden-
tical object in knowledge. 
25. Montague, WT, 47. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 2. 
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c. Rationalistic philosophy reasons from acknowledged authority.
26 
The ackno>iledged authority in Dr. Montague's philosophy is ex-
perience as a whole. The various sources of experience have been cited 
several times; the rationalistic is but one of five. 27 The authority 
is, then, preponierantly nonrational. Dr. Montague proceeds rational-
istically with the treatment of material--as if it were self-evident 
that the procedures of formal logic, consistency, etc., were valid 
without need of justification. 
Empirical philosophy has usually come to this impasse. Obser-
vation and verification do pre-empt rationalistic judgment in both 
science and scientific philosophy. To the philosopher, however, 
such a procedure remains a frustrating experience not unlike the con-
scientious Communist party-worker who finds he has to amend or retract 
principles dear to him on the dictate of the Politburo. The observa-
tion and organization of the empirical is in itself a tremendous task, 
but there lies beyond it attempts such as this investigation to "re-
tool11 in order to understand the dynamic within the empirical order it-
self. This Montague does not do satisfactorily. 
d. Rationalistic philosophy systematizes that which is present and 
known. 
Dr. Montague not only systematizes what is known, but attempts to 
26. Since Montague identifies truth with objective relations, a ration-
alistic treatment in his sense would reason from 11 facts 11 as the 
"authority". Cf. Chapter VI, Section 3 • 
. 27. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 2. 
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draw into the system not only what is knowable but even what cannot be 
known. 28 This super-rationalism is inappropriate to his general method-
ology and unnecessary to the remainder of his system. It may however be 
accounted for by the circ\.Unstances of his excursion into and his sub-
sequent encounters with neo-realism, especially the discussion about 
neutral entities. Nevertheless, Dr. Montague concltmes that the evidence 
indicates the presence not only of nonrational characteristics but even 
irrational factors in the existent order. 29 
e. A rationalistic philosophy is characterized by precise units of 
logical and grammatical construction. 
vfuile one does not find Dr. Montague particularly concerned with 
inadequacies or distortions of language, still he studiously avoids 
attempting to over-extend the preciseness of logical and grammatical 
statement. That he can be both mathematical and precise is well demon-
strated in his articles on mathematics, but he has stated his principle 
that rationalistic reasoning does not suit many kinds of data and that 
logical and mathematical reasonings are not existential disciplines; 
so, to his credit, he does not attempt the unsuitable.3° 
f. Rationalistic philosophy describes a status quo situation. 
In good rationalistic fa.shion, Dr. Montague attempts to define a 
totality of things, comprised of existent and subsistent things, which 
28. Cf'. Chapter VI, Section 3· 
29. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 2. 
30. Ibid. 
264 
would, if successful, be static at least as far as quantity is con-
cerned • .31 It is not believed that his attempt was successful. As 
regards either the realm of the subsistent or the realm of the existent, 
both of which are changing in the course of time, there is no static 
situation either quantitatively or qualitatively and primarily non-
rational methods are called upon to understand situations which have 
definitely nonrational constituents. 
g. Rationalistic philosophy does not express the unique properties of 
wholes nor the truth of developing experience in process. 
More than in rost respects, .Dr. :tvrontague is rationalistic in his 
depen:ience upon analysis almost exclusively as the instrument of the 
understaniing.32 One example of this point of view is the lack of a 
wholistic concept of personality. The individuality of energy forms or 
of spiritual forms is destroyed by the process of analysis. The active, 
valuing, conscious fonns (being unanalyzable) are all carried back through 
the analysis of being as potentialities of the atomistic energy pro-
cesses • .33 
h. The rationalist introduces a pattern of necessity into the interpre-
tation of events. 
There is a fundamental and apparently irrational indetermi~cy in 
all existents in Dr. Jvlontague 1s philosophy. The fundamental elements 
are energy processes ani these are conceived to have some indeterminacy 
.31. Cf . Chapter VI, Section .3 • 
.32. Cf . Section 1, b, above • 
.33. Cf . Chapter VI, Section .3. 
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of action. This indeterminacy is progressively broadened as potential 
self-determination replaces spatial determination.34 
i. Rationalistic primiples tern to mental conservatism with respect 
to reflective selection, verification, and systematization. 
As has been said repeatedly, Dr. r-iontague relies to such an extent 
upon nonrational, all-inclusive, sources of data that the pretensions 
of rationalism to exclusive consideration are rejected.35 With respect 
to selection am verification of data, Dr. Nontague is primarily non-
rationalistic. With respect to systematization, he is primarily ration-
alistic. 
j. The similarity of the realm of objects and the realm of ideas is 
a presupposition of rationalism. 
Correspondence of ideas and objects is not rationalistically 
postulated by Montague. The very possibility of the similarity is 
provided for empirically in the account that sensations are but mind's 
distinctive view of energy processes taking part in nature.36 Having 
provided thus for the mind to receive valid and objective data from 
the space-t:iJne order, Dr. Hontague carries the proposition too far in 
his view of the mind as passive in knowledge. In at least two large 
spheres of human concern the knowledge relations are constitutive and 
the object does not exist apart from that relation. Those two spheres 
are the consciousness of self and of value. While Dr. Hontague does 
34. Cf. Chapter VI, Sections 3 and 5. 
35. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 2. 
36. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 5. 
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not treat the first of t hese, he comes very near to admitting the second.37 
k. Rationalism deperrls upon a system of a priori truths. 
Dr. Montague's philosophy does not develop from nor argue for a 
priori principles. The formal laws of logic are applicable to a po.int but 
empirical facts take precedence. The concept of subsistents might be 
presumed to be of a priori validity but it seems evident they are the pro-
duct of the conviction that things are not dependent for their being on 
the knowledge relation.38 The self-evidence of this proposition has been 
challenged repeatedly throughout this exposition. 
1. Rationalism cannot produce insight in problem situations without 
appealing beyond itself to empirical data. 
Dr. Montague does not depend upon a unique rationalistic process 
for insight in problem situati9ns; his theory of insight is a hypothesis 
regarding the conjunction of instinct and merrory .39 On the basic point 
of the definition of human motivation, he is peculiarly silent. \fuile 
he says, 11Fiety to the actual is impiety to the ideal11 , 40 he does not 
say how he conceives man to become acquainted vrith an ideal. On the 
point of source of data, he is definite that the data are produced by 
a federated method in which nonrational elements predominate.41 
To attempt to describe how sentience, consciousness, and person-






Montague, BU, 29. 
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present", 42 although he usually claims to be a metaphysical material-
ist. 43 Would he also say the.t the ideal (which is but the compossible 
part of the subsistent and existent without any describable agency)44 
is also somehow omnipresent? This muld be a lame answer, but quite in 
keeping with the manner in which other similar questions have been 
handled. 
m. Rationalistic ethics is characteristically a rigid impersonalistic 
system subject to the twin dangers of legalism and dogmatism. 
In treating of the dynamics of the ethical situation in exper-
ience Dr. f.iontague warns against these very dangers. 
In treating the metaphysics of values he is quite arbitr~J• His 
attempt to equate ethics with volume of the ego is an unhappy, mechan-
istic, and over-complex effort. It is an effort to apply a metaphysics 
to ethics without reference to value data. And, the conviction behind 
the sanctionless morality does not do away with the sanction still 
operating in his own theory. 45 Herein is an attempt to deal demon-
stratively with a kind of data which requires a more dynamic principle 
of description, explanation and systematization. 
n. Rationalistic psychology tends to introduce (a) separation of mind 
and body and (b) a rigid faculty psychology. 
42. !Vl.ontague, BU, B2. 
43. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 3, and contrast Section 7. 
44. The articles on theology and Belief Unbound present a different idea 
with an 11Absolute11 consciousness-an idea not referred to or in-
tegrated with his writings on ontology and metaphysics in general. 
Cf. Chapter VI, Sections 3 and 7. 
45. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 7. 
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One of the central attempts in Dr. Montague 1s philosophy (to demon-
strate that consciousness may be a fonn of energy, that mind and body 
are but two aspects of energy in the natural order) is a formalistic 
attempt to establish an equation between factors whose definitions have 
invalidated the equation. Unable to approach the problem synoptically 
with a reconciling synthesis he reverts to an ill-fated attempt at re-
duction of mind to energy. 46 Even so, there remains the separation of 
''knowledge" and 11will 11 functions of the self which are quite isolated 
from each other in his neglect of the 11will 11 function. 
o. Rationalism tends to develop an all-inclusive formula which is over-
extended, i.e., an unverified hypothesis treated as proved, at the 
expense of the content of experience. 
In this respect, Dr. Iviontague is a rationalist. In his attempt to 
organize a systematic philosophy applicable to all the divisions of 
that science, he has tried to develop and to demonstrate his "Formula" 
repeatedly. This investigation has attempted to point out that the 
system is more adequate as dealing with physical nature than it is in 
dealing with the problems of self-consciousness and of valu_e. There is 
also serious question whether the system as a method provides sufficiently 
for arriving at objective, interpersonal truth or whether it must rest 
content with thst view of truth which is relative to the standpoint of 
each investigator. 
46. Cf. Chapter VI, Section 5. 
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Chapter VIII 
THE PHlLOSOPHY OF RADOSLAV ANDREA TSAIDFF 
1. Bj.ographieal Data 
Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff was born in Sofia, Bulgaria, January 3, 
188?, and has been in the United States since 1903. He is a graduate 
of Oberlin College, 1906, and has a Ph. D. degree from Cornell University 
in 1910. The title of his dissertation was, Schopenhauer's Criticism 
of Kant 1 s Theory of Experience. He was instructor in philosophy at 
Clark University, 1912-1914. Since 1914 he has been at Rice Institute 
in Houston, Texas, and has been head of the Philosophy Department since 
1924. 
Dr. Tsanoff has served as visiting professor at Boston University 
in 1926, the University of Southern California in 1928 and 1929, and the 
University of T8xas -in 1925, 192?, 1930, 1935, 1936, and 1941. He was 
president of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Asso-
ciation in 1941. 1 
1. Runes, WWP, 268. 
2?0 
2. Methodology 
a. The Task of Philosophy 
Tsanoff quotes Aristotle approvingly: "All men by nature desire · 
to know. 112 
The philosopher endeavors to achieve an intellect~ version 
of Reality ••• insists on an intellectual approach. 
The primary determiners of the characteristics of the various 
philosophies are (1) some which express the rational-scientific ideal,4 
(2) some which are social manifestations,5 am (3) some which express the 
personality and temperament of the philosopher.6 "The greatest philo-
sophic genius is characterized by an ideal balance of these factors. 11 7 
The balance referred to above is a balanced inclusiveness. Dr. 
Tsanoff recites the characteristics of the broad schools of ethics and 
remarks against mst of them their partial and uninclusive position. 
fformalism 1sJmain defect is one which, as we shall observe, 
is shared by other ethical doctrines. It is the tendency to 
select some notably important element of value in hmnan life, 
and then to judge th~ moral ltDrth ·of conduct solely in terms 
of that one element. 
The hedonist errs in concentrating on emotional tone; he 
neglects the other aspects of our activity. He does not take 
into account the whole of experience in which the feeling of 
pleasure is only one factor. 9 
The examination of formalism, hedonism, and evolutionary 
ethics has exposed a common defect ••• Each of them tends to 
2. Tsanoff, WG, 276. 
3. Ibid., 277. 
4. Ibid.' 277. 
5. Ibid.' 278. 
6. Ibid.' 219 
7. Ibid.' 280. 
8. Tsanoff, ETH, 67. 
9. Ibid.' 82. 
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• 
select some one aspect of human conduct, to concentrate on 
it as the sole or prime essential of moral value, and to use 
it as criterion for the ethical evaluation of the rest of our 
life.lO . 
In distinction from this concentration on partial aspects, Dr. 
Tsanoff urges emphasizing "wholeness" or inclusiveness which he calls 
an "integral view". 
Genuine and adequate moral judgment must respect and must 
exprell our character and activity in its all-round whole-
ness. 
Always by this refereroe to the whole ofmm's caree~·· 
each specific action is to be probed and appraised • 
Every science, every reliable organization of factual know-
ledge rnakei its contribution to the available ultimate 
synthesis. 3 
The unique quality of the integral synthesis is recognized in such pas-
sages as this: 
Why should not also King Lear be similarly reducible and 
explicable by refere.nce to its elements? But this proposal 
would ignore the qualities of meaning and value, which, along 
with the incredible complexity of dramatic invention, express 
the creative character of the masterpiece.l4 
"Creative character" and 11 integral views 11 require inclusive, critical 
methods of thought. Note the criticism of substance, based on the cri-
terion of analysis: 
The substantialist bias of so much modern thinking is due 
to the deman:ls for a solid stati: basis of all change, and this 
in turn is owing to the habitual analytic tendency of thought.l5 
10. Tsanoff, ETH, 103. 13. Tsanoff, WG, 283. 
11. Ibid., 106. 14. Ibid., 287. 
12. Ibid.' 107. 15. Tsanoff, POI, .352. 
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b. The Stages of Thought 
On the stages of thought, Tsanoff notes that Ribot lists (1) 
observation, (2) conjecture, and (3) verification.l6 Graham Wallas 
lists (1) preparation, (2) incUbation, (3) illumination, and (4) veri-
ficati.on. (It "Will be noted that by comparison with the group of stages 
used in this inquiry--insight, verification, and relation-both Ribot 
and "W'allas include prefatory observation or preparation which is not 
included herein. This preparation is essential; the constant demand for 
inclusiveness has emphasized it, but it was not separated out as a 
distinct stage. The "systematizing" stage of relation is not mentioned 
in the Ribot and Wallas lists and appears to be a serious oversight.) 
Tsanoff says: 
The stages of creative activity in scientific process are 
clearly Ribot's second, conjecture, or Wallas 1 second and 
third, incUbation and illumination.17 
The last process ••• critical rev1s1on ••• may require the 
highest competence,_ but it is mainly expert technique, the 
prose of science.lts 
Tsanoff refers to the ideal process of thought which he describes 
and the product of that process as 11 integralu. In his sense of the term 
it appears that integral comprehends both insight and systematizing as 
an organic unit in the stages of thought (as either process or product) 
16. Discussing mechanical invention, 11Ribot traces four sufficiently 
clear phases or stages: the genn, incubation, flowering and 
completion. The similarity of these to the stages of scientific 
invention in the fonnation and proof of hypotheses will be seen 
directly." (Tsanoff, ~~n, 211.) 
17. Tsanoff, WG, 193. 
18. Ibid. 
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rather than disti.mt stages as have been used in this dissertation. Such 
an emphasis is a healthy inclusion to demonstrate the genuine creative 
synthesis involved in systematizing, but it is not adequate in itself 
·because there is no inherent dynamic within it to drive one on to re-
lating and synthesizing diverse subject material. 
In one case Tsanoff analyzes the process of scientific thought 
fairly much in detail in which six factors or stages can be found: 
The mind confronted with a problem /J.J has no convincing 
analysis or explanation, or finds the traditional 
account inadequate. Wandering along the periphery [j.J 
is an indecisive entertainment of alternatives. In the 
process of intense probing, /5Jthe depths of the mind 1 s 
experience may be stirred, below and beyond the reach of 
clear attention. Even as deliberate reason is essaying 
one explanation after another, [4J subconsciously a ten-
dency toward some focus or other is developing. The 
progress of the latter may or may not be retarded by the 
conscious preoccupation of the mind. If it is so retarded, [5J the relaxing of conscious effort, in rest or sleep 
or in doing something else, may be the very opportunity 
to bring the other idea with a rush ani a flash into full 
possession of the center of attention ••• Once luminously 
clear about the central ·idea, ••• L6_7the decisive radius 
that has reached the center fans out again, fans out in many 
radii.l9 
This is an interesting and possible hypothesis concerning the 
involvement of the whole mind reaching toward an integration of the 
conscious and the subconscious. 
Further discussion of "integralness 11 is postponed to the section 
on "Relation", below. 
(1) Tsanoff on Insight as a Stage of Thought 
The \ia.ys of Genius is devoted largely to an investigation of the 
19. Tsanoff, WG, 200-201. 
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nature of insight in the arts and sciences. He finds that the conditions 
of insight are similar in the several branches of knowledge which he 
investigates (poetry, drama, law, science, and religion). 
Speaking generally of creative activity in the fine arts, Tsanoff 
notes two marks of truly creative work: (1) "a real artist expands his 
range of free expression,u20 and (2) 11 a masterly work of art must be true 
to life, a living expression.n21 
\-.iith reference to poetry he says: 
The poet does not cogitate correctly along some one radius 
of evidence and inference, but a true insight possesses his 
full circle of experience as he moves to the center. 22 







/J.JA mind of creative genius is a mini richly stored 
with a treasure of memories and ideas easily evoked in 
varied contexts, each moment ready to enhance the lively 
response to direct impression by original a:rrl fertile 
associati.on.23 
/J.JThe sponsors of emotion as the wellspring of poetry 
would trace each poem to some genuine fe~4,.ing. It takes 
passion to achieve passionate utterance. 4 
Dflalking by oneself seems to be a conuoon stimulus to 
the imagination. Is it because it realeases the bodily 
energies easily and rhythmically, opens the mind to the 
fresh, moving impressions of nature, or allows it to s~­
render itself to the mood or meditation of the moment. 5 
L4JThe creative activity, if predominantly intellectual, 
demands a sober head ••• But many poets and other artists 







have re~~ed on stimulants to stir and to release lyrical 
fervor. 
The stage of insight in .dramatic invention is described in alter-
native sources: 
The germinal idea, as in Sardou 1 s example, may present itself 
in the form of a problem. Or it may come to the mind from 
considering a certain trait of character and imagining its 
dramatic development. 27 
A vague creative urge moves some of2~hem, the strong in-clination to compose, to produce ••• 
A numb~r ~f dramatists have remarked the stimulating effect 
of musl.e. 9 
Goethe declares: 11 The more incommensurable am inconceivable 
a poetic production is to the intellect, so much the better.n30 
Regarding scientific invention, Tsanoff reports: 
When Newton was asked how he attained his law of gravitation, 
he replied: 11By always thinking of it. u3l 
The mathematician Gauss had tried to prove a theorem for 
four years, in vain. 11At last two days ago I succeeded, not 
by dint of painful effort, but so to speak by the grace of 
God .... 11 There is a sudden leap and flash of genius.32 
The general precept for a mind of the requisite ability would 
seem to be: After trying to the utmost, stop trying, and it 
will do itself. It is more likel:y to come to minds that do 
not relax or expect it too soon. 3J 
Conditions favoring successful incubation: concentrated 
interest... a large stock of well-organized pertinent infor-
mation ••• a sense of well-being, self-confidence, and fruit-
26. Tsanoff, WG. 
27. Ibid." 143. 
28. Ibid." 144. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid., 145, from Eckerman, Gesprache mit Goethe, ed. Bartels, Vol. 
II, 324-325. 
31. Ibid., 192. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid., 196. 
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ful cooperation ••• and freedom from interruption.34 
Tsaooff finis the judicial process quite s:imil.ar to the pro-
cess of problem--solving in other areas. Lllthough Tsanoff mentioned 
solving problems (cf. above) he usually uses the term insight and 
stresses the creative act or thrust of the :imagination, a subtle dis-
tinction in terminology, but one having the effect of stressing the 
imaginative e.zrl creative elements rather than the routine mechanics 
sometimes associated with problem-solving._? 
We may recall Pasteur 1s reflection that the great original 
ideas in science come only to competent minds that are 
prepared by long study and research. So in the field of 
judicial decision, legal insight is required as well as 
normal reasonableness and personal integrity ••• : creative 
intelligence ••• integral estimate.35 
It is notable that while there is recognition of external factors 
which appear to accompaey insight (e.g., walking, music, etc.) and while 
there is at least a hypothetical description of the role of the sub-
conscious in insight; nevertheless, the unique nature of the imaginative 
synthesis is never diluted. This is the sense in which he uses the word 
"intuition11 • And, as he says, this is the traditional meaning of the 
term.36 
In .his Ethics, Tsanoff refers to insight as the value relating 
the intellectual to the rel:kious. 
Perhaps these two high values, understazrling and beauty, 
may be expressed more truly, in a way that expresses their 
mutual relation, as insight and vision. These words, 
34. Tsanoff, WG, 197. 
35. Ibid., 221-222. 
36. Ibid., 199. 
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insight and vis ion, may serve also to relate the intellect-
ual and aesthetic values to the religious.37 
This concept is not elaborated further in that discussion by Dr. 
Tsanoff, but in the Ways of Genius the role of imaginative intuition is 
even expanded to occupy the central role and the nonrational qualities 
are enhanced: 
The seer follows his imagination, not because his reason 
concludes that his convictions are not true, but because 
he finds the speech of reason incapable of expressing the 
truths fully. "The heart has its reasons which reason 
.does not know at all," said Pascal.38 
There is one point (and only one reference to it was found) at 
which Tsanoff seemed to suggest a pragmatic will-to-believe theory of 
insight. In the Problem of Immortality. he says~ 
Nothing in the whole discussion of the problem of imloor-
tality is more significant than the modern ma.n 1s insistence 
on pressing certain demands regarding his destiny despite 
their apparent incompatibility with a b~V of scientific 
conclusions which he does not question. 
(2) Tsanoff on Verification as a Stage of Thought 
Dr. Tsanoff adopts the stage of verification as one of the 
essential parts of the process of deliberation. In so doing he follows 
the cited examples of Ribot and Wallas. 4° 
Verification is sometimes interpreted solely as the process of 
empirical verification, i.e., testing of an hypothesis by direct appeal 
37. Tsanoff, ETH, 121. 
38. Tsanoff, WG, 250. 
39. Tsanoff, POI, 4. 
40. Tsanoff, WG, 193. Cf. Above. 
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to observational data. A broader concept of verification is used in this 
dissertation to include all the JJBans, both empirical and I:ogical, by 
which a particular hypothesis is criticized before being considered 
verified.41 
Dr. Tsanoff readily admits the role of empirical verification, 
particularly in the realm of science: 
For the scientist, ideas are always intended versions of 
facts, and to nature they" ut go, to be sustained or upset 
by the available evidence. 
A supplementary, elementary criterion of the true is expressed 
this way: 
One wey of appraising a system of philosophy is, whether in 
its view of the world it can include itself a.rrl account for 
it~elr.43 
From this standpoint he goes on to point out that materialism is unable to 
account for itself, while :idealism advocates "solutions 'Which rule out 
their problem". 44 
One indication that extra-logical verification is sometimes 
excusable is reflected in this passage: 
Seers and saints are in intention philosophers; they would 
reach the depth and heart of reality. But the logical 
approach to reality does not satisfy them. They declare: 
11Spiritual things must be spiritually understood.n45 
41. Cf. Chapter I. 
42. Tsanoff, WG, 191. 
43. Ibid., 282. 
44. Ibid. Cf. Section on Metaphysics below. 
45. Ibid., 250. 
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Tsanoff draws a connection between empirical verif ication and a 
pragmatic criterion by quoting Pasteur: 
True theories ••• are the expression of actual facts, and 
are characterized by being able to predict new facts, a 
natural consequence of those already kno'Wll. In a word, 
the characteristic of a true theory is its fruitfulness. 46 
Still a fifth qualification of logical verification is Tsanoff 1s 
concept of relativity: 
All truths and principles, all values, are characterized 
by relativity ••• the relativity of deepening insight, expand-
ing outlook, developing mastery.47 
Such a relativity is in Tsanoff 1s use more radical than Hegel's which 
also said that there was truth in the partial but it was not the whole 
truth · . There is in Tsanoff no Absolute or whole truth except an ab-
solute relativity ofspiritual process in the universe. Except to say 
the spiritual is a higher level and that it has roots in the physical, 
Tsanoff pays scant · attention to the inter-relation of the mental and 
physical aspects of the universe. In such a conceived cosmos, an ex-
panding field of values and expanding fields of p:lrsonal responsibility 
are primary constituents. There is in Tsanoff 1s radical relativity a 
reminier of James' radical empiricism; it is a universe of gen\time 
creative novelty and of genuine expansion of meaning. There is nothi.ng 
here to indicate that there are not guiding principles and/or forces 
within the expansion process, but they have not predetermined much of 
the product in any precise degree. 
46. Tsanoff, WG, 210. 
47. Tsanoff, ETH, 43-44. Cf. WQ, 2S3. 
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The close relation of verification and systematizing is noted in 
a pointedly clear statement: 
A true judgment differs from error or illusion in its 
superior logical value; it has the virtue of coherence 
with the system of judgments into which it is introduced; 
the merit of being better, more adequate, more satisfact-
ory than any other judgment which presented itself for 48 
acceptance or which could be made under the circumstances. 
Methodology has already led into metaphysics but the above remark 
was necessary to show the interrelationship. That remark was also 
needed to understand Tsanoff 1s standpoint with regard to the certainty 
of the conclusions which one reaches. 
A genuinely expanding and creative reality is not precisely 
predictable. Empirical prediction is not always accurate. 
The title of this concluding section in our inquiry, 
11Creative Reality", has an unmistakably metaphysical 
ring, but, it makes no pretensions to abstract conclu-
siveness.49 
(3) Tsanoff on Relation as a Stage of Thought 
Tsanoff does mt i.mlude relation or systematization as a stage 
of thought, ror does either Ribot or Wallas from whom he draws his list. 50 
This is not to say that he does not believe in system for he most cer-
tainly does. 
All scientists are, in the course of their rese~ches, 
accumulators. But the great creative minds proceed through 
and beyond the accumulation of particular facts to the 
48. Tsanoff, POI, 334. 
49. Tsanoff, WG, 284. 
50. Ibid.' 285. 
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theoretic contemplation of universal principles, beyond the 
traditional explanation of part of the evidence to the inter-
pretation of the whole.51 
The mark that distinguishes Tsanoff in his concept of system-making 
is his emphasis upon the creative synthesis involved which is not only 
identical in kini with the process described as insight, but is probably 
also identical with and inherent in insight. In other words, the in-
sight in problem areas is expected not only to serve as an instrument 
for the res-olution of the particular problem involved, but alsE:> is 
expected to serve as an instrument of systematizing of thought. The con-
sistent ma.rk of genius is the ability of a mind to create ideas which 
serve constructively in both functions. Such postulates of minds are 
ca.ll.ed "integral views". 
Genius is animating and productive intelligence.52 
Genius is philosophical in that, irrespective of the special 
field in which it may be active, it fans out to embrace a 
whole new horizon.53 
The creative mind of genius man±fests a heightening of the 
normal processes of intelligence to such a degree that it 
reveals and expresses depths and summits of experience 
amazingly beyond our usual reach. It is the consummation of 
all that the hll@an spirit is neant to be. In creative 
activity the mind reveals and surpasses itself. But, this 
supreme achievement has its hazards, 5~ich have proved often very grave and sometimes disastrous. 
Mind is essentially integral, and the more thoroughly or 
consummately it manifests its power, in creative activity, 
the more clearly is its true ~haracter of genius revealed 
in a variety of perspectives. 5 
51. Tsanoff, WG, 192. 
52. Ibid., 7. 
53. Ibid., 8. 
54• Ibid., 38. Cf. Note at end of Section (2) above. 
55. Ibid., 190. 
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Personality here Lin moral decision_lachieves itself in-
tegrally, in unique expression ••• An imaginatively cogtem-
plated expression of the self is actually espoused. 5 
As these foregoing comments address themselves to the integral person, 
so Dr. Tsanoff speaks of the integral view: 
The more integral view L.Combining natural ani moral sciences_7 
is bo~h the more intelligent and the morally significant 
view. 7 
Wherever genius may start, it probes below the particular, 
below the crust, to the heart of the matter, and then expands 
in universal-~~egral outlook to new and original conception 
and utterame. 
The philosophic urge of the mind is in its integral quality 
of genius, when it evokes its own problem of ultimate 
contemplation. 59 
The metaphysical dualism between the value realm and the physical 
realm (see Section 3, this chapter, below) accompanies a divided system 
of knowledge: The values we demand, work out, create over against the 
description of physical phenomena we passively reflect.6° Against Dr. 
Tsanoff 1 s presentation it can be argued with real justice that an 
11 integral" view which reconciles the systems of knowledge (on his tenns) 
is a definite difficulty. 
Yet he does not see this difficulty becaus~ quite the contrary 
of what has just been .criticized, he says: 
In this sense personality is :inieed monadic, a miniature 
universe ••• Personality is not to be dissolved and preserved 
56. T~anoff, WG, 236 (order of sentences reversed). 
57. Ibid., 3?9. 
58. Ibid.' 249. 
59. Ibid., 2?9. 
60. Cf. POI, 4, cited above. 
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fragmentar ily; i t ever advances full-front.61 
c. View of Mirrl and Reason 
Tsanoff defirns mini thus: 
Mind is mt only a systematic organic process but also the 
awareness of it, self-consciousness. Thinking man is pre-
eminently capabl~2of self-expressive and self-representa-tional activity. 
It is evident from such a statement that mind is not here conceived 
as an abstract capacity for (nor capacity for abstract) thought. It i n-
eludes other than rationalistic processes. Elsewhere, Dr. Tsanoff says: 
The process of deliberation is a conscious engagement of 
our whole being, with all sid~s of our personality being 
brought to bear on the issue. 3 · 
Nevertheless a wholi stic concept of mind and of reason is not 
consistently advocated by Dr. Tsanoff. In an early article the tension 
is obvious: 
Any attempt to state the feeling and will-phases of reality 
in terms of narrowly logical cognition is almost certain to 
result in a too abstract metaphysics.b4 
Contrast the following: 
What he /jhe ideal;i.stJdemands is the recognition of the 
standpoint of rational intelligibility
6
and organic unity as 
the criteria of philosophical reality. 5 
61. POI, 371, order reversed. 
62. Tsanoff, ETH, 341. 
63. Ibid., 29-30. 
64. Tsanoff, Art. (1910 )1 , 634. 
65. Ibid., 638. 
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Speaking of himself as an idealist in th~ case, Dr. Tsanoff commits him-
self to the dilemma of either a too abstract metaphysics or of a philoso-
phy which leaves out of account the feeling and will phases of reality. 
Dr. Tsanoff does not take notice of this tension which persists 
into his current writing. In his Ethics, he says: 
We cannot be more explicit than our subject matter permits; 66 
otherwise we may pay too dearly for our abstract precision.67 
In another place: 
v e trim and adjust our data to fit them into available con-
ceptual frames, or we refashion our frames, or el~S by chance 
or logic are led to some entirely new hypothesis. 
Abstract precision seems to go with trimmed and adjusted data, but 
one is restless with a philosophy with such a high valuation of the for-
mal content. The reconciliation of the demarrl for formal, thorough, 
rationalistic systematization and the demand for respect for data which 
apparently do mt fit is never accomplished nor consciously attempted. 
Tsanoff confronts material with the demand for rationality and 
systematization. ihile his is a justifiable methodology it can not 
guarantee that the process will reveal a rationalistic and systematic 
body of koowledge. The diversity of natural history and human experi-
ences seem to require that any philosopher entertain the live possibil-
ity that his methodology ani his goal will be only partially consummated. 
Dr. Tsanoff gives no evidence of earnestly confronting this problem. 
66. Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth., I, 4. 
67. Tsanoff, ETH, 25. 
68. Tsanoff, Art. (1940), 29. 
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It has been remarked above that "deliberation is a conscious en-
gagement of our whole being11 which would indicate that mind and its 
function are broadly conceived. Within mind, understanding is conceived 
as the integral product of reason and of :imagination. 
Reason is analytic in its grasp; it probes but does not enter; 
perceives but does not possess; it may master its subject, 
but still remains alien. 
6
Ima.gination is penetrative insight, 
a communion and a vision. 9 
One further comment of a general nature is appropriate regarding 
Tsanoff 's concept of language and its use. 
The ideal in scientific, that is knowledge-yielding prose, 
as in mathematics, would be the use of terms formally de-
fined and used with consistency throughout. vJhere evidence 
seems to point more than one way, or where the complexity 
of the problem or the material seems protean, we may seek 
words with a ccrrespond.ing latitude of meaning. Philosophical 
exposition may provide ready illustrations of this quandary 
of intelligence ••• 
The poet uses words to convey not abstract precision but a 
true fertility of meaning, not logical consistency but a 
fitness variously int:imate in continually shifting contexts. 70 
Tsanoff 1s sympathetic recognition of poetry as an expression of 
creative intelligence indicates his disclaimer for depending upon 
"scientific" language representing all the concreteness of experience. 
3. Metaphysics 
Tsanoff, early in his career, ruled out a philosophy of things-in-
themselves and has maintained consistently that experience is the base of 
69. Tsanoff, WG , 253. Cf. POI, 376. 
70. Ibid. J 110. 
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philosophy, a base which cannot be escaped. 
That the reality of philosophy must be intelligible exper-
ience •• • LisJ a fundamental presupposition without whilh 
the theorist of reality cannot make one single step.? 
The formula 1 No object without a subject 1 must stand. 72 
It will be recalled from the previous discussion that while philo-
sophy approaches its task with an attempt to organize its material 
logically and systematically, 73 Tsanoff has recognized that the 11 feel-
ing arrl will phases of reality11 cannot be stated in "terms of narrowly 
logical cognition11 • 74 
Although the distinction is admitted the necessity of including 
both phases is admitted: 
Will and thought are not separate bags in which reality is 
stored ••• r-7ther, 7fe they organic aspects of one and the same exper~ence. 
And, more directly: 
The heart of reality is the intelligible, dynamic, conative, 
aspiring activity '\'ll'd.ch is the 7%rld of experience ,-the 
only -world we know or can know. 7 
So, while recognizing distinctions of quality within experience, he also 
constantly rem.inis his readers of the wholeness of experience and reality. 71 
A further distimtion within experience is that between physical 















Tsanoff, Art. (1920), 75. 
Cf. also Tsanoff, Art. (1941), 111. 
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Dr. Tsanoff is a metaphysical dualist while claiming that intellectual, 
moral, and religious activity comprehends and operates upon the world of 
the physical sciences. 
Dr. McTaggart 1 s selves, conceived in too substantialist 
terms, fail to allow for an adequate recognition of the 
actuality of the :impersonal factors in the world of self-
activity, or for an adequate interpretation of the meta-
physical role and significance of consciousness.78 
Naterial existence is of the widest extensiveness, nature 
as factual mechanical operation. But on a higher level 
nature is manifested and can be int~rpreted as a rational 
system. Our minds may concentrate on the exploration of 
the cosmic mechanism, as in the phys'ical sciences, but 
mind must not forget itself ••• It does recognize both 
mental and material processes as we find them in nature, and 
.it also realizes the unique advantage of the mind's recog-
nition of itself as a deepening in§.ight into the full char-
acter and significance of reality. ·t9 
The mental and the material are both qualities of nature 
as we know it in ourselves. 80 
Nature shows herself really complex and various. 81 
Yet contrast the following: 
The hard and fast distinction between brute facts and 
~alues thus.bre~s down, for8~here are no brute facts. ~very fact J.S a JUdged fact. · 
It appears Dr. Tsanoff may not be as much an idealist in the later 
book (Ways of Genius) as the earlier (Problem of Irrnnortality). Yet, if so 
he has come to a more divided dualism, not to mechanical realism. 
There is some justification for saying that the dualism is only 
78. Tsaneff, Art. (192of, 305. 
79. Tsanoff, WG, 271. 
so. Ibid., 272. 
81. Ibid.' 283. 
82. Tsanoff, POI, 334-335. 
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a division in the world of our experience. (Cf. especially the comment 
about reality of philosophy as intelligible experience. Note #71.) How-
ever, in the v·Jays of Genius Tsanoff seems to step outside this whole 
framework to say: 
Mental and material processes are two aspects of ·the 
operation o~ nature ••• Philosophy must take nature as it 
finds it ••• 3 
Dr. Tsanoff 1s dualism is mt absolute, but only slightly re-
stricted. The realm of physical nature is the causal order, f34 but some-
how mind in its evaluative function judges that causal order while being 
rooted in it. ( 11Hind is not apart from the rest of nature but is rooted 
in it. 11 ) 85 \"/hile he protests that this evaluative and judging function 
is as real as any other aspect of the universe and he even says that 
the universe itself is expanding toward harmony and perfectibility 
there is m reference to self-consciousness as applied to this expand-
ing function. Such a state provokes the question: Is the status of 
values a by-product of the causal evolutionary (though apparently un-
conscious) process? From all he has said, it could be. 86 
The implications of this dualism (and the .hint at pluralism) are 
not worked out in detail. Dr. Tsanoff has not addressed himself spe-
cially to metaphysics; he has pointed out only some of the metaphysical 
concomitants of the pattern of ideas his studies have developed. 
83. Tsanoff, WG, 270. Cf. 271: "It does recognize both mental and 
material processes as we find -them in nature." 
84. Tsanoff, WG, 284. 
85. Ibid. 
86. Cf. Section 5 on Theology. 
The most engaging of the comments he makes is that directed to the 
"gradational" character of reality. This was referred to in the previous 
section in discussing his criterion of truth. Its character is brought 
out in these excerpts from The Nature of Evil: 
Truth, for instance, has no sMtus in isolation but is 
always relative to a context. 
Cosmic concourse is a scale of hierarchy of activities. 
Things are not indifferently on a par ••• That there is 
some sort of hierarchy ••• is not a conclusion of valua-
tion but its ~rime presupposition ••• Evil is literally 
degradation. 88 
Not bare identity of structure, nor yet change and bare 
sequence of discretes, but growth, mLfolding and genuine 
enhancement of perfection, active, arduous and inex ... 
haustible, characterize the world process.~9 
Unfortunately the gradations are not rrore specifically defined. This is 
the base upon which the 11ethics of perfectionism" is developed. And it is 
repeated and enlarged in The Ways of Genius: 
Reality here is not a body of facts, but a scale of ideal 
prospects of actuality ••• Unlike the realm of factual 
material existence, the realm of truth and the r ealm of 
justice are inexhaustible-not boundless merely in extent 
or duration, but boundless in prospect, infinitely per-
fectible and significant.90 
The creative mind literally enhances the world of values.91 
Our studies of genius do warrarrt the recognition of a 
creative charac~~r in mental activity, especially at its 
highest levels. 
If the creative function of mind is restricted to the realm of moral 
87. Tsanoff, TNE, 388. 
88. Ibid., 392. 
89. Ibid., 398. Cf. Note 96. 





and intellectual values, what of the operative or instrumental functions 
(e.g., personal or public health) and all the modifications of the 
natural environment which an industrial order has produced? To this 
Dr. Tsanoff replies: 
It may be that the study of the creative element in intel-
ligence enables us to discover characteristics deeply rooted 
in other realms of nature. Our principles of interpre-
tation ••• may be shown to be more necessary in explaining 
processes than traditional naturalism had supposed. This 
may well be, and if so, may strengthen the case of idealistic 
metaphysics.93 
Nevertheless, he has sketched a moral and intellectual and re-
ligious order open to molding by concentration, endlessly challenging 
the resources of fertile intelligence. The truth is not static because 
of continual process with infinite aspects to minds of all stages of 
development. Indeed, he says: 
A judgment of the whole cannot be possible in an absolutist 
philosophy which comlud.es by turning aside from aspiring 
personality to contemplate the icy pinnacles of Absolute 
Perfection. 94 
4. Ethics 
Dr. Tsanoff has spent a major part of his productive career deal-
ing with the subject of ethics in The Nature of Evil, The Moral Ideals 
of Our Oivilization, and Ethics (not to list articles). 95 
In the Ethics, his system of values is worked out in what he 
93. Tsanoff, WG, 288. 
94. Tsanoff, POI, 355. 
9 5. For which cf. Bibliography. 
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calls ethical perfectionism, an evolutionary and gradational theory of 
valu.e closely related to the m3taphysics discussed above. ~s a matter 
of conjecture it would appear that the metaphysics ·is a product of the 
thinking in the field of values. 
Perfectionism is defined thus: 
The goodness of any particular act must be sought in its 
contribution to the harmonious realization and fruition 
of human capacities, in the manifold. perfection of human 
life ••• Ferfectionism has proclaimed the dominance of 
reaso.n; the pre-eminence of spiritual values, intellectual, 
aesthetic, religious; and the integrity and harmony of the 
morally developed9~d matured character, notably in its social relations. 
The hi hest value is the one manifest· 
pression and fulfillment of personality. 
Somewhat similar to the way in which Montague federates methods 
of general philosophy, 98 Tsanoff proposes that perfectionism completes 
and harmDnizes the various methods of ethical inquiry which according to 
him are: traditionalism,99 legalism, 100 theological,lOl teleologi~a1, 102 
103 
and formal. Most of these are self-explanatory; one exception might 
be that Dr. Tsanoff defines teleological ethics in terms of biological 
evolutionary .mechanism which rules out the validity of values.104 Tsanoff 






All that is true in hedonistic, rationalistic, altruistic 
ethics may find its place in this recognition Lthat the 
moral hierarchy engages all our faculties and energiesJ, 
Tsanoff, ETH, 40. 101. Ibid., 35. 
Ibid., ll6-ll7. 102. Ibid., 38. 
Cf. Chapter VI. 103. Ibid., 39. 
Tsanoff, ETH., 33. 104. Ibid., 38-39. 
Ibid., 34· 
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Some of these partial insights have been mistakenly cham-
pioned as all-sufficient. They may all be incorporibed 
harmoniously in an inclusive ethical perfectionism. 5 
In a real sense it represegts the integrating of our moral 
activity and reflection.lO 
How the values of the various methods are "incorporated harmoniously" 
in perfectionism (except for the mere totality of inclusiveness) is 
never worked out. 
Essentia:L principles of the theory ••• : OJ achievement 
of integrity of human character by order and balance, 
rational control and direction, due distribution of em-
phasis, true perceP!,ion of relative worth in the hier-
archy of values ••• L2JThe acknowledgement of the unique 
and inviolable dignity of each person, irrespective of 
race or rank ••• LJ~The recognition of the essentially 
social character ~b7personality and of the process of self-realization. 
All these principles are quite general and reaiily susceptible to extreme 
variations of interpretation. It is well and good to say the goal of 
ethics is the fruition of personality, but such a statement ~equires a 
definition of the dynamics of personality which indicates the nature 
(and hence the nurture) of the fruiting process. For example, most 
any of the dynamic psychologies could adopt the above 11 principles11 , but 
the adoption would mt integrate values; so also it would be with theo-
logical theories of personality, economic theories, etc. 
Tsanoff endorses the idea of an empirical account of values which 




Tsanoff, ETH, 378. 
Ibid., 110. 
lb id. , 109-110. 
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Ethics must necessarily fi~0§oth its problem and its method in human experience. 
~he 'W01M discloses value only in ani to personal exper-
J.ence. 
It is evident that from such a beginning no other-worldly scale of values 
is to be deduced. Man's responsibility centers in the present issues of 
choice. 
A realization of one 1s essential kinship with all real-
ity must necessarily show that the true •ought 1 is the 
expression of man's own true self, in which he shares 
in the organic character of all experience.llO 
While man 1 s nature is kin to all reality, t.he relativity of values to 
persons is stoutly maintained, at the same t:ime claiming this is not a 
mean classification. 
vie grant that values would not be comprehended in it Lthe 
causally ordered system with which the physical sciences . 
dealJ, but we should o~:fict to the inference that values 
are therefore not real. 
No thing is value, but in all things value of some sort 
may be sought.ll2 
The reality of values is not affected by their distinctly 
personal connotation; on the other hand, it does not 
follow thfi
3
we should maintain value as real in impersonal 
contexts. 
This position has a surface appeal, but it leads into difficulty. 
108. Tsanoff, Art. (1910)2 , 531. Cf. Tsanoff , ETH, 24, on 11the personal 
connotation of all values 11 • 
109. Tsanoff, TNE, 389. 
110. Tsanoff, Art. (1910)2 , 533. 
111. Tsanoff, ETH, 28. Cf. Tsanoff, POI, 333 and 340. 
112. Tsanoff, TNE, 389. 
113. Tsanoff, ETH, 374• 
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There is implicit here a Cartesian dualism which leads into a morass 
where ~ither reason mr moral activity can have any efficacy at all. 
The role of reason has been elaborately formulated by Dr. Tsawff.114 
Throughout the studies of pessimism and evil he stands by the side of 
reason: 
Radical pessimism is radical skepticism; irrational.115 
Self-refutation is flagrantly manifested in unqt~ified 
pessimism. An utter~y worthless world would not admit 
of being condemned.n 
Yet reason, to Dr. Tsanoff, is m disembodied logic machine. It is not 
' 
an abstraction with only an epiphenomenal role in things: 
Logical, aesthetic, moral, religious activity--the whole 
realm of value--is essentially cJT'tive: demanding, 
pursuing, resisting, preferring. 
There is every indication that man builds character, men build society 
(or societies), and rearrange as well as add to reality. If the physical 
science realm, a realm in which man and the objects of his will are 
included, is truly uncomprehending of value how can these things be? 
Note also that, objecting to formal. ism, he says: 
An act is not wholly "WOrthy of moral approval just because 
it is done conscientiously... It is vindicated or repudia.ted 
in the events.ll8 
It 113 precisely in the realm of events that the matrix of the space-time 
114. Cf. "dominance of re~son11 in Tsanoff, ETH, J~O, quoted above. 
115. Tsanoff, Art. (1920) , 567. Cf. ETH, 350, and POI, 355. 
116. Tsamff, TNE, 364. 
117. Tsanoff, Art. (1940), 27. 
118. Tsamff, Art. (1941), 110. 
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order becomes real. Events in Tsanoff's metaphysically dualistic cosmos 
must comprise personal ani impersonal factors. But the events are caus-
ally determined in the im.pe rsonal and purposefully chosen in the per-
sonal. Again turning to the conative nature of the value realm referred 
to above, the difficulty remarked above recurs: How can it be? 
To Dr. Tsanoff the good is the progressive expansion of value 
in persons; "evil is literally degradation11 • 119 The 11good11 is harmonious 
achievement which is rot to be confused psychologically with sensation 
or pleasure: "Undiluted pleasure cannot be the highest good, nor is life 
to be pronounced evil merely because it is pa.inful.ul20 
A further characteristic of Dr. Tsanoff 1s theory is that he con-
ceives the process of creating and extending values to be an eternal 
process. 
It is of the essence of value, then, that it recognizes 
no final terminus or conclusion.121 
Unlike the realm of factual material existence, the realm 
of truth and the realm~~ justice are inexhaustible ••• 
boundless in prospect. 
The principal virtues in Dr. Tsanoff 1s ethics are divided between 
personal ani social. The chief personal virtues are wisdom, 123 courage, 124 
and temperance ; 125 the social virtues are justice126 and truthfulness.127 
Each person who exercises his bj_rthright of evaluation and choice 
128 is a creator of value. 
119. Tsanoff, TNE, 392. (Cited also 124. Ibid.' 134. 
above. Note #87.) 125. Ibid.' 136. 
120. Tsanoff, Art. (1920)2 , 565. 126. Ibid., lL~O. 
121. Tscmoff, TN&, 398. 127. Ibid.' 141. 
122. Tsanoff, WG, 286. 128. Ibid., 344. cr. 358. 
123. Tsanoff, ETH, 132. 
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5. Theology 
Tsanoff is a theist; he believes in God and defines his concept 
of Hm.: 11God is infinite; infinite perfectibility.u129 Whether by 
chance or design it is difficult to tell, but Dr. Tsanoff d.oes not refer 
to God in }ersona.l terms. 
The difficulty of conceiving adequately the universe of 
value and its apogee and center as active self-perfectible 
perfection is due to the fact t~~b our minds have become 
addicted to the analytic habit. j 
Only obliquely can one suggest consciousness in Anselmian fashion as an 
attribute of God 1s nature as Tsanoff refers to Him: Values must be 
related to persons; perfectibility is a value attributed to God 1 s nature; 
therefore God 1s nature must be ~rsonal • . Nevertheless, this personal 
reference is minimal in Tsanoff 1s description. 
This upward-surging, ever more perfectly active charactl§l 
of the cosmos is what we can intelligently mean by God. 
Having abandoned the whole of the natural world to the realm of 
mechanical determinism,132 Tsanoff is hard-pressed indeed to find a legi-
timate field of activity for his God. It has been seen that he would 
substitute for the Aristotelian unmoved-mover concept of God an evolving, 
perfecting, exparrling harmony, but with no agency in the material world 
such a Deity is extremely restricted. Note nevertheless the attempt: 
129. Tsanoff, Art. (1940~ 34. 
130. Tsanoff, POI, 376. 
131. Tsanoff, TNE, 400. 
132. It must be acknowledged again Tsanoff has not developed his philo-
sophy of nature, but except for one slight reference to the pos-
sibility of an idealistic philosophy of nature (WG,288) the mater-
iali~tic section of his metaphysical dualism remains unaltered. 
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Is the notion of a finite God the sole residuary legatee 
in the alleged liquidation of the monistic estate in 
theology? Or may it not be that the collapse of philo-
sophical ·and theological absolutism calls for a radical 
revision of monism in more concrete and explicitly dynamic 
terms rather tha~~or its abandonment in favor of nome-
script pluralism. 3 
But in spite of this and other similar references, Dr. Tsanoff 1s God 
could be a.n fulpersonal process for all he says explicitly on the subject. 
In reviewing Brightman 1 s Religious Values, he says: 11 The notion of God 
as Infinite Moving Perfection is one which Professor Brightman should 
134 have been less reluctant to adopt • 11 
In his Ethics, he defines "religion as man 1 s conviction of the 
supreme reality of his highest values."135 Even in this context such 
a definition appears incomplete and too purely intellectualistic. 
Religion is characterized quite as much by commitment as conviction and 
is also characterized by special attitudes (i.e., worship) toward the 
source of values. The same remark is applicable to another definition; 
11 The eternal conservation and fulfillment of values becomes the final 
idea arrl therefore the supreme postulate of religion.ul36 
Particularly in The Problem of Imrortality Tsanoff argues against 
the concept of God as an "Absolutely Perfect Being11 • 
Philosophical theism is entangled in a quandary by its 
absolUtism •• 1 The theist is, in his own way, likewise a machanist. 37 
133. Tsanoff, TNE, 369. 
134. Tsanoff, Rev. (1926)1 , 443. 
135. Tsanoff, ETH, 360-361. 
136. Tsanoff, POI, 30-31. Cf. also 331. 
137. Ibid., 345· 
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Any philosopher who, explicitly or implicitly, writes 
aspiring experience on one page and Absolute Perfection 
on the other, is bound to find that his two pages are 
not of the same book.l3S 
The open-endedness of the conative process in the universe is stated 
thus: 
Experience affQrds no final solution because it has no 
final problem • .L39 
13S. Tsanoff, FOI, 346. 
139. Ibid., 348. 
299 
Chapter IX 
THE P.ELATIVE USE OF RATIONAL AND NOI-m.ATIONAL COt-[:EPTS I N THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF 
1. The Rational and Nonrational in Tsanoff 1 s Methodology 
a. Tsanoff 's Relation to the Problem of Certainty 
Except for a precise caution to avoid more precision in statement 
than the subject material would allow, 1 Dr. Tsanoff does not speak dir-
ectly to the topic of certainty. There are, however, inherent tendencies 
of thought which can be valuable implicates to the topic. 
On the basis of his dualistic categories of physical science and 
human values, 2 it would appear that certainty of a high degree would be 
warranted in regard to the natural order, but that a less assured war-
ranty would be appro priate in the field of values. Even this is rendered 
ambiguous by the references to 11mind in nature" and to the possibility 
that value preferences are actual in the physical order.3 
1. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 2, c. 
2. Ibid., Section 3. 
3. Ibid., Section 4. 
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At any rate, to reverse the order of consideration, Tsanoff is 
definite that judgments of value (logical, aesthetic, moral, or 
religious) are relative to the situation of the observer by virtue 
of the creative activity of personalities which inject real differ-
ences into the situations they encounter. 4 
It is to be suspected that when Dr. Tsanoff twns his attention 
to the details of a metaphysical statement he will recognize the ambi-
guity of his position with respect to physical phenomena. Such a 
recognition on the basis of his thought to date would indicate he should 
ameliorate the bifurcation of nature and the bifurcation of the valid-
ity of kno1-.ledge which his present remarks involve. 
Tsanoff 1 s relation to and treatment of the problem is basically 
an empirical approach issuing in an empirical judgment regarding the 
data under observation. There is no indication of a value preference 
for a priori certainty; rather a high degree of tolerance for recogniz-
ing the validity of probable judgments in the whole value realm includ-
ing, significantly, the logical. 
b. Tsanoff on Insight 
In the ~'lays of Genius it might be anticipated that there might be 
a critical examination and evaluation of the various ways by \vhich gifted 
men have received their inspirations. Ho1-rever, as a matter of review, 
it is apparent that this type of explanation is attempted only in a 
limited way. 5 
4. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 4. 
5. Ibid., Section 2, b, (l). 
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For the most part the "explanation" consists in a description of 
the developmental situation, enumerating the factors according to which 
the times were ripe for some particular expression of special signifi-
cance; and to a lesser degree an explanation in terms of the physical 
circumstances (e.g., walking, sleeping, etc.) under which the enlighten-
ment occurred.6 
Long, hard, sustained effort to achieve synthesis - alternated 
with or followed by periods of relaxation or mild exercise - seems best 
suited to produce synoptic insights in minds of the requisite character. 
The "requisite character" of such a mind is apparently more a matter of 
inheritance than of individual achievement. He gives no particular light 
on the circuitous argument regarding heredity ani environment. To the 
extent to which it is emphasized that genius is an hereditary endowment, 
the applicability of Tsanoff 1s study as a general theory of knowledge 
is in question.? 
The work is not however an entertaining essay describing especially 
endowed persons without general application. General characteristics 
running through the entire catalog of fields are: (1) sensitivity to 
possibilities of situations which brings out the 11 problems 11 or the 
"occasions 11 for creative intelligence to function and (2) concentration 
on those problems or occasions. It might be argued that 11 sensitivity11 
is question-begging; it is certain it is an integral function of high 
level thought, but it is apparent from the record also that most men 
of genius worked harder than the common run. 
6. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 2, b, (1). 
7. Ibid. 
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In addition to these two common characteristics, Tsanoff 1s study 
offers a tentative psychological description of the process by which 
insight may occur apparently from outside the self-conscious personality. 
It will be recalled that that description calls upon concentration to 
stimulate the periphery of consciousness vlhich "subconsc i ously" has 
organizing .tendencies analogous to those of the 11 conscious 11 mind. Vfhen 
the conscious mind relaxes, the subconscious occasionally 11 erupts" into 
consciousness with a ready-formed answer. 8 
In none of these facets of the phenomenon of insight is there 
indication of the characteristically rationalistic a priori as the source 
of judgment. There is instead on the one ham an i ndication of a kind 
of biological and/or social detenninism and on the other a frank ad-
mission of an attempt at description of an ultimate empirical capacity 
of human intelligence. 
c. Tsanoff on Verification 
Having dealt primarily with ethics, philosophies of pessimism, and 
the characteristics of genius, Tsanoff's relation to the problems that 
arise in straight-forward philosophic analysis is not always readily 
apparent. 
Tsamff accepts, without any evidence of having criticized, the 
traditional framew:>rk of formal logic, but it is given no special 
sanctity being referred to on a par with other values.9 
8. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 2, b, (1). 
9. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 4. 
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On the other hand he does not slip into a static concept of the 
true; preferences, insights, and choices are constantly altering the cir-
ctunstances analogous to organic grovrth.10 Indeed there is so much atten-
tion to the process of r;erfection and the creation and/or enhancement 
of value that Dr. Tsanoff leaves himself open to criticism as suggest-
ing automatic progress. 
As wiil be noted in the succeeding section, Dr. Tsanoff's concept 
of the systematically true is that (1) which works pragmatically, (2) 
>vhich produces clarifying references to other material, ani (3) >vhich 
stimulates further personal growth.ll 
As regards the domain of the physical sciences Tsanoff undoubtedly 
approves and requires empirical verification.12 In respect to personal 
experience one is mt so certain that an adequate place has been made 
for social intercourse which provides for social verification.13 The 
relative-to-persons quality of value data (apparently individual per-
sons) and the divorce of these data from their erst-while objects 
appears to leave the way open for solipsistic anarchy in the fields of 
value experience.l3 
d. Tsanoff on Relation 
It was remarked in the exposition of the previous chapter that 
Tsanoff does not distinguish in his "stages of thought" the systematizing 
stage, but instead points to insight or illumination as serving both the 
10. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 4. 
11. Ibid., Section 2, b, (2). 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid., Section 4. 
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immediate and the universalizing problem-solving functions. 14 
In a sense this identification is accurate. The urge of a mind to 
order, classify, and inte rrelate the data of particular judgments is a 
problem solving situation closely akin to and perhaps identical '\'rith 
the situation within the process of arriving at particular judgments. 
Viewed psychologically, however, the inclination to isolate groups of 
data (rooted in the psychiatric mechanism of logic-tight compartments) 
is about universal; it is the universal condition to which philosophy 
makes its challenge. The lack of a conscious recognition of the obligation 
to systematize coherently the data of experience leaves one open to 
the temptation to adopt too readily macrocosmic; monadistic over-
simplifications, touch-stones, or preferences produced from prejudices. 
From a critical point of view then it seems a wise precaution to 
mark the obligation of a mind to consider new value claims in relation 
to other value claims in the system-building reference as a distinct 
stage of r eflective thought. 
Failure to explicate the process of systematization15 also tends 
to leave t he process very much a ~stery and a miracle. The sometimes 
pedantic accumulation of data and the painstaking sorting of inductive 
principles is abundantly documented in both the physical and social 
sciences to a degree not acknowledged in Tsanoff 1 s stress on the "flash" 
of genius. 
Since Tsanoff 1 s published thought in this field is directed at the 
topic of genius one cannot criticize him too strongly for not doing some-
14. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 2, b • . 
15. Ibid., Section 2, b, (3). 
thing else, but it would appear that he may have overextended his re-
marks in the discussion of genius which would make it difficult to con-
struct a coherent universal account of the knowledge process. 
To the extent (and it is considerable) to which biological and 
social determinism and inexplicable 11 integral" views are the expression 
of creative intelligence, just that far are nonrational factors oper-
ating in his concept of systematizing or relation. 
e. Tsanoff and Attempts to Escape the Circle of the Given 
According to Tsanoff in the field of values, i.e., logical, moral, 
aesthetic, and religious, persons have the concrete potentiality exer-
cised through choice of creating values, enriching their character, and 
these values become constitutive within the total sum of reality.1 6 The 
creative and constitutional power of mind is a nonrational factor in 
his theory; the 11given11 is enhanced and expanded in history. 
f. Tsanoff and Attempts to Systematize the Focus of Attention 
While it cannot w·ith assurance be extended to all persons, at 
least as regards genius Tsanoff inclines to the opinion t hat persons are 
11born that way11 or that situations create the man. They have been 
mentioned above as biological and social determinants.1 7 
It will be recalled that among the conditions (i.e., factors 
favorable to focusing attention) for creative activity were: (l ) a rich 
16. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 4. 
17. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 2, b, (1). 
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treasure of memories (i.e., wide experience) readily available, (2) 
a lively imagination and r eady association, (3) geniune feeling, (4) 
solitary walks, (5) concentrated interest, (6) sense of security, and 
(7) freedom from interruption,18 (Concentration may be little more than 
a synonym for attention.) 
g. Tsanoff 1s Attempts to Preserve the Unique Properties of v~ holes 
Dr. Tsanoff 1 s philosophy is person-centered without any special 
examination on his part in his published writings to indicate \-lhy that 
is the case. He remarks that it is self-evident that values to have 
any meaning must be related to exp:lrience.19 
In addition, Tsanoff's metaphysical pluralism is supported by the 
remark to the effect that one must deal with the objects of experience 
as they are '\'l'hich constrains him from reducing either mind or matter 
to a manifestation of the other. 20 
Self-evidence of propositions is a characteristic of rationalistic 
philosophy; the self-evidence of a person-centered philosophy seems 
quite advanced from the customary tenets to which self-evidence has been 
ascribed. As regards the metaphysical dualism, Tsanoff's philosophy is 
empirical rather than rationalistic, phenomenalistic rather than the 
product of logical analysis. 
2. The Rational and Nonrational in Tsanoff's Metaphysics 
a. The primary ideal of a rationalistic philosophy is the internal relation 
18. Cf. Chapter• VIII, Section 2, b, (1). 
19. Ibid., Section 2, c. 
20. Ibid., Section 3. 
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of a continuous, complete, demonstrative consistency. 21 
In a creative and evolutionary philosophy such as Tsanoff 1 s demon-
strative consistency can be held to in one of two ways: either a pre-
determinism (such as Augustine 1 s) which counts the ill for only a de-
privation of the good22 or an amor dei intellectualis (such as Spinoza 1s) 
which transmutes the distinction by the generalization of perspective. 
It is apparent that Tsanoff would choose niether of these alternatives; 
he declares himself for real, substantive, spontaneous creation at 
least in the realm of value. 23 
b. Rationalistic philosophy factors its material analytically, em-
phasizing quantitative relations. 
As remarked before, Tsanoff 1s dualistic ontology splits his philo-
sophie method. He contends that the logic of fixed classes and of quan-
titative relations is applicable in the field of natural science. 24 On 
the other hand he is much more cautious in the field of value, holding 
that the creative process alters reality; therefore, this situation re-
quires an empirical, ex post facto method of investigation. 25 
c. Rationalistic philosophy reasons from acknowledged authority. 
The acknowledged basis of philosophy for Dr. Tsanoff is personal 
21. These sub-topics are derived from the analysis and definition of 
rationalism and nonrationalism in Chapters I and II. Discussion of 
that derivation is not repeated here. 
22. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 5. 
23. Ibid., Section 4. 
24. Ibid., Section 3. 
25. Ibid., Section 4. 
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experience, not narrowly defined, but inclusive. 26 The rationalistic 
authority is conceptual in character; Tsanoff 1s inclusive experiential 
base is not restricted to conceptualized experience.27 
While the base or beginning data are experiential by nature, it 
will be recalled that Tsanoff claims philosophy aims at an intellectual 
version of reality. 28 One may assume that this intends a conceptualized 
version. Such a definition appears to prejudge the results of examin-
ing the data. Rather than this, some of the urge of npdern philosophy 
is to define its task as the attempt to discover the function of a man 
in view of the real. Such a function may not be just an intellectual 
version of reality; it may take the form of more overt functions in 
society, etc. 
To sum up• Tsanoff begins on a broadly inclusive, experiential, 
i.e., nonrationalistic, base of data and presuppos~s he will come out 
with a conceptual, intellectual picture of reality. The possibility 
of disjunction between the two apparently does not occur to him. 
d. Rationalistic philosophy systematizes that which is present and known. 
Tsanoff claims that a consistent mark of a genius is the way in 
which his insights are able to be universalized, to epitomize great 
masses of actual or possible experience.29 Since Tsanoff has not addressed 
himself to a general theory of knowledge the remarks on genius may or may 
not be supposed to be generalized, but if Tsanoff intends the discussion 
26. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 2, c. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid., Section 2, a. 
29. Ibid., Section 2, b, (l). 
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of genius to be generally applicable it is evident he does not conceive 
of systematizing as demonstrative, orderly deduction but rather as 
flashes of penetration, or, as he calls them, integral views which sym-
bolize in manifold ways the true nature of things.30 
e. Rationalistic philosophy is characterized by precise units of logical 
and grammatical construction. 
Logic is catalogued by Tsanoff in the realm of values and the 
realm of values is relative to persons and times.31 Values are constantly 
altered, created and reshuffled and it is difficult to see that the kind 
of logical precision is present in Tsanoff 1 s published thought vlhich 
would be material for constructing a philosophy rationalistically. 
f. Rationalistic philosophy describes a status quo situation. 
Tsanoff makes a vigorous attack upon all philosophies which claim 
to embrace the totality of possible experience. All systems of Abso-
lutism seem to be included in this attack; he asserts that pretension 
to comprehension of the end or the totality logically involves the meta-
physician in a system of mechanism and determinism.32 
Positively, he s peaks strongly for an evolving system of thought 
and reality, a system in which genuinely creative agents (persons) are 
at work, and where creative agents are present it is unwarranted to pre-
diet the character of their creation. 
30. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 2, b, (1). 
31. Ibid., Section 4. 
32. Ibid., Sections 3 and 5. 
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Nevertheless, having said all of this he strains at consistency 
in maintaining a hard core of mechanism in the physical sciences and the 
material which they describe _33 
g. Rationalistic philosophy does not express the unique properties of 
wholes nor the truth of developing experience in process. 
Tsanoff 1s gradational theory of reality is more stratified than 
it is organic. Although he frequently mentions the necessity of persons 
' for the validity of experience, that is apparently t heir raison d'etre, 
not experience for the sake of personal growth.34 This distinction is 
important and in failing properly to evaluate its metaphysical signi-
ficance Tsanoff is hazy on the nature of both fersons and deity and he 
has been negligent of the instrumental role of the processes of person-
ality in the creation of value. 
The puzzle of the relation between the common type of mind and 
genius is similar. If Tsanoff 's concept of genius is or is not supposed 
to be universalized then the creative function of mind is still a mystery. 
In sununary, Tsanoff 1 s treatment of value is principally analytic 
and seldom functional or organic, i.e., principally rationalistic. 
h. The rationalist introduces a pattern of necessity into the pattern 
of events. 
Tsanoff admits the validity of necessity in the physical order but 
not in the value system. His t heory regarding necessity thus is split 
33. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 3. 
34. Ibid., Section 4. 
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along the lines of his metaphysical dualism.35 
i. Rationalistic principles tend to mental conservatism with respect 
to reflective selection, verification, and systematization. 
By his own criterion, Dr. Tsanoff claims that philosophy should 
be inclusive in data and in methodology.36 In practice he has specialized 
on value data so exclusively and has generalized from those data so 
broadly that he is guilty of mt living up to his own standard in this 
respect. 
Rather than being rationalistic, however, one would ascribe this 
situation to specialization of inquiry and to incompleteness of inves-
tigation. 
j. The similarity of the realm of objects and the realm of idea.s is a 
presupposition of rationalism. 
It apf:ears that Dr. Tsanoff has endorsed the presupposition of 
correlation but has proceeded later to draw such a distinction in function 
between the value-illolding and organizing function of ideas and the neces-
sary mechanism of the physical order that the presupposition is invali-
dated even though the discard is unrecognized.37 
k. Rationalism depends upon a system of a priori truths. 
In the system of thought constructed by Professor Tsanoff, the very 
idea of a priori truths is dismissed although the combination of an im-
35. Cf. Chapter VIII, Section 2, b, (3) and Section 4. 
36. Ibid., Section 2, c. 
37. Ibid., Section 4. 
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personal concept of deity and the metaphysical validity of values would 
seem to be a combination that would tend to produce a substantive system 
of a priori truths. 
The aversion to the a priori is more in character with the general 
position he states, however; so, with the lack of a personal quality in 
divinity and even of an exact account of the nature of finite persons 
go t he only ways r eadily at hand to conserve the values whose reality 
his system proclaims. 
l. Rationalism cannot produce insight in problem situations without 
appealing beyond itself to empirical data. 
By the statements that mind is rooted in nature and that t here are 
no brute facts but only judged facts,38 Tsanoff indicates definitively 
that t he data for mental activity are empirical in source. 
His explanations are principally social and biological determinants 
and secondarily a hypothetical psychological description of mental process 
and a description of a concomitant circumstances. 39 
When one adds to this the judgment that logic is a relative value 
among other relative values it is apparent that Tsanoff considers the 
phenomenon of insight to be rooted much more in the distinctive content 
of received experience rather than from native a priori functions of the 
mind. 
m. Rationalistic ethics is characteristically a strict, impersonal 
system of values subject to the twin dangers of dogmatism and of 
legalism. 
38. Cf . Chapter VIII, Section 3. 
39. Ibid., Section 2, b, (1 ) . 
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Tsanoff 1 s ethics is thoroughly nonrational at this point. All 
values are made relative to purposing, creative agents. 40 1:mether by 
choice or design the definition of the basic nature of these agents has 
been reglected resulting in an extreme leeway in the expression of their 
aspiring to perfection. 
The criteria for perfection are quite hazy. Individuality approach-
ing anarchY is one product of the relativity of all values, including 
the logical, to finite persons of indeterminate nature. 
n. Rationalistic psychology tends to introduce (a) separation of mind 
and body and (b) a faculty psychology. 
Hind-body dualism as a metaphysical principle has been adopted by 
Tsanoff though the exact limits of its application as a universal principle 
are lef t somewhat in doubt. 41 
His treatment of this problem (somewhat out of character) is almost 
exclusively analytic and unrelieved by the synthetic-integrative appli-
cation with which he typically approaches other problems. 
o. Rationalism tends to develop an all-inclusive formula which is over-
extended, i.e., an unverified hypothesis treated as pr oved, at the 
expense of the content of experience. 
Tsanoff has not only avoided arriving at any statement of such a 
formula but has also declared that an adequate f ormulation of the absolute 
. . .bl 42 l.s JIIJ.possl. e. 
40. Cf. Chapter VIII , Section 4. 
41. Ibid., Section 3. 
42. Ibid., Sections 3 and 5. 
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p. nationalistic philosophy has been characteristically a truncated 
philosophy which did not adequately represent the existential ideals, 
attitudes, and values of personal life, nor did it adequately point 
to its own transcerrlence in the total life of the person or of 
society. 
The aspiring arrl striving lif e of the individual who creates 
and expands values in the quest for perfection is a magnificent ideal and 
challenge. 43 
There are two points of dissatisfaction: (1) Through lack of 
clear definition, diversity and proliferation are emphasized at the 
expense of the likelihood of solid achievement. (2) The insufficiently 
bridged dualism of value and material reality leaves man an unneces-
sarily pathetic and jmpotent role in the scheme of things. 
In spite of these objections, the main point is clear: Tsanoff 
stands directly against rationalistic abstraction and definitely in the 
camp among those who \~igh carefully the concrete experience of persons. 
43. Cf . Chapter VIII, Section 4. 
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Chapter X 
THE ffiOCESS OF THE INVESTIGATION AND SOME BY-PRODOOTS 
1. The Problem 
Reason has been the instrument of philosophy. During the larger 
part of the history of philosophy reason has been conceived in a re-
stricted sense, the purely deductive sense which is implied in the term 
"Rationalistic". Under the five-fold pressure of psychology, critical 
philosophy, the experiences of evil, science, and existentialism, reason 
itself has been under attack. The defenders of reason have brought for-
ward a broadened conception of its function that has admitted components 
to the rethodology and to the systems of "reasonableness" which are 
nonrationalistic in character. This dissertation attempts to sketch the 
respective territories of rationalistic and nonrationalistic components 
in reasonable philosophy and to exemplify am document the definitions 
in the works of Lovejoy and Montague and Tsanoff.1 
1. Introduction, Section 2. 
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2. A Definition of Rationalism 
Rationalism is used in .current philosophy in many different senses.2 
The confusion which results from this multiplicity indicates that a care-
ful delineation needs to be made, a delineation which takes into 
account the cohering interrelationship of terms, particularly the terms 
"mind 11 , 11 reason11 , and the 11 nonrational 11 • 
Taking note of current definitions and of the immediate concern for 
clarifying the interrelationships among the terms under consideration, it 
is proposed that 11mind11 in its individual reference, be defined as the sum 
total of the characteristics of consciousness, with emphasis upon the 
unity of the self.J 
In the same context, 11 reason11 or 11 reasonableness 11 in general, is 
an order among things or a principle of order as conceived by minds or 
a mind. In an individual mind, reason is the relating, patterning, and 
selecting function which renders experience comprehensible and meaningful 
and directs the activity of the organism as well.4 
A satisfactory definition of rationalism in philosophy is rendered 
extremely difficult by the vast diversity of content and of method which 
has been attributed to it in the history of thought. If it >vere to be 
defined as a synonym for either mind or reason (or reasonableness) the 
problem would be avoided by mere side-stepping. If it is to be distin-
guished within a coherent synopsis of the field, it is essential that it 
be delineated in so far as possible as a simple, logically self-consistent 
2. Introduction, Section 5, and Chapter I. 
J. Chapter I, Section 1. 
4. Chapter I, Section 2. 
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concept embracing both methodology and its characteristic content. Since 
the latter alternative indicates a realistic facing of the problem, this 
was the course which was adopted. 5 
a. Characteristics of the Rationalistic Method:6 
(1) Rationalism · is the deductive reasoning, judging, or compre-
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heooing activity of the mind which aims at valid propositions or method-
ology. 7 Deduction is the mental analysis of given postulates by precisely 
defined procedures which reveal the necessarily constituent relations 
among those postulates. 8 , The two great systems of deduct ion are those 
stemming from Aristotle (syllogistic inference) and, in so far as it is 
a formal pattern only, from Hegel (dialectical inference). 
(2) The criterion of rationalism is the system of principles in-
herent in the mental work of verifying its own efforts: consistency. 9 
(3) The affinity of rationalistic and mathematical reasoning is 
iooicative of the scope of their application: where regular quantitative 
relations inhere which are to be extracted analytically and formulated 
explicitly .10 
b. Points of Effectiveness in the Rationalistic Method: 
(1) Rationalism demonstrates consistency among related propositions. 11 
5. Chapter I, Section 3. 
6. Chapter I, Section 3~ b, (4), (a). 
7. Chapter I, Section 3, a. 
8. Chapter I, Section 3, a, (2). It must be emphasized that it is not 
claimed that either Aristotle's . or Hegel's 11 system" is rationalistic, 
but it is averred that the "formula" or pattern of -their respective 
logics is. - .. 
9. Chapter I, Section 3, a, (1), and Section 3, b, (3). 
D. Chapter I, Section 3, a, (3). 
ll. Chapter I, Section 3, b 1 (3). 
(2) Rationalism expresses analytic factoring which represents a 
generally quantitative relation.12 
(3) Rationalism reasons from acknowledged authority.13 
( 4) Rationalism systematizes that which is present and known and 
proposes hypotheses for empirical testing.14 
(5) Rationalism encourages the development of precise units of 
logical and grammatical construction.1 5 
(6) Rationalism describes a status quo (classical deduction) or 
at least a self-enclosed (Hegelian deduction) situation.16 
c. Points of Inadequacy in the Rationalistic Nethod: 
(1) Rationalistic method aims at and characteristically claims 
absolute certainty about material truth. For formal truth, when one 
postulates the rules of a system and postulates perfect definitions, a 
restricted kind of certainty is attained. In order to do so, of course, 
abstract symbols are a necessity. Such is the case in formal logic and 
in mathematics.17 
(2) Rationalistic method cannot produce insight in problem 
situations without appealing beyond itself to empirical data.18 
(3) Rationalistic method cannot deal with degrees of probability 
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among propositions except in the case of those propositions whose relations 
12. Chapter I, Section 3, a, (3). 17. Chapter I, Section 3, b, (2). 
13. Ibid. 18. Chapter I, Section 3, b, (1). 
14. Chapter I, Section 3, b, (1). 
15. Chapter I, Section 3, b, (2). 
16. Chapter I, Section 3, b, (3). It is claimed herein that the over-
extension of the formal pattern of Hegel's method at the expense of 
the empirical content has led htm to unwarranted assurance regarding 
the demonstrability and the inclusiveness of the Absolute. The evi-
dence dictates a seeking attitude not a .brash claim of achievement 
respecting the 11whole 11 • 
are expressible in terms of precise mathematical frequency. 19 
(4) Rationalistic method cannot formally escape the circle of 
the given and that 'Which is actually present in thought. Inherent in 
the Hegelian deduction is the reference beyond itself to the data of 
experience (hence is not a pure rationalism).20 
(5) Classical logic does mt draw knowledge beliefs into atten-
tion in order to create an integrated system of beliefs. Hegelian logic 
points a formal direction but mt a content. Rationalism does not specify 
the postulates of the concept mr does it involve a:ny but the formal 
implicates. 21 
( 6) Rationalistic method cannot discover and demonstrate the 
unique properties of wholes mr the truth of developing experience in 
process. Hegel's logic proposed a formula of rationalistic type, but 
its constant requirement of empirical "phenomenology'' invalidates it as 
a purely rationalistic methodology. 22 
d. Characteristics of Rationalistic Philosophy: 23 
(1) The rationalistic philosophy introduces a pattern of necessity 
into the interpretation of events.24 
(2) Rationalistic principles terrl to mental conservatism with 
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respect to reflective selection, verification, and systematization of data.2 5 
(3) Rationalism tends to describe a mechanical, static, meta-
26 physical system. 
19. Chapter I, Section 3, b, (3). 
20. Chapter I, Section 3, a, (1). 
21. Chapter I, Section 3, b, (1). 
22. Chapter I, Section 3, b, (3). 
23. Chapter I, Section 3, b, (5). 
24. Chapter I, Section 3, c, (1). 
25. Ibid. 
26. Chapter I, Section 3, c, (2). 
(4) The similarity of the realm of objects and the realm of ideas 
is a presupposition of rationalism.27 
( 5) Rationalism applied to psychology tends to introduce separa-
tion of mind and body and a rigid faculty psychology.28 
(6) Rationalism deperrls upon a system of a priori propositions.29 
(7) Rationalistic ethics is characteristically a strict system 
subject to the twin dangers of dogmatism and legalism. 30 
(8) Rationalism tends toward an all-imlusive formula at the ex-
pense of the content of experience.31 
3. Definition of the Nonrational in Philosophy 
The conclusion reached in the definition of rationalism posed 
a problem for the treatment of the nonrational.. That problem was whether 
or not all other philosophical methods and conclusions should be lumped 
together under the broad classification of nonrational or whether some 
further differentiations should be made • 
It was obvious that a good share of modern philosophizing was ex-
cluded by the definition of rationalism, including such apparent examples 
as scientific induction and pragmatism. The definition of reason within 
the total scope of the activity of a mind had already drawn a line 
between the activities of thought which represented confidence in reason 
and those other activities of mind which would be substituted for reason 
or which would try to invalidate reason •. 
27. Chapter I, Section 3, c, (2). 30. Chapter I, Section 31 c, (4). 
28. Chapter I, Section 3, c, (3). 31. Ibid. 
29. Chapter I, Section 3, c, (2). 
32J. 
It was decided therefore to maintain the distinction between those 
kinds of activities which attempted to be reasonable and those which re-
jected reason.32 An attempt was made in Chapter II to list as many of the 
various approaches t o philosophy, other than rationalistic, which tried to 
be reasonable as herein defined. "Reasonable'' is defined as the coherent 
and systematic representation of the true and as any act of a person to 
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modify the true in the direction of more coherent systematization of experience. 
This procedure would have the merit of disclosing or re-emphasizing 
the resources of the mind which are not precisely rationalistic and it 
was anticipated that such a classification might point some of the factors 
to be considered in a genuinely inclusive, synoptic, and coherent philo-
sophy. This procedure would also demonstrate the considerable degree 
to which strict rationalistic philosophy has been amended by supple-
mentation, thus marshaling evidence of the resources which philosophy 
has available for meeting the particular challenges of the present time. 
The classification of the nonrational topics in philosophical 
methodology was developed in view of the functional stages of philosophic 
thought: (1) the stage of insight, (2) the stage of verification, and 
(3) the stage of relation.33 
The principal nonrational sources of insight are: (1) empirical 
induction, (2) prestige authoritarianism, (3) specific revelation, (4) 
sign reading, (5) trial and error, accident, intuition or "hunch", and 
elimination of alternatives by testing, (6) attention, interest, and 
concern, (7) nonrational functions of personalities, e.g., will, senses, 
emotions, etc., (8) sensitivity to empirical novelty, (9) evolutionism, 
(10) empirical coherence, and (11) a normative concept of personality)4 
32. Cf. Chapter II, Section 1. 
33. Chapter I, Section 3, b. 
34. Chapter II, Section 3, a. (1). 
·rhe analysis which was carried out did not indicate that there is 
anything in the nonrational side of the discussion to supplant or to in-
validate the rational except the radical claims for exclusivism, neces-
sity, or certainty on one side or the other and except for a specific 
caution against accepting logical demonstration as verification because 
of the inherent (1) weaknesses in the process of classification and 
definition and (2) empirical novelty in experience. 
In the section on verification there were pointed out a number 
of criteria for empirical verification: (1) induction, based upon the 
uniformity of nature, (2) prestige authoritarianism, (3) specific 
revelation, (4) emotional certitude, (5) satisfaction of human need, (6) 
will-to-believe, (?) appeal to practical consequences, (8) positivism, 
and (9) empirical coherence. It was pointed out that probable judgments 
played a large role in testing verification according to these criteria. 
As remarked in the previous paragraph, although at one time or another 
expansive claims of certainty have been attached to each of these sources 
of verification (as with rationalism), the evidence regarding them all 
seems to be that apodictic certainty is unwarranted with regard to any 
or all of the available methods of verification.35 
In regard to philosophical method at the stage of relation it was 
found that nonrational philosophical methodology emphasized: (1) re-
spect .for and consideration to those diff erences within experience which 
may be as significant as smilarities, (2) respect for the unique exper-
iential wholeness of personality, (3) attention to the phenomenon of 
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organic growth and evolutionary development not only in individual experience, 
35. Chapter II, Section 3, b. 
but also in history 1 (4) a native dialectic in philosophic thought in-
volving an alternation between whole-concepts and attempted (i.e., at 
least partial) rationalistic analysis and demonstration, aoo (5) that 
faith, aspiration, ani ethical values are somet:im.es achieved only by 
transcending the conceptual formulation of the understanding moving over 
into a concrete exemplification of the concept (an act of will in the 
complex of wi1Js of society). 36 Once more it was discovered that these 
factors of mnrational philosophy are not alternatives nor contradictions 
to rationalistic philosophy, but rather are complementary, fruitional 
considerations. 
Thus it was that at the conclusion of the chapter on the definition 
of mnrational methodology it did mt seem appropriate to analyze the 
distinctive content of mnrational philosophy as was done in the case 
of rationalistic philosophy. The character of the supplement is revealed 
already by that which it supplements and by the inadequacies of the base 
without the supplement. 
Therefore, it appears that a genuinely synoptic philosophy (a 
synthesis of rationalistic and nonrationalistic philosophy) will be 
genuinely inclusive in its methodology involving sympathetic consideration '· 
to all the resources for data and for handling of data. The kinds of 
data and the kinds of "handling" which were en'l.mlerated pointed to a set 
o£ generalized characteristics of 'procedure for a synoptic philosopny which 
might be described in the following terms: 
(l) The tools of reason must be treated as tools, not as ends. 
The tendency to haughty aloofness (from the concrete data of experience) 
36. Chapter II, Section 3, c. 
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of the ratiocinative mind must be combated. Professor De'l~olf 1s pre-
suppositions of synoptic reason are valid and appropriate: 
(a) Conviction of the non-illusoriness and non-falsity of faith. 
(b) Humility of reason. 
(c) Belief in the infinity of God's challenge to man's and 
society's progress. 
(d) Passionate interest and ethical commitment. 
(2) The first loyalty of philosophy to be true to the data of 
experience must be its cardinal principle. The tendency to include 
data readily systematizable and to close the system against new data 
must be constantly avoided. 
(3) The systematizing process must be at least reasonable; 
it cannot take easy leaps to non-sequiturs, paradoxes, etc. This does 
not mean that the system >vhich the process produces will be absolutely 
consistent necessarily and through and through. Actual experience appears 
to display inconsistency. The reasonable, as the represent ation of the 
actual must not reflect more consistent systematization than the actual 
experiential data. Where there is disparity it will be frankly included 
in the results. 
(4) Abstraction and over-simplification will be avoided in view 
of the tendency to allow the rationalistic process to become the goal 
instead of remaining a step toward the goal. The synoptic philosophy 
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must be really inclusive and must be coherent among all this inclusiveness. 
(5) The analytic-synthetic alternation between parts and wholes 
must be practiced constantly not only in thought but also in conduct. 
The unique goal of aspiration within a h~unan life and in the society of 
men would seem to be: 
(a) V'lholeness of personality, well-balanced at the highest 
level of the individual's potentiality, 
(b) World-citizenship among the human community, and 
(c) Humble and devoted relation to the universal ground of 
being.37 
Synoptic philosophy aims at the true understood as (a) representation 
in conformity to the real whether conceptual or nonconceptual; (b) par-
ticipation -in the process of forming the real conceptually or otherwise; 
from which develops that Truth is the integration by a person of that 
representation and that participation. The foregoing investigation is 
used as an instrument in the following research with the theories of Love-
joy, Montague, and Tsanoff. 
4. Lovejoy 1 s Use of the Rational and Nonrational 
a. Lovejoy's Methodology 
Lovejoy's philosophical method is primarily a combination of Pation-
alistic analysis and induction from observation of empirical data. He 
admits this method does not fit all the data; thus there are large areas 
in which the data are not organized demonstratively.38 
The product of this combination is not a high degree of certainty, 
as Professor Lovejoy readily admits. His concept of the incompleteness 
of reality at any given moment in the time process, inclines him to the 
use of provisional and tentative results, but he does not proceed from 
such probable reasonings to infer that current data provide clues for 
the prediction of the future. Such a hesitancy might be either from 
rationalistic caution against over-extension or a nonrationalistic de-
claration of belief in radical novelty: in Lovejoy it is unquestionably 
37. Chapter II, Section 4, b. 
38. Chapter V, Section 1, a. 
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the former, i.e., rationalistic caution)9 
With respect to insight, the most important conscious apprehen-
sions (such as time) are nonrational (i.e., empirical) in origin, exper-
iences carrying their own validity with them. The logical criteria have 
their source in the psychological necessity of the human mind to avoid 
contradiction.4° 
Although Lovejoy recognizes that lack of inclusiveness is a general 
philosophical fault his own data are restricted as to sources and to their 
application.41 There is no evidence of his having a theory of the devel-
opment of mental content; he has only a static concept of inclusiveness 
of observation. 42 
b. Lovejoy 1s Metaphysics 
Lovejoy accepts the rationalistic ideal of demonstrative certainty 
as the theoretical ileal tO\•rard which thought aims ; he rejects the notion 
of attaining it as an irrational notion.43 
The analytic logic of partes extra partes prescribes a pluralistic 
metaphysics.44 Empirical verification, however, is primary over the 
"rationalistic urgen.L:-5 
On the basis of data from limited sources (primarily' the physical 
sciences), lovejoy sketches his materialistic, temporalistic system.46 
His lindtation of data is partially self-imposed to make philosophy 
11 scientific 11 • 47 In his system the static materialism is constantly at 
variance with his evolutionary temporalism. His concept of real time is 
nonrationalistic as it calls for new emergents in the historical process, 
39. Chapter V, Section 1, a. 44. Chapter V, Section 2, b. 
40. Chapter V, Section 1, b. 45. Chapter V, Section 2, c. 
41. Chapter V, Section 1, c. 46. Chapter V, Section 2, d. 42. Chapter V, Section 1, d. 47. Chapter V, Section 2, e. 
43. Chapter V, Section 2, a. 
327 
His materialism instead rationalistically describes a status quo situa-
tion. 48 
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Professor Lovejoy's philosophy recognizes wholes of logical classes, 
not synoptic or o~ganic ~holes.49 Nonrationalistically, however, he 
recognizes the temptation to state concepts in terms of necessity and he 
tries rather successfully to avoid the temptation. 50 
The presupposition of the similarity of the realm of objects and 
the realm of ideas is adopted pragmatically and functionally as reasonable 
by persons long before they are capable of criticizing the concept. 5l 
S:imilarly all basic concepts, including logical, are immanent in exper-
ience.52 Lovejoy produces m theory of insight beyond the assertion that 
it is a native characteristic of minds to seek it.53 
Lovejoy's ethics is undeveloped. There is barely suggested a 
principle for the construction of a theory; the desire for approved 
predicates by the acting self. The idea is empirically based.54 
Am Professor lovejoy has not developed his psychology of the 
self, having paid little attention to the "person•• who philosophizes or 
experiments • 55 
Lovejoy's temporalistic principle is in part a protest against 
various rationalistic eternalistic philosophies. It becomes positive 
only potentially for mw emergents, etc.; he mver attempts to define the 
dynamic of his principle.56 
48. Chapter V, Section 2, f. 53. Chapter V, Section 2, 1. 
49. Chapter v, Section 2, g. 54. Chapter V, Section 2, m • 
. 50. Chapter V, Section 2, h. 55. Chapter V, Section 2, n. 
51. Chapter V 1 Section 2, j. 56. Chapter V, Section 2, o. 
52. Chapter V, Section 2, k. 
Professor Lovejoy would seriously limit the data with which philo-
sophy would deal; he would reduce the role of the philosopher to that of 
the technician.57 
'l'he complications which arise to the analyst of Lovejoy's philo-
sophy are traceable to a considerable degree to the disparities result-
ing from treating rational and nonrational procedures in philosophy as 
if they were opposed to each other. Lovejoy did not recoreile them in 
an integrated methodology in which they supplement each other. In fail-
ing so to do he did not achieve a systematic, synoptic, and coherent 
view of the totality of experience. This is not to discount the very 
admirable treatment of isolated problems which he handled with skill. 
5. Montague 1 s Use of the Rational and Nonrational 
a. Montague 1s Nethodology 
Dr. Montague creates a federated methodology in whj.ch rationalism 
is restricted to the domain of com.Irensurable and abstract relations; 
authoritarianism is valid for those experiences known only by other minds; 
intuitionism is approved for selecting primary values; empiricism is 
applicable for particular facts and relations; pragmatism is valid in the 
realm of human action; and moderate skepticism is an important check 
against 11 a priori validity'' and "transcendental necessity" . 5S Empiricism 
is marked as the most widely applicable and reliable of all the methods. 
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'ro his inclusive methodology he adds tbt. knowledge does not attain absolute 
certainty but it does attain an adequate warranty to moral and reasonable 
57. Chapter V, Section 2, P• 
58. Chapter VII, Section 1, b. 
action if accompanied by open~indedness toward new data.59 
The formal laws of logic should be used as far as possible, but 
data are mt always subject to their use. 60 
The circle of given data for philosophical systematizing is con-
stantly expanded by the dialectic process of reason (which Montague 
calls the 11complete inductive-deductive cycle"): (1) experience, (2) 
comparison with other experience, (3) demonstration of hypotheses, and 
(4) empirical verification. 61 Attention is to be guided by inclusiveness 
and tenta.tiveness.62 
The persistent analytic mode of thought, with synopsis functioning 
only in the field of mathodology, has resulted in separate 11wholes" in 
the various fields of philosophy without coherence, interrelationship, 
or consistency. 63 
The inclusiveness of the federation of methods indicates a pre-
ponderance of data. produced by the nonrationa.l sources. The treatment 
of the data however remains peculiarly analytic rather than synoptic; 
in his methodology there is no dynamic which interrelates organically 
the fruits of his thought. The inclusive accumulation of data is organ-
ized and discussed in his "Writing in more separate classifications than 
would be the case of an integrated system; the description of a group 
of data as of a given date is emphasized to the neglect of the questions-
'Why? How? or Whence to or from? 
59. Chapter VII, Section 1, a. 
60. Chapter VII, Section 1, c. 
61. Chapter VI, Section 2 and Chapter Vll, Section 1, d. 
62. Chapter VII, Section 1, e. 
63. Chapter VII, Section 1, f. 
330 
b. Montague's Metaphysics 
While intelligibility is the ideal goal of thought and being 
]llontague states that the principle of compossibility is not universally 
true to the facts so there is a basic nonrationality in being. The gen-
eral tendency is discoverable by intelligent inquiry and its relative 
intelligibility is the warrant for reasonable action and prediction.64 
His rationalistic, analytic method results in a kind of elementism favor-
ing quantitative and material relations.65 
The basic philosophical data, according to his opinion, are pri-
marily empirical in origin and the empirical data are the most valid. 66 
In addition to the empirical order, however, he reasons from his major 
philosophical conviction ( 11 things known do mt depend for their being 
on the knowledge relation") to a realm of subsistents in which all gener-
al objects are represented in a revived, classical, epistemological and 
metaphysical realism. 67 The eternalistic, subsiste~ realm 1s a ration-
alistic comept of static content and relations, but these characteristics 
are :oot applicable to the existent (i.e., changing, nonrational) order. 68 
Montague's concept of growth is always in the language of size or 
mere arrangement, not in the symbolism of organic evolution. 69 The inde-
terminacy of the existent is basic and given, a condition which is a 
challenge to both persons and God. 70 
His attempt to equate ethics with volume of the ego is an unhappy, 
64. Chapter VII, Section 2, a. 
65. Chapter VII, Section 2, b. 
66. Chapter VII, Section 2, c. 
67. Chapter VII, Section 2, d. 
68. Chapter VII, Section 2, f. 
69. Chapter VII, Section 2, g. 
70. Chapter VII, Section 2, h. 
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mechanistic, and over-complex effort. The sanction remains though he 
argues for a sanctionless morality. Herein is an attempt to deal demon-
stratively with a kind of data which requires a more dynamic principle 
of description and explanation, and systematization.71 
Dr. Hontague attempts unsuccessfully to reduce by formalistic 
argument the concept of consciousness to the concept of energy. 72 In 
his materialistic phase, inconsistent with his later vJriting on value 
and theological issues, he reveals the attempt rationalistically to 
adjust the data to fit the preconceived pattern.73 
Dr. Montague has expressed hhlself on the variety of philosophical 
issues more than either Professor Lovejoy or Professor Tsanoff. From 
the standpoint of breadth of data then there is more system here with 
which to deal. But the system lacks cohesive unity in (1) absence of 
a dynamic and evolutionary method of treating data and (2) changes in 
position but changes reflected in specialized articles without pointing 
out. 'What changes those new positions required toward other related and 
implied issues. 
6. Tsanoff 1s Use of the Rational and Nonrational 
a. Tsanoff!s Methodology 
In Tsanoff 1s philosophy there is no indication of a value prefer-
ence for a priori certainty; rather a high degree of tolerance for recog-
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nizing the validity of probable judgment in the whole value realm including 
71. Chapter VII, Section 2, m. 
72. Chapter VII, Section 2, n. 
73. Chapter VII, Section 2, o. 
significantly~ the logical.74 
Insight in problem situations is the result of a person 1 s sensi-
tivity to the }X>ssibilities of situations~ concentration upon them~ and 
a candid recognition of the external physical and social factors which 
contribute to the results of reflection.75 
Value judgments including truth judgments help make reality as 
well as reflect it. The physical order requires and Tsanoff approves 
of empirical verification. All values are relative to the infinite per-
fectibility of persons~ the nature of whom is mt precisely explained. 76 
Dr. Tsanoff 1s concept of the systematically true is (1) that which 
works pragmatically~ (2) that which produces clarifying references to other 
material~ and (3) whi~h · stimulates personal growth. 77 In spite of the 
fact that he does not regularly regard systematization as a stage of 
thought he consistently points out the systematic implications of his 
thought. He emphasizes the uniqueness of the phenomemn of insight, stres-
sing thiS characteristic rather than the characteristic of interrelation 
of thought in systems. 78 
Experience is constantly expan:iing according to Tsanoff through 
the choices persons make to create values, enrich character, and add to 
the sum of reality. 79 
Tsanoff emphasizes many nonrational factors in attention: biolo-
gical and social determinants, memory (i.e., comparison and differentiation 
of wide experience), genuine feeling, striving with persistence, accumu-
lation of inclusive data, lively imagination, solitary walks, concentrated 
7 4. Chapter IX~ Section 1~ a. 77. Ibid. 
75. Chapter IX~ Section 1, b. 78. Ibid. 
76. Chapter IX, Section 1, d. 79. Chapter IX, Section 1, e. 
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interest, sense of security, and freedom from interruption. 80 
Dr. Tsanoff regards as self-evident the relation of all values 
to personal experience. As regards the unique properties of wholes he 
largely ignores the problem. 81 
b. Tsanoff 1s Metaphysics. 
Tsamff rejects demonstrative consistency as the ideal of philo-
sophy; he declares himself for real, substantive, spontaneous creation 
at least in the realm of values. 82 . The logic of fixed classes and of 
quantitative relations is applicable in the field of natural science; 
on the other harrl he holds that in the field of value the creative pro-
cess alters reality thus an empirical, ex post facto description is 
required. B3 
The base of Tsanoff's philosophy is the totality of experience, 
hence, rational plus nonrational. The presupposition is held uncritically 
that he will come out with a conceptual, intellectual picture of reality. 84 
He does not conceive systematizing rationalistically as demonstrative, 
orderly deduction, but rather as creative insights, or as he calls them, 
integral views which symbolize in manifold ways the true nature of 
things. 85 
Tsanoff makes a vigorous attack on all absolutisn5 and eternalisms 
urging an evolving and creative principle in their place. 86 
In the absence of a working dynamic theory of personality, Tsanoff 1 s 
80. Chapter IX, Section 1, f. 
81. Chapter IX, Section 1, g. 
82. Chapter IX,, Section 2, a. 
83. Chapter IX, Section 2 11 b. 
84. Chapter IX, Section 2, c •. 
85. Chapter IX11 Section 2, d. 
86. Chapter IX, Section 2, e. 
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description of experience is stratified analytically rather than synthe-
sized functionally and organically. In this respect he is merely 
rationalistic.87 
In his dualism of material order and value order his cosmos is 
split between mechanistic determinism and creative enhancement of value. 
In the material order, so far as scanty references reveal his position, 
the causal sequence, i.e., necessity, reigns; not so in the value reaJm.88 
His philosophical -writings are centered so largely in vaiue theory 
that although his criterion is inclusive he has not expounded his reflec-
tions on his concept of nature and science. 89 Dr. Tsanoff rejects the 
a priori as a source of truth. 90 The metaphysical bifurcation of reality 
raises a question regarding knowledge of it in its different phases; but 
Tsanoff does not treat this difficulty. 91 He definitely indicates that 
the data for mental activity are empirical in source. 92 
All values are made relative to purposing, creative agents, thus 
awoiding both legalism and dogmatism. The criteria for perfection are 
quite hazy. 93 
Mind-body dualism is adopted by Tsanoff. His treatment of this 
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problem is almost exclusively analytic and unrelieved by the synthetic-
integrative application with which he typically approaches other problems.~ 
Tsanoff rejects the possibility of arriving at an all-inclusive 
formula or concept of reality which has any concretely objective meaning. 
87. Chapter lll, Section 2, g. 91. Chapter IX 
' 
Section 2, j. 
88. Chapter IX, Section 2, h. 92. Chapter JX, Section 2, 1. 
89. Chapter IX, Section 2, i. 93. Chapter IX, Section 2, m. 
90. Chapter IX, Section 2, k. 94. Chapter D:, Section 2, n. 
The only understanding mature reflection affords is a concept of the 
95 process. 
The aspiring and striving life of the individual who creates and 
expands values in the quest for perfection is no rationalistic abstraction; 
It is a clear challenge to evaluate properly the concrete experiences 
(in all their manifold relations) of persons, 96 
7, Additional Considerations 
The investigation of the problem, the process which has been in-
volved, and the results which have been obtained seem to warrant some 
additional observations important enough to be considered integrally a 
part of the investigation. 
a. The necessity of formulating the basic working definitions in the 
field of rationalism and rionrationalism has produced . a sensitivity to 
the philosophical implications of methodology which has proved most re-
warding. A developing methodological self-consciousness helps to reveal 
long encrusted prejudices and uncriticized assumptions. In the clamor 
of the forum there is too little of this kind of examination, but in an 
age when the forum has become almost a new Babel such a retreat for 
straightening out motives and means is very much in order, 
b. In one particular, the methodological sensitivity has reflected the 
tendency of method as instrument to be transformed into rigid formula 
ruthlessly applied, The examination of the history of this problem 
reveals a persuasive caution to the philosopher always to stand in humble 
95, Chapter IX , Section 2, o, 
96. Chapter ~' Section 2, p. 
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wonder before the infinite richness of exist~nce. The investigation has 
likevdse shown how easy it is to pay lip service to this qpen-minded seek-
ing attitude and to proceed uncritically uttering dogmatic dicta. 
c. The careful examination of the basic definitions and their char-
acteristics both in terms of method and of content provided a fairly sub-
stantial list of items which served throughout the study of individual 
philosophies as check-points for the process of investigation itself. 
vlhile it is not presumed that the list of points is exhaustive, the fact 
remains that .it stands at least as a series of guides in relatively un-
charted territory. The whole list of points may be subsumed under the 
general command to inclusiveness. There are hm'lever many who recognize 
the command who fail in its execution. It is one thing to be told to 
lubricate an automobile and to be furnished also a chart of points to be 
greased. The points in the list of means of insight, verification, and 
systematization stand in somewhat the same relation to the goal of in-
clusiveness as a lubrication chart does to a smoothly running mechanism. 
d. The method of investigation of follovfing the lead of this list of 
some of the characteristics of method and content ·in rational and non-
rational philosophy appeared in the process of the investigation to be 
genuinely fruitful. The method alerts the student to the key point likely 
to be at issue; it suggests typical interrelationships - all of which 
helps to point out inconsistency or significant contributions. In the 
investigation of the philosophies of classical and of contemporary time, 
the process helped direct attention to points of especial importance. 
e. :r.1ore specifically the investigation of the philosophies of Lovejoy 
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Hontague, and Tsanoff demonstrated that nonrational methods and charact-
eristics occupy a dominant role in these philosophies; a role of such 
preponderance generally that it appears to this investigator that it 
should be more widely recognized and examined both in the practice and 
the teaching of philosophy. There are here the first traces of a co-
herent and synoptic logic which further research and elaboration could 
give sUbstance and focus. Furthermore the major inadequac ~es which drew 
criticism in the course of the investigation were most generally blamed 
upon lack of the proper understanding of the nature or function of a 
nonrational method or characteristic. 
f. The examination of the nonrational herein has demonstrated that its 
content and method is a fulf illment of reason not its destruction. \'Jhere 
philosophy is still thought to be "queen of the sciences" , i:.e., devel-
oping wisdom regarding the totality of experience, it seems plainly the 
result of this study that the proper instrument of such a science is 
reason c.onceived in its fullest, not its restricted, and singularly 
partisan sense. 
g. The examination of the respective content of the rational and the 
nonrational produced a minimum set of criteria for an adequate synoptic 
philosophy. As the methodological question is resolved the next stage of 
thought is the projection of reconstruction. That task is not within the 
scope of this investigation. These criteria are,to some extent, familiar, 
but having examined the methodological question, the familiar factors 
become new in scintillating possibilities of further philosophical inves-
tigation. By such a process philosophy is transformed from merely an 
academic discipline into a meaningful synthesis of exper ience. 
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ABSTRACT 
Reason as the instrument of philosophy is under attack at the pre-
sent from the standpoint of psychology, critical philosophy, the experience 
of evil, science, and existentialism. Rationalism as deduction no longer 
is an adequate concept of reason. This dissertation investigates the 
nonrationalistic content of reason required to supplement deductive ration-
alism in order to develop a coherent and synoptic view of reason as 
the instrument of philosophy in current times. 
Mind is defined as the sum total of consciousness, with emphasis 
upon the unity of the self. 
Defmition of reason: Reason is defined as the relating, pattern-
ing, or systematizing and selecting function which renders experience com-
prehensible, coherent, and meaningful and directs the activity of the 
organism as well. 
Definition of rationalism: Rationalism is defined as the deductive 
reasoning, judging, or comprehending activity of the mind which aims at 
necessary propositions or methodology. 
Both mind and reason are conceived as basically individual. 
The reasonable is conceived as the coherent and systematic repre-
sentation of the true and as a:ny act of a person to modify the true in 
the direction of more coherent systematization of experience. In turn, 
the true is representation (conceptual or nonconceptual) in conformity 
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to the real including persons' participation, conceptually or otherwise, 
in the process of forming the real; from which it develops that Truth is 
the integration by a person of that representation and that participation. 
Theses regarding rationalism: 
l. The criterion of r ationalism is the system of principles in-
herent in the mental work of verifying its own efforts: deductive con-
sistency. 
2. The affinity of rationalism and mathematics is indicated in 
their joint applicability to quantitative relations extracted analyti-
cally and formulated explicitly. 
3. Rationalistic methodology is effective in: (a) demonstrating 
consistency among related propositions, (b) expressing analytic factor-
ing, (c) reasoning from acknowledged authority, and forming hypotheses 
for empirical testing, (d) systematizing what is present and known, (e) 
developing precise units of logical and grammatical construction, and 
(f) describing a status guo or at least self-enclosed situation. 
4. Rationalistic methodology is inadequate in: (a) claiming 
absolute certainty about material truth, (b) producing insight in pro-
blem situations wit hout appealing beyond itself to empirical data, 
(c) dealing with degrees of probability except in cases of precise 
mathematical frequency, (d) escaping the circle of the given, i.e., that 
which is actually present in thought, (e) drawing knowledge beliefs 
into attention to stimulate systematization, and (f) discovering or 
demonstrating the unique properties of wholes or evolutionary develop-
ment within experience. 
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5. Rationalistic philosophy is characterized by: (a) a pattern 
of necessity in interpreta.tion, (b) conservatism in respect to selec-
tion, verification, and systematization of data, (c) a mechanical, 
static, metaphysical system, (d) a presupposition of similarity between 
realms of objects and ideas, (e) mind-body dualism and a faculty 
psychology, (f) a priori propositions, (g) dogmatic and legalistic 
ethics, and (h) an all-inclusive formula often over-extended at the 
expense of the content of experience. 
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Nonrational philosophical methodology is herein conceived to be that 
group of techniques in philosophy other than purely deductive which yet 
uphold the validity of reason as the primary instrument of philosophy. 
The ascription 11 nonrational11 would be applied to facts or data 
judged to be excluded from a strictly demonstrative, deductive system 
of thought. 
The classification of nonrational methodology is presented in 
view of the functional stages of philosophic thought: insight, verifi-
cation, and relations. 
Theses regarding nonrationalism: 
1. The principal nonrational sources of insight are: (a) empirical 
induction, (b) prestige authoritarianism, (c) specific revelation, (~) 
sign-reading, (e) trial and error, accident, intuition or "hunch", and 
elimination of alternatives by testing, (f) attention, interest, and 
concern, (g) nonrational faculties, (h) sensitivity to empirical novelty, 
(i) evolutionism, (j) empirical coherence, and (k) a normative concept 
of personality. 
2. The principal nonrational criteria for verification are: (a) 
induction, (b) prestige authoritarianism, (c) specific revelation, 
(d) emotional certitude, (e) satisfaction of human need, (f) will to 
believe, (g) appeal to practical consequences, (h) positivism, and (i) 
empirical coherence. 
3. At the stage of relation, nonrational methodology emphasizes: 
(a) respect for differences, (b) respect for the unique experiential 
wholeness of personality., (c) attention to the phenomenon of organic 
growth and evolutionary development in individual experience and in 
history, (d) a native dialectic in thought alternating between whole con-
cepts and attempted rationalistic demonstration, (e) that faith, 
aspiration, and ethical values are sometimes achieved only by trans-
cending conceptual formulation by moving over into acts of the will. 
4. In all three stages of thought, these factors of nonrational-
ism are not alternatives to nor contradictions to rationalistic philo-
sophical methodology, but rather are complementary and fruitional con-
siderations. 
5. The nonrationalistic criteria do exclude the rationalistic 
claims for necessity, absolute certainty, absolute comprehensiveness, 
and eternil_:,.alidity. 
6. Nonrationalism itself, as a supplement to rationalism, does 
not produce a distinctive system, but the combination of rationalism and 
nonrationalism points toward a genuinely synoptic and coherent theory 
of reason. 
The synoptic procedure seems to require: (a) The tools of reason 
must be treated as tools n6t as ends. (Safeguards in maintaining this 
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status are a conviction of the non-illusoriness of faith, humility of 
reason, belief in the infinity of God's challenge to man's progress, and 
passionate interest involving ethical commitment.) (b) Philosophy must 
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be true to and inclusive of the data of experience. (c) The systematiz-
ing process must be at least reasonable, but not all judgments regarding 
partial contexts are necessarily absolutely consistent with all other 
judgments in other contexts. (d) Abstraction and over-simplification will 
be avoided. (e) The analytic-snythetic alternation between parts and 
wholes must be practiced constantly not only in thought but also in conduct. 
The foregoing research is the basis and instrument for investi-
gating the philosophies of Lovejoy, Montague, and Tsanoff which inves-
tigation is aimed not so much at a general critique of those philosophies 
as a critical review of their rational and nonrational components. 
Theses regarding Lovejoy's philosophy: 
1. Lovejoy depends completely upon empirical data for his phil-
osophy, but stringently limits to public objects the data with which he 
believes philosophy should deal. 
2. Lovejoy's philosophic method is almost exclusively analytic 
and deductive (the logic of partes extra partes). Induction plays a 
minor role and he does not attempt a synoptic or coherent principle. 
3. The temporalistic metaphysics is based upon a self-evident 
principle which is treated as a nonrational datum without attempting to 
develop a dynamic interpretation. The presence of the nonrational 
prescribes the impossibility of demonstrative certainty, necessity, 
eternalism, or consistency. 
4. Lovejoy's philosophy recognizes wholes of logical classes, 
not synoptic or organic wholes. 
5. As a consequence of 1, above, Professor Lovejoy has not developed 
a psychology of the self, having paid little attention to the person who 
philosophizes or experiments. 
6. In failing to develop a synthetic treatment of data or method-
ology he fails to achieve a systematic, synoptic, and coherent view of 
the totality of experience. 
Theses regarding Montague 1 s philosophy: 
1. Montague proposes a broadly inclusive theory of the validity 
of the various sources of data and appropriate means of dealing with 
each: authoritarianism for non-present data, rationalism for abstract 
and commensurable relations, intuitionism for primary values, empiri-
cism for particular facts, pragmatism for human action, and skepticism 
for defense against a priori necessity. 
2. 1-'Iontague does not propose any synthesis by which these method-
ologies may be integrated when data are interrelated as they are in all 
experience. Lacking such a synthesis his treatment of data remains 
primarily analytic and his criteria are jointly inclusiveness and con-
sistency. His persistent analytic method neglects the interrelationship 
of classes of data. 
3. Montague proposes a dialectic of a semi-Hegelian type in his 
inductive-deductive cycle consisting of': experience, comparison, de-
monstration of hypotheses, and empirical verification. 
4. A basic nonrationality in being is described by Montague in 
his understanding of the imperfect "compossibility" of being. 
5. Montague is preoccupied with realistic epistemology and he 
neglects the role of the self as will, although his later writings 
- ·- -·-------- --------------
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indicate . he has moved over toward at least the possibility of a cosmic 
self as a finite God. 
Theses regarding Tsanoff's philosophy: 
1. Tsanoff conceives that all data for philosophic treatment arise 
in experience. While the standard of his method is genuinely inclusive 
he has not developed a philosophy of science or of nature. 
2. Being and reality are described by Tsanoff in terms of levels, 
of which matter and mind are the primary differentiations. Viewing 
reality including all values in levels of accomplishment is Tsanoff 's 
basis for analytic demonstration in rationalistic terms. 
3. Viewing philosophy as understandable only in terms of personal 
experience, Tsanoff sees that persons are the agents by which an abstract 
potentiality of infinite perfection is gradually transformed into actual-
ity. He believes persons function creatively, not being predetermined 
in the direction of their perfectibility. 
4. Tsanoff proposes a synoptic criterion of the true including 
pragmatic, intellectually clarifying, and personally stimulating factors. 
5. The combination (rational and nonrational, #2 an:l #3 above) 
philosophy is incomplete in two important respects: (a) it lacks a 
developed philosophy of science and nature and (b) it lacks a precise 
formulation of the nature of persons as agents of creative reality. 
The investigation of the problem of basic methodology in relation 
to the rational and nonrational and the analysis of the philosophies of 
Lovejoy, Montague, and Tsanoff in accordance with the characteristics 
developed has led to the following conclusions: (a) a demonstration of 
the importance of sensitivity to and self"""(:onsciousness regarding the 
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il'ill'lications of methodology for philosophy, {b) a caution against 
transforming methodology into rigid procedure in philosophy, {c) a check-
list which guides attention to factors otherwise easily overlooked in 
philosophical judgment, (d) a pragmatically fruitful investigation de-
monstrated in the philosophies of Lovejoy, Montague, and Tsanoff, {e) 
a demonstration of the importance of nonrational components in method 
arrl content of these three contemporary philosophies, arrl (f) an expanded 
concept of reason in which nonrational factors do not contradict but 
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